A09386:134
A C[hristian] and [plain]e treatise of the manner and order of predestination and of…
A C[hristian] and [plain]e treatise of the manner and order of predestination and of the largeness of Gods grace. First written in Latin by that reverend and faithful servant of God, Master William Perkins, late preacher of the word in Cambridge. And carefully translated into English by Francis Cacot, and Thomas Tuke.A C[hristian] and [plain]e treatise of the manner and order of predestination and of the largenes of Gods grace. First written in Latine by that reuerend and faithfull seruant of God, Master William Perkins, late preacher of the word in Cambridge. And carefully translated into English by Francis Cacot, and Thomas Tuke.
London: printed by F. Kingston for William Welby and Martin Clarke, 1606
Title page typeset from the transcription.
Modern spelling is a reading aid: the words are the author’s, only the spelling is modernized. Original shows the page as printed, with the transcription marks.
Again it is objected. He that saith that the decree of God is the energetical operative beginning of all things, necessarily maketh the decree of God, the beginning also of sin. Whereunto I answer, That the holy Ghost himself saith that the decree of God is the beginning of all things being and existent; Eph. I. cap. II. verse: God worketh all things after the counsel of his own will. And again in the 17. of the Acts, In him we live, we move, and have our being. Augustine saith: The will of God is the very cause of all things which are. Hugo 1de S. Vict. saith: There is no cause of the will of God, which is the cause of all things. And this very thing common reason will teach us, because there must first some certain ground be laid, from whence every thing should have or take the being and existence thereof; and this ground is even the very will of God. For a thing is not first, and then afterward God willeth it to come to pass; but, because God hath decreed that a thing should come to pass, ⟨p. 59⟩or be done, therefore it is; And yet shall not God therefore be the cause of sin: because sin is not properly a thing, action, or being, but a defect only: and yet nevertheless it is not therefore nothing. For whatsoever hath a being, is either 2Really and positively, or else in Reason only. And under those things which are in Reason, are contained not only notions and relations, but also privations: because they have not a real matter and form out of the understanding. But sin hath not a positive and real being, & yet it hath a being in Reason (as they terre it.) For so far forth it is in the nature of things being, as it may cause a true composition in the mind: and although it do not exist positively, that is, by matter, or form created; yet it is privatively: because 3that by the remove or taking away of original righteousness, that doth immediately and truly follow and exist. Neither doth it follow, as some other natural habit, or as a pure negation, but as a certain thing between both, that is, a want and absence of the contrary good.