A09386:131
A C[hristian] and [plain]e treatise of the manner and order of predestination and of…
A C[hristian] and [plain]e treatise of the manner and order of predestination and of the largeness of Gods grace. First written in Latin by that reverend and faithful servant of God, Master William Perkins, late preacher of the word in Cambridge. And carefully translated into English by Francis Cacot, and Thomas Tuke.A C[hristian] and [plain]e treatise of the manner and order of predestination and of the largenes of Gods grace. First written in Latine by that reuerend and faithfull seruant of God, Master William Perkins, late preacher of the word in Cambridge. And carefully translated into English by Francis Cacot, and Thomas Tuke.
London: printed by F. Kingston for William Welby and Martin Clarke, 1606
Title page typeset from the transcription.
Modern spelling is a reading aid: the words are the author’s, only the spelling is modernized. Original shows the page as printed, with the transcription marks.
Secondly they use to object, that God willeth things contrary, if he will that that should come to pass which he forbiddeth in his law. Answer. It is true indeed, if he should will one and the same thing to come to pass and not to come to pass in one and the same respect and manner: but God forbiddeth evil as it is evil, and willeth it to come to pass as it hath respect unto good. Hereupon Aquinas saith, That evil be and that evil be not, are contradictorily opposed; but that 1God willeth evil to be, and that God willeth evil not to be, are not contradictorily opposed, seeing both are affirmative.
Secondly they vse to obiect, that God willeth things contrarie, if hee will that that should come to passe which hee forbiddeth in his law. Answer. It is true indeed, if he should will one and the same thing to come to passe and not to come to passe in one and the same respect and manner: but God forbiddeth euill as it is euill, and willeth it to come to passe as it hath respect vnto good. Heereupon Aquinas saith, That euill be and that euill bee not, are contradictorilie opposed; but that 1God willeth euill to be, and that God willeth euill not to be, are not contradictorily opposed, seeing both are affirmatiue.
- 1Sum. q. 9. art. 9.Summ. q. 9. art. 9.
Thirdly, they object thus: That thing which being granted, another thing necessarily followeth, is the cause of that ⟨p. 56⟩self same thing that doth follow; but this being granted that God willed the fall of Adam to come to pass, the same came to pass necessarily and infallibly. Therefore the will of God was in this respect the cause of sin. Whereto I answer, that the first proposition of this argument is not general, for in admitting the creation of the world, both the place and the time or continuance thereof are infallibly and without doubt also to be admitted, and yet the creation of the world is not the cause of the continuance thereof, and of the place, where it now consisteth. And that this proposition may be true, it is thus to be framed: That thing which being granted, another thing infallibly followeth (no other cause coming between) is the cause of the very same thing that followeth. And the second proposition also fitted to this former is untrue. For this being granted that God willeth sin to happen, sin shall not come to pass immediately, but by the means of mans free will; & although it come to pass infallibly on Gods part which decreeth it, yet it comes to pass freely on mans part, for it had been possible