A14095:1063
A discovery of D. Jacksons vanity. Or A perspective glass, whereby the admirers of…A discovery of D. Iacksons vanitie. Or A perspective glasse, wherby the admirers of…
A discovery of D. Jacksons vanity. Or A perspective glass, whereby the admirers of D. Jacksons profound discourses, may see the vanity and weakness of them, in sundry passages, and especially so far as they tend to the undermining of the doctrine hitherto received. Written by William Twice, Doctor of Divinity, as they say, from whom the copy came to the pressA discovery of D. Iacksons vanitie. Or A perspective glasse, wherby the admirers of D. Iacksons profound discourses, may see the vanitie and weaknesse of them, in sundry passages, and especially so farre as they tende to the undermining of the doctrine hitherto received. Written by William Twisse, Doctor of Divinitie, as they say, from whom the copie came to the presse
Amsterdam: printed by the successors of Giles Thorp, 1631
Modern spelling is a reading aid: the words are the author’s, only the spelling is modernized. Original shows the page as printed, with the transcription marks.
3 You proceed to free your tenet from exceptions; but alas, you propose but one exception, and that a poor one, Seeing no thing can be without Gods will, what can be good before God wills it? And your answer is by concession, That goodness actually existent in the creature, cannot be without some precedent act of Gods will, as much as to say, this exception is nothing to the purpose: and so you undertake to free your Tenet only from such exceptions as are nothing to the purpose. Now as touching goodness actually existent in God himself, doth that depend merely upon the will of God, or at all upon the will of God? The manifestation of it, or the exercise of it depends merely upon the will of God, for as much as this is performed only by outward works, and God might have chosen whether he would have made the world, or any part of it, yea, or no. But as for Gods goodness, we that taste of divinity but in trenches, acknowledge, that the being thereof is as necessary as the being of God himself, and depends not at all upon the liberty of Gods will: There is, you say, a goodness objective precedent in order of nature to the act or exercise of Gods will. What I pray? Is it any such as binds God to the willing of any outward thing? take heed what you say, lest you fall into Atheism by making God a necessary agent, or that he was bound in the way of justice to make the world: whence it followeth, that the world was everlasting. Yet this goodness which you make the object of Gods will, savoureth of ditch water rather then of spring water; for it is brought by you, as that which showeth Gods will, what is to be done. But every novice knows, it belongs not to goodness to give direction, but to wisdom rather: and therefore Aquinas, as I showed before, makes that whereupon depends the reason of all justice to be the wisdom of Gods understanding. And I grant willingly, that the direction of wisdom in God precedeth the operation of his will in order of nature, according to that of Aug. alleged by Bradw. out of his answer to the 7. question of Orosius. In Deo praeire voluntas sapientiam non potest, ergo prius est rationabiliter sapere, qaam rationabiliter veil.
3 You proceed to free your tenet from exceptions; but alas, you propose but one exception, and that a poore one, Seeing no thing can be without Gods will, what can be good before God wills it? And your answer is by concession, That goodnesse actually existent in the creature, cannot be without some precedent act of Gods will, as much as to say, this exception is nothing to the purpose: and so you undertake to free your Tenet onely from such exceptions as are nothing to the purpose. Now as touching goodnesse actually existent in God himselfe, doth that depend meerly upon the will of God, or at all upon the will of God? The manifestation of it, or the exercise of it depends meerly upon the will of God, for as much as this is performed onely by outward workes, and God might have chosen whether hee would have made the world, or any part of it, yea, or no. But as for Gods goodnesse, we that tast of divinity but in trenches, acknowledge, that the being thereof is as necessary as the being of God himselfe, and depends not at all upon the liberty of Gods will: There is, you say, a goodnesse objective precedent in order of nature to the act or exercise of Gods will. What I pray? Is it any such as bindes God to the willing of any outward thing? take heed what you say, lest you fall into Atheisme by making God a necessary agent, or that he was bound in the way of justice to make the world: whence it followeth, that the world was everlasting. Yet this goodnesse which you make the object of Gods will, savoureth of ditch water rather then of spring water; for it is brought by you, as that which sheweth Gods will, what is to be done. But every novice knowes, it belongs not to goodnesse to give direction, but to wisedome rather: and therefore Aquinas, as I shewed before, makes that whereupon depends the reason of all justice to be the wisedome of Gods understanding. And I grant willingly, that the direction of wisedome in God precedeth the operation of his will in order of nature, according to that of Aug. alledged by Bradw. out of his answer to the 7. question of Orosius. In Deo praeire voluntas sapientiam non potest, ergo prius est rationabiliter sapere, qaam rationabiliter velle.