A14095:1313
A discovery of D. Jacksons vanity. Or A perspective glass, whereby the admirers of…A discovery of D. Iacksons vanitie. Or A perspective glasse, wherby the admirers of…
A discovery of D. Jacksons vanity. Or A perspective glass, whereby the admirers of D. Jacksons profound discourses, may see the vanity and weakness of them, in sundry passages, and especially so far as they tend to the undermining of the doctrine hitherto received. Written by William Twice, Doctor of Divinity, as they say, from whom the copy came to the pressA discovery of D. Iacksons vanitie. Or A perspective glasse, wherby the admirers of D. Iacksons profound discourses, may see the vanitie and weaknesse of them, in sundry passages, and especially so farre as they tende to the undermining of the doctrine hitherto received. Written by William Twisse, Doctor of Divinitie, as they say, from whom the copie came to the presse
Amsterdam: printed by the successors of Giles Thorp, 1631
Modern spelling is a reading aid: the words are the author’s, only the spelling is modernized. Original shows the page as printed, with the transcription marks.
Then again you return to our unconstant humour, and upon the back of that tell us, that though none doth good, yet we may do less evil then others. And lastly, that they who love equity, are hardly drawn to dispense with injustice; and at last having sate long, you hatch an excellent Maxim, that where judgement is infallible, and love to justice invincible, there •s not possible to transgress in judgement. All which when I compare together, and with your theme proposed, How God may be said to have done all that he could for his vineyard, it calls to my remembrance a certain mad fellows discourse, when I was a Scholar at Winchester, that would talk of ⟨p. 587⟩master Killigree, and Abbey lands, fat venison, and such like uncoherences a long time together.
Then againe you returne to our unconstant humour, and upon the backe of that tell us, that though none doth good, yet we may doe lesse evill then others. And lastly, that they who love equity, are hardly drawn to dispense with injustice; and at last having sate long, you hatch an excellent Maxime, that where judgement is infallible, and love to justice invincible, there •s not possible to transgresse in judgement. All which when I compare together, and with your theame proposed, How God may be said to have done all that he could for his vineyard, it cals to my remembrance a certaine mad fellowes discourse, when I was a Scholler at Winchester, that would talke of ⟨p. 587⟩master Killigree, and Abbey lands, fat venison, and such like uncoherences a long time together.
But let us examine them apart: Both parts of contradiction cannot be true; and it is as true that both parts of contradiction cannot be false. But whereto this tends, and how pertinent to your purpose in this place, I cannot devise; Only you tell us that the not extending of this Maxim so far as we should, is the cause why we conceive difficulties in your wild discourse premised, as also of our ignorance in assoiling them. A strange conceit, and whereof I see no colour of reason, neither do you take any pains to explicate it, by accommodation or instance, but let fly at random, as if you would employ your readers in seeking after sense and reason where there is none to be found. And if this were true, your self should have assoiled the difficulties conceived in the points proposed, by extending this Maxim to the utmost, to serve your turn; and showed, how by not extending it so far as is meet, difficulties are conceived, and no means found to assoil them: but your self have taken no such course: And who was ever known, not to extend this Maxim to the uttermost? where can you find any limitation or confining of it? what do you mean to abuse your readers patience with such incredible fictions?