A dispute against the English-popish ceremonies, obtruded upon the Church of Scotland Wherein not…A dispute against the English-popish ceremonies, obtruded vpon the Church of Scotland Wherein not…

2. As for those actions which proceed from the deliberation of reason, howbeit many of them be indifferent quo ad speciem, yet none of them is, nor can be indifferent quo ad individuum. The reason of this difference and distinction is, ^xbecause every action hath it's species or kind from the object; and a humane moral action, hath it's species or kind, from the object referred to the original of humane actions, which is reason. Whereupon it cometh, that if the object of the action include something that agreeth to the order of reason, it shall be a good action, according to it's kind: for example, to give alms to an indigent man. But if it include something that is repugnant to the order of reason, it shall be an evil action according to it's kind; as, to steal or take away another mans goods. Now sometimes it happeneth, that the object of an action doth not include something that belongeth to the order of reason; as, to lift a straw from the ground, to go to the field &c. such actions are indifferent, according to their kind. But we must pronounce far otherwise of them, when we speak of them quo ad individuum, because as they are individuated by their circumstances, so in their individual being, they have their goodness or badness from the same circumstances, as hath been showed. So that no such action as is deliberated upon, can bee indifferent quo ad individuum; because oportet saith ^yThomas quod quilibet individualis actus habeat aliquam circumstantiam, per quam trahetur ad bonum, vel malum, ad minus ex parte intentionis finis.

2. As for those actions which proceed from the deliberation of reason, howbeit many of them be indifferent quo ad speciem, yet none of them is, nor can be indifferent quo ad individuum. The reason of this difference and distinction is, ^xbecause every action hath it's species or kinde from the object; and a humane morall action, hath it's species or kind, from the object referred to the originall of humane actions, which is reason. Whereupon it commeth, that if the object of the action include something that agreeth to the order of reason, it shall be a good action, according to it's kind: for example, to give almes to an indigent man. But if it include something that is repugnant to the order of reason, it shall be an evill action according to it's kind; as, to steale or take away another mans goods. Now sometimes it happeneth, that the object of an action doth not include something that belongeth to the order of reason; as, to lift a strave from the ground, to goe to the field &c. such actions are indifferent, according to their kinde. But we must pronounce farre otherwise of them, when wee speake of them quo ad individuum, because as they are individuated by their circumstances, so in their individuall beeing, they have their goodnesse or badnesse from the same circumstances, as hath been shewed. So that no such action as is deliberated upon, can bee indifferent quo ad individuum; because oportet saith