A dispute against the English-popish ceremonies, obtruded upon the Church of Scotland Wherein not…A dispute against the English-popish ceremonies, obtruded vpon the Church of Scotland Wherein not…

Thus shall my Position stand good, namely, that those individual Sect. IV actions which the D. calleth necessary, because their species is commanded of God, and those individual actions which he calleth indifferent, because their species is not commanded, both being considered quo ad inviduum; the former hath no other remunerable good in them, then the latter; and the whole remunerable good which is in either of them, standeth only in adjecto modo. Which being so, it is all one, when we speak of any individual morall action quo ad individuum, whether we say that it is good, or that it is remunerable and laudable, both are one. For as is well said by ^hAquinas, necessarium est omnem actum hominis, ut bonum vel malum, culpabilis vel laudabilis rationem habere. And againe. Nihil enim est aliud laudari vel culpari, quam imputari alicui malitiam vel bonitatem sui actus. Wherefore that distinction of a twofold goodness, causans and concomitans, which the D. hath given us, hath no use in this question, because every action is laudable and remunerable, which is morally good, whether it be necessary or not. Now moral goodness ⁱsaith Scaliger, est perfectio actus cum recta ratione. Humane morall actions are called good or evil, in ordine ad rationem, quae est proprium principium humanorum actuum, saith ^kAquinas, thereupon inferring, that illi mores dieuntur boni, qui rationi congruunt: mali autem, qui à ratione discordant. D. Forbesse doth therefore pervert the question, whiles he ^lsaith, in hac cum fratribus quaestione, hoc bonum est quod necessarium. Nay, those actions we call morally good, which are agreeable to right reason, whether they be necessary, or not. Since then, those actions are laudable and remunerable, which are morally good; and those are morally good which are agreeable to right reason: it followeth, that forasmuch as those actions which the D. calleth indifferent, are agreeable to right reason, they are therefore not only morally good, but also laudable and remunerable, & so not indifferent. Yea those actions which he calleth necessary, beeing considered quo ad individuum, are no otherwise laudable and remunerable, then those which he calleth indifferent, being considered in like manner quo ad individuum, as hath been showed.