A14095:114
A discovery of D. Jacksons vanity. Or A perspective glass, whereby the admirers of…A discovery of D. Iacksons vanitie. Or A perspective glasse, wherby the admirers of…
A discovery of D. Jacksons vanity. Or A perspective glass, whereby the admirers of D. Jacksons profound discourses, may see the vanity and weakness of them, in sundry passages, and especially so far as they tend to the undermining of the doctrine hitherto received. Written by William Twice, Doctor of Divinity, as they say, from whom the copy came to the pressA discovery of D. Iacksons vanitie. Or A perspective glasse, wherby the admirers of D. Iacksons profound discourses, may see the vanitie and weaknesse of them, in sundry passages, and especially so farre as they tende to the undermining of the doctrine hitherto received. Written by William Twisse, Doctor of Divinitie, as they say, from whom the copie came to the presse
Amsterdam: printed by the successors of Giles Thorp, 1631
Modern spelling is a reading aid: the words are the author’s, only the spelling is modernized. Original shows the page as printed, with the transcription marks.
4. I see no cause for this distinction of yours, concerning Ideal perfections, & internal perfections. For if you understand ideal perfections of perfections external and possible to be created by God, but from everlasting represented unto God by his essence; there is no cause why you should exclude the plurality of these from the essence of God. For what Divine can doubt, but that as the perfections of created things are many, so they are all known by God, and from everlasting were represented unto God; and plurality of finite perfections represented unto God, and known by him, doth no way hinder the unity of Gods infinite essence, no more then it hinders the unity of our souls essence, such as it is. But if you mean it not of Idea representata, but representans; so I grant, there is but one in God, as there is but one essence, which essence of God represents all entities, and quiddities possible. But the argument which you use to prove this unity in God, is neither congruous, nor sound. Not congruous, because it tends only to this, namely to prove that God is illimited and infinite; as much as to say, that all kind of entities are comprehended in the nature of God; but whether they are so comprehended, as with distinction of plurality, or without, that is another question, to the clearing whereof, you confer nothing for ought I yet perceive. You demand, if Gods being be absolutely illimited, what could limit or restrain it from being power, from being wisdom, from being goodness, from being infinitely whatsoever any thing that hath being is? I leave the congruity of your last phrase to be justified by your self. I dare not say, that God is whatsoever man or beast is. But touching your interrogation, I say, it is nothing to the purpose. For the question in present is not, whether Gods being be both life and power, and wisdom, and goodness, and whatsoever any thing is, which is your phrase, not mine: But the question is, whether all these are one in God, or more, that is, whether his life be his power, and both, his wisdom, and all these his goodness, and every thing else, that any creature is, whose being also (as you say) is infinitely in God. Not whether ⟨p. 74⟩all these things are in God, but whether all these are drawn to an unity in God, without all plurality?
4. I see no cause for this distinction of yours, concerning Ideall perfections, & internall perfections. For if you understand ideall perfections of perfections externall and possible to be created by God, but from everlasting represented unto God by his essence; there is no cause why you should exclude the pluralitie of these from the essence of God. For what Divine can doubt, but that as the perfections of created thinges are many, so they are all knowne by God, and from everlasting were represented unto God; and pluralitie of finite perfections represented unto God, and knowne by him, dothe no way hinder the unitie of Gods infinite essence, no more then it hinders the unitie of our soules essence, such as it is. But if you meane it not of Idea representata, but representans; so I grant, there is but one in God, as there is but one essence, which essence of God represents all entities, and quiddities possible. But the argument which you use to proove this unitie in God, is neyther congruous, nor sound. Not congruous, because it tends only to this, namely to proove that God is illimited and infinite; as much as to say, that all kinde of entities are comprehended in the nature of God; but whether they are so comprehended, as with distinction of pluralitie, or without, that is another question, to the cleering wherof, you conferre nothinge for ought I yet perceave. You demaund, if Gods beinge be absolutely illimited, what could limit or restrayne it from being power, from being wisedome, from being goodnes, from being infinitely whatsoever any thing that hath being is? I leave the congruity of your last phrase to be justified by your selfe. I dare not say, that God is whatsoever man or beast is. But touching your interrogation, I say, it is nothing to the purpose. For the question in present is not, whether Gods being be bothe life and power, and wisedome, and goodnes, and whatsoever any thinge is, which is your phrase, not mine: But the question is, whether all these are one in God, or more, that is, whether his life be his power, and both, his wisedome, and all these his goodnes, and every thinge els, that any creature is, whose beinge allso (as you say) is infinitely in God. Not whether