for it is one thing to enquire whether Gods will be the rule of goodness in this sense, whether whatsoever God brings to pass in the world, is therefore good because God hath done it, and a far different thing to demand, whether Gods will be the rule of goodness in this sense, that whatsoever God commands us in his word (for so I understand you when you speak of Gods revealed will) it is therefore good because God commandeth it. And I give a manifest reason of this difference, for before the revelation of Gods word, and without that, all men naturally are able to discern between good and evil, they knew impiety, idolatry, profane swearing, perjury, irreligiousness, contempt of government, murder, uncleanness, gluttony, drunkenness, theft, oppression, extortion, lying, to be evil, and the contrary to these to be good, by the light of nature, and suggestion of conscience, there being a law of good and evil written in the hearts of all, their conscience bearing witness, and their thoughts accusing, or excusing, Rom. 2. 14. 15. And therefore it is false to say, that we know this or that to be good, because Gods will revealed commends it to be such For undoubtedly, in most points of morality, we know this to be good, and that to be evil, without the revealed will of God, and by the very light of nature. Neither doth it follow, that because God willeth nothing but that which is just and good, therefore justice and goodness are the objects of ⟨p. 456⟩his will; first, because we have heard out of Aquinas, that Gods wisdom is his justice: secondly, it is absurd to say, that justice, goodness, or wisdom are the objects of his will. Again, if the goodness of Gods will consists in willing that which is good and just, to wit, in things that are to be done by man, then the rectitude of Gods will shall accrue to him from without, and shall not be essential unto him, like as the rectitude of mans will, which is disproved by Aquinas in the place before alleged. Whereas you say, unless this or that had been good, God had not willed it, this may admit such an interpretation as nothing serves your turn; for the wisdom of God may represent this or that to be good, that is, such as is sit to be done in the way of congruity, so that if it be done it shall be done congruously, yet not to be good, so as it ought to be done in the way of necessity.
for it is one thing to enquire whether Gods will be the rule of goodnesse in this sense, whether whatsoever God brings to passe in the world, is therefore good because God hath done it, and a farre different thing to demand, whether Gods will be the rule of goodnesse in this sense, that whatsoever God commands us in his word (for so I understand you when you speake of Gods revealed will) it is therefore good because God commandeth it. And I give a manifest reason of this difference, for before the revelation of Gods word, and without that, all men naturally are able to discerne between good and evill, they knew impiety, idolatry, profane swearing, perjury, irreligiousnesse, contempt of government, murder, uncleannesse, gluttony, drunkennesse, theft, oppression, extortion, lying, to be evill, and the contrary to these to be good, by the light of nature, and suggestion of conscience, there being a law of good and evill written in the hearts of all, their conscience bearing witnesse, and their thoughts accusing, or excusing, Rom. 2. 14. 15. And therefore it is false to say, that wee know this or that to be good, because Gods will revealed commends it to be such For undoubtedly, in most points of morality, wee know this to be good, and that to bee evill, without the revealed will of God, and by the very light of nature. Neither doth it follow, that because God willeth nothing but that which is just and good, therefore justice and goodnesse are the objects of ⟨p. 456⟩his will; first, because wee have heard out of Aquinas, that Gods wisedome is his justice: secondly, it is absurd to say, that justice, goodnesse, or wisedome are the objects of his will. Againe, if the goodnesse of Gods will consists in willing that which is good and just, to wit, in things that are to be done by man, then the rectitude of Gods will shall accrue to him from without, and shall not bee essentiall unto him, like as the rectitude of mans will, which is disproved by Aquinas in the place before alledged. Whereas you say, unlesse this or that had beene good, God had not willed it, this may admit such an interpretation as nothing serves your turne; for the wisedome of God may represent this or that to bee good, that is, such as is sit to be done in the way of congruity, so that if it be done it shall be done congruously, yet not to bee good, so as it ought to be done in the way of necessity.
