A09365:1273
The Whole Treatise of the Cases of Conscience
The whole treatise of the cases of conscience distinguished into three books: the first whereof is revised and corrected in sundry places, and the other two annexed. Taught and delivered by M. W. Perkins in his holy-day lectures, carefully examined by his own briefs, and now published together for the common good, by T. Pickering Bachelor of Divinity. Whereunto is adjoined a twofold table: one of the heads and number of the questions propounded and resolved; another of the principal texts of Scripture which are either explained, or vindicated from corrupt interpretation.The whole treatise of the cases of conscience distinguished into three bookes: the first whereof is revised and corrected in sundrie places, and the other two annexed. Taught and deliuered by M. W. Perkins in his holy-day lectures, carefully examined by his owne briefes, and now published together for the common good, by T. Pickering Bachelour of Diuinitie. Whereunto is adioyned a twofold table: one of the heads and number of the questions propounded and resolued; another of the principall texts of Scripture vvhich are either explaned, or vindicated from corrupt interpretation.
Cambridge: printed by John Legat, 1606Cambridge: printed by Iohn Legat, 1606
Modern spelling is a reading aid: the words are the author’s, only the spelling is modernized. Original shows the page as printed, with the transcription marks.
Secondly, Fasting of it self, is a thing indifferent, neither good nor evil. For though it be referred to a religious end, which is the ⟨p. 437⟩humbling of the soul; yet it is not good in it self, but only in regard of the end. Neither is it any part of Gods worship, being so referred; but only a prop and furtherance, serving (in the right use thereof) to make a man more fit for the duties of Gods service.
Secondly, Fasting of it selfe, is a thing indifferent, neither good nor euill. For though it be referred to a religious end, which is the ⟨p. 437⟩humbling of the soule; yet it is not good in it selfe, but onely in regard of the end. Neither is it any part of Gods worshippe, beeing so referred; but only a proppe and furtherance, seruing (in the right vse thereof) to make a man more fit for the duties of Gods seruice.
Thirdly, these ends if they be well considered, cannot be the true ends of fasting, as will appear by this example. A beggar at our doors, entreats an alms, we give it, and he receives it. But will any man say, that by begging he doth merit or deserve his alms? In like manner we are all beggars, that have nothing of our own, neither food nor raiment, nor any other blessing we do enjoy, but all we have, cometh unto us only from God. Well, upon just occasion we give our selves to fasting, we pray earnestly unto him for mercy, in the pardon of our sins. In this case, is it not great madness to think, that we by begging mercy can merit mercy at the hands of God? But prayer (saith the Papist) as it is prayer, merits nothing, but as it is a good work. Ans. Prayer as it is a good work, is no other then begging; and then it is unpossible, that it should be meritorious, unless it be granted, that begging is meritorious, which cannot be.
Thirdly, these ends if they be well considered, cannot be the true ends of fasting, as will appeare by this example. A begger at our doores, entreats an almes, we giue it, and he receiues it. But will any man say, that by begging he doth merit or deserue his almes? In like manner we are all beggers, that haue nothing of our owne, neither food nor raiment, nor any other blessing we doe inioy, but all we haue, commeth vnto vs onely from God. Well, vpon iust occasion we giue our selues to fasting, we pray earnestly vnto him for mercie, in the pardon of our sinnes. In this case, is it not great madnesse to thinke, that we by begging mercie can merit mercie at the hands of God? But praier (saith the Papist) as it is praier, merits nothing, but as it is a good worke. Ans. Praier as it is a good worke, is no other then begging; and then it is vnpossible, that it should be meritorious, vnlesse it be granted, that begging is meritorious, which cannot be.