A14095:101
A discovery of D. Jacksons vanity. Or A perspective glass, whereby the admirers of…A discovery of D. Iacksons vanitie. Or A perspective glasse, wherby the admirers of…
A discovery of D. Jacksons vanity. Or A perspective glass, whereby the admirers of D. Jacksons profound discourses, may see the vanity and weakness of them, in sundry passages, and especially so far as they tend to the undermining of the doctrine hitherto received. Written by William Twice, Doctor of Divinity, as they say, from whom the copy came to the pressA discovery of D. Iacksons vanitie. Or A perspective glasse, wherby the admirers of D. Iacksons profound discourses, may see the vanitie and weaknesse of them, in sundry passages, and especially so farre as they tende to the undermining of the doctrine hitherto received. Written by William Twisse, Doctor of Divinitie, as they say, from whom the copie came to the presse
Amsterdam: printed by the successors of Giles Thorp, 1631
Modern spelling is a reading aid: the words are the author’s, only the spelling is modernized. Original shows the page as printed, with the transcription marks.
5. That Principle Omnia unum sunt, was the position of Melisus as well as of Parmenides. And though Simplicius doth not double with you (for why should you suspect that, especially seeing any man may err and misreport another's opinion without doubling); but though he erred not, and Parmenides indeed acknowledged distinction (and no other likelihood but he did), yet this is far from justifying that mystical interpretation which you make of Parmenides his meaning: although you positively deliver that Parmenides meant the same that Plato did, to wit that Multitude of things visible is but the multiplied shadow of invisible independent unity. He spake Poetically, you Figuratively; which kind of discourse, as I remember, Aristotle sometimes reprehended in Empedocles. But surely, either you mistake, or I; who rather think that saying to be delivered in respect of the matter, wherehence all things are derived; and not in respect of the Agent, who derives them. Sure I am, it may as naturally signify respect to the matter, as to the Agent; yea and much more, and that for two reasons. First, because the matter whereof every thing consists, is of the essence thereof, so is not the Agent. Secondly because all other things, besides the matter, came from the matter, in their opinion, but all other things besides the Agent, came not from the Agent. For the matter it self, in their opinion, proceeded not from the Agent, but was as eternal, as God himself. Nay nor all other things, besides the matter, came from the Agent; but some as it were in spite of the Agent, being overruled with the untoward lines of the matter, as your self but a little before professed to be the opinion of the Stoics. In Gods essence is only his own being formally, ours virtually and eminently, in as much as God can produce it, and exemplarily also, but that, I confess, is something mysterious unto me, save that I conceive, it respecteth his understanding, like as to be in him virtually, respecteth his power. And I doubt ⟨p. 65⟩not, but that the essence of God doth represent unto him, all natures possible.
5. That Principle Omnia unum sunt, was the position of Melisus as well as of Parmenides. And thoughe Simplicius dothe not double with you (for why shoulde you suspect that, especially seinge any man may erre and misreport anothers opinion without doublinge); but thoughe he erred not, and Parmenides indeede acknowledged distinction (and no other liklihood but he did), yet this is farre from justifyinge that mysticall interpretation which you make of Parmenides his meaninge: allthoughe you positively deliver that Parmenides meant the same that Plato did, to witt that Multitude of thinges visible is but the multiplyed shadowe of invisible independent unitie. He spake Poetically, you Figuratively; which kinde of discourse, as I remember, Aristotle sometimes reprehended in Empedocles. But surely, eyther you mistake, or I; who rather thinke that sayinge to be delivered in respect of the matter, wherehence all thinges are derived; and not in respect of the Agent, who derives them. Sure I am, it may as naturally signifie respect to the matter, as to the Agent; yea and much more, and that for two reasons. First, because the matter wherof every thiing consists, is of the essence therof, so is not the Agent. Secondly because all other thinges, besides the matter, came from the matter, in their opinion, but all other thinges besides the Agent, came not from the Agent. For the matter it selfe, in their opinion, proceeded not from the Agent, but was as eternall, as God himselfe. Nay nor all other thinges, besides the matter, came from the Agent; but some as it were in spight of the Agent, being overruled with the untoward lines of the matter, as your selfe but a litle before professed to be the opinion of the Stoicks. In Gods essence is only his owne being formally, ours vertually and eminently, in as much as God can produce it, and exemplarily allso, but that, I confesse, is somethinge mysterious unto me, save that I conceave, it respecteth his understandinge, like as to be in him vertually, respectethe his power. And I doubt