A09386:132
A C[hristian] and [plain]e treatise of the manner and order of predestination and of…
A C[hristian] and [plain]e treatise of the manner and order of predestination and of the largeness of Gods grace. First written in Latin by that reverend and faithful servant of God, Master William Perkins, late preacher of the word in Cambridge. And carefully translated into English by Francis Cacot, and Thomas Tuke.A C[hristian] and [plain]e treatise of the manner and order of predestination and of the largenes of Gods grace. First written in Latine by that reuerend and faithfull seruant of God, Master William Perkins, late preacher of the word in Cambridge. And carefully translated into English by Francis Cacot, and Thomas Tuke.
London: printed by F. Kingston for William Welby and Martin Clarke, 1606
Title page typeset from the transcription.
Modern spelling is a reading aid: the words are the author’s, only the spelling is modernized. Original shows the page as printed, with the transcription marks.
Thirdly, they object thus: That thing which being granted, another thing necessarily followeth, is the cause of that ⟨p. 56⟩self same thing that doth follow; but this being granted that God willed the fall of Adam to come to pass, the same came to pass necessarily and infallibly. Therefore the will of God was in this respect the cause of sin. Whereto I answer, that the first proposition of this argument is not general, for in admitting the creation of the world, both the place and the time or continuance thereof are infallibly and without doubt also to be admitted, and yet the creation of the world is not the cause of the continuance thereof, and of the place, where it now consisteth. And that this proposition may be true, it is thus to be framed: That thing which being granted, another thing infallibly followeth (no other cause coming between) is the cause of the very same thing that followeth. And the second proposition also fitted to this former is untrue. For this being granted that God willeth sin to happen, sin shall not come to pass immediately, but by the means of mans free will; & although it come to pass infallibly on Gods part which decreeth it, yet it comes to pass freely on mans part, for it had been possible ⟨p. 57⟩for man not to have sinned when he did sin if he had would. As may appear by this Similitude. God forsaketh man by not conferring and bestowing on him necessary and sufficient help for the avoiding of sins; now man being forsaken by him, sinneth necessarily; And yet the fault is not to be laid on God, because that in this his forsaking him the will of man cometh between. For God forsaketh man being willing to be forsaken, and not against his will and mind.
Thirdly, they obiect thus: That thing which being graunted, another thing necessarilie followeth, is the cause of that ⟨p. 56⟩selfe same thing that doth follow; but this being granted that God willed the fall of Adam to come to passe, the same came to passe necessarily and infallibly. Therfore the will of God was in this respect the cause of sinne. Whereto I answere, that the first proposition of this argument is not generall, for in admitting the creation of the world, both the place and the time or continuance thereof are infallibly and without doubt also to bee admitted, and yet the creation of the world is not the cause of the continuance thereof, and of the place, where it now consisteth. And that this proposition may be true, it is thus to be framed: That thing which being granted, another thing infallibly followeth (no other cause comming betweene) is the cause of the very same thing that followeth. And the second proposition also sitted to this former is vntrue. For this being granted that God willeth sin to happen, sin shall not come to passe immediatly, but by the meanes of mans free wil; & although it come to passe infallibly on Gods part which decreeth it, yet it comes to passe freely on mans part, for it had been possible