Moreover, the self same necessity followeth ⟨p. 77⟩of their hypothesis, who affirm a bare permission. For that which God permitteth, the self same thing will he not hinder▪ and evil, if God hinder not, cannot be avoided: and that which cannot be avoided, shall come to pass infallibly. And therefore evil, permission being once granted, of necessity cometh to pass, although most freely on mans part. Whereupon it is plain, that the decree of God is not more inevitable, than is the very permission separated from the decree. I do wish that they would well weigh and consider this, who object unto us either the Stoical fate, or the dosages of the Manichees. For we differ from them as much in certain judgement & opinion, as whosoever do differ most. For first, the Stoics do tie God unto the second causes, so that he cannot do otherwise, then the nature of them will suffer: we on the other side, do hold that all second causes do depend upon and are ordered by God. Secondly, the Stoics say, that neither God nor second causes can do otherwise by their nature than they do: we say that some second causes, are by Gods ⟨p. 78⟩ordinance mutable, othersome immutable; and that God himself, can either not do, that which he doth, or else do it otherwise. But now to come to the Manichees, who make two coeternal gods; we but one. They of their two Gods, make one good, and another evil: we say, that there is one absolutely good & just God. Thirdly, they will have one of their Gods to be the cause and worker of good things, and the other of evil: we make one true God the creator and ruler of all things, and working nothing but that which is most good and most just. Fourthly, they say that they which are created by their good God cannot sin: we say, that God doth most freely convert whom he will, and when they are converted, they can never in this life perfectly be free from sins, but do sometimes run into such sins, as do grievously wound the conscience. Fifthly, they say, that they that are created by the evil God simply cannot be converted: we say, that unclean spirits and men were created both good and holy, but yet they fell by their own will and fault, and not by any fault but the just ⟨p. 79⟩permission of the Creator, and brought upon themselves a necessity of sinning.
Moreouer, the selfe same necessitie followeth ⟨p. 77⟩of their hypothesis, who affirme a bare permission. For that which God permitteth, the selfe same thing will hee not hinder▪ and euill, if God hinder not, cannot bee auoyded: and that which cannot be auoyded, shall come to passe infallibly. And therfore euill, permission being once graunted, of necessitie cōmeth to passe, although most freely on mans part. Whereupon it is plaine, that the decree of God is not more ineuitable, than is the very permission separated from the decree. I doe wish that they would well weigh and cō sider this, who obiect vnto vs either the Stoicall fate, or the do•ages of the Manichees. For we differ from them as much in certaine iudgement & opinion, as whosoeuer doe differ most. For first, the Stoickes doe tie God vnto the second causes, so that he cannot doe otherwise, then the nature of them will suffer: wee on the other side, doe hold that all second causes do depend vpon and are ordered by God. Secondly, the Stoickes say, that neither God nor second causes can doe otherwise by their nature than they doe: wee say that some second causes, are by Gods ⟨p. 78⟩ordinance mutable, othersome immutable; and that God himselfe, can either not doe, that which hee doth, or else doe it otherwise. But now to come to the Manichees, who make two coeternall gods; we but one. They of their two Gods, make one good, and another euill: we say, that there is one absolutely good & iust God. Thirdly, they wil haue one of their Gods to bee the cause and worker of good things, and the other of euil: we make one true God the creatour and ruler of all things, and working nothing but that which is most good and most iust. Fourthly, they say that they which are created by their good God cannot sinne: we say, that God doth most freely conuert whom hee will, and when they are conuerted, they can neuer in this life perfectly be free frō sinnes, but doe sometimes run into such sinnes, as doe grieuously wound the conscience. Fiftly, they say, that they that are created by the euil God simply cannot be conuerted: wee say, that vncleane spirites and men were created both good and holy, but yet they fell by their owne will and fault, and not by any fault but the iust ⟨p. 79⟩permission of the Creatour, and brought vpon themselues a necessitie of sinning.