A09918:36
An evident display of Popish practises, or patched Pelagianism Wherein is mightily cleared the…An euident display of Popish practises, or patched Pelagianisme Wherein is mightelie cleared the…
An evident display of Popish practises, or patched Pelagianism Wherein is mightily cleared the sovereign truth of Gods eternal predestination, the staid groundwork of our most assured safety by Christ. Written in Latin by that reverend father, master Theodore Beza, and now lately Englished by VV.H. preacher of the Gospel.An euident display of Popish practises, or patched Pelagianisme Wherein is mightelie cleared the soueraigne truth of Gods eternall predestination, the stayd groundworke of oure most assured safetie by Christ. Written in Latin by that reuerend father, mayster Theodore Beza, and now lately Englished by VV.H. preacher of the Gospell.
London: printed by Ralph Newberie, 1578
Modern spelling is a reading aid: the words are the author’s, only the spelling is modernized. Original shows the page as printed, with the transcription marks.
We therefore do in deed confess with Paul that all things are done by purpose of the Divine will, that whom he will before they be borne, or ever they have done either good or evil, he either loveth or hateth: and therefore in his time either pitieth or hardeneth: but we add this, that this notwithstanding, there is no injustice with God, that he which doth so decree these things, doth notwithstanding that which is altogether righteous. And this we prove by many reasons. First because that the will of God is the sovereign rule of Justice: neither is it a good consequent that that is unjust, because mans reason seeth no cause of such Justice. For what? doth not the sun shine, because the blind is still in darkness? Again, we say they deal foolishly, who hold that any thing is good in it self before God will have it so: seeing that contrarily, it is requisite that God will anything to be just before it can be so. For the will of God dependeth not of the quality of things: but the contrary, the quality of things by order of causes doth follow the will of God. Thirdly we add also that in such decree whereby God from the beginning determined whatsoever vassals of his wrath he would, that the execution of his purpose must be distinguished from the purpose it self, that is the purpose of rejecting from damnation. We understand no other cause of the purpose ⟨p. 11⟩than the very will of GOD, which can not be but altogether most just, albeit the blind wisdom of the flesh thinketh otherwise. But the causes of execution, that is damnation, the Lord hath plentifully and plainly showed us, even the voluntary corruption of Adam derived unto us, and the fruits of that corruption. But here again mans reason enforceth it self. Whence (saith it) be the causes of this damnation? have they so come to pass against the will of GOD? no forsooth: for then he should not be Almighty. Therefore with his will, for he doth not suffer unwillingly, and that is the opinion of Epicures, to ordain a careless foreknowledge of GOD, which is easily overthrown by infinite testimonies of Scripture.
We therefore doe in déede confesse with Paule that al things are done by purpose of the Deuine will, that whome he will before they be borne, or euer they haue done eyther good or euill, he eyther loueth or hateth: and therefore in his time eyther pitieth or hardeneth: but we adde this, that this notwithstanding, there is no iniustice with God, that he whiche dothe so decrée these things, dothe notwithstandying that whiche is altogither rightuous. And this we proue by many reasons. Firste bycause that the will of God is the soueraigne rule of Iustice: neyther is it a good consequent that that is vniust, bycause mans reason seeth no cause of such Iustice. For what? doth not the sunne shyne, bicause the blinde is still in darkenesse? Againe, we say they deale foolishly, who holde that any thing is good in it selfe before God will haue it so: seyng that contrarily, it is requisite that God will anything to be iuste before it can be so. For the will of God dependeth not of the qualitie of things: but the contrary, the qualitie of things by order of causes doth folowe the will of God. Thirdly wée adde also that in suche decrée whereby God from the beginnyng determined whatsoeuer vassals of his wrath he woulde, that the execution of his purpose muste be distinguished from the purpose it selfe, that is the purpose of reiectyng from damnation. Wée vnderstande no other cause of the purpose