A14095:1326
A discovery of D. Jacksons vanity. Or A perspective glass, whereby the admirers of…A discovery of D. Iacksons vanitie. Or A perspective glasse, wherby the admirers of…
A discovery of D. Jacksons vanity. Or A perspective glass, whereby the admirers of D. Jacksons profound discourses, may see the vanity and weakness of them, in sundry passages, and especially so far as they tend to the undermining of the doctrine hitherto received. Written by William Twice, Doctor of Divinity, as they say, from whom the copy came to the pressA discovery of D. Iacksons vanitie. Or A perspective glasse, wherby the admirers of D. Iacksons profound discourses, may see the vanitie and weaknesse of them, in sundry passages, and especially so farre as they tende to the undermining of the doctrine hitherto received. Written by William Twisse, Doctor of Divinitie, as they say, from whom the copie came to the presse
Amsterdam: printed by the successors of Giles Thorp, 1631
Modern spelling is a reading aid: the words are the author’s, only the spelling is modernized. Original shows the page as printed, with the transcription marks.
Now I demand in the name of common sense and sobriety, whether this be a decent thing to say, that to make both parts of contradiction true is possible to power alone considered, whereas indeed it is no more possible, in reference to any power to make both parts of contradiction true, then to make both parts of contradiction false. Neither indeed is it in the power of God, as touching any one part of contradiction, if it be not true, to make it true, or if it be true to make it false. As for example, I am alive; it is not in the power of God to make it false. He may take my life from me, but that is not a course to make that proposition false. For it was true only for that time when it was pronounced, not for the time to come when my life is taken from me. So when Socrates is dead this proposition is false, Socrates is alive, neither is it in the power of God to make it true: for though he can restore life to Socrates, yet thereby he shall not make that proposition true. For that proposition was true for that time only, when it was pronounced, not for the time to come, least of all for that time when God had restored life to Socrates. But you will say, the being of a thing is the cause why a proposition concerning the being of that thing is said to be true, not on the contrary. And God is the cause of the being of things.
Now I demand in the name of common sense and sobrietie, whether this be a decent thing to say, that to make both parts of contradiction true is possible to power alone considered, whereas indeed it is no more possible, in reference to any power to make both parts of contradiction true, then to make both parts of contradiction false. Neither indeed is it in the power of God, as touching any one part of contradiction, if it be not true, to make it true, or if it be true to make it false. As for example, I am alive; it is not in the power of God to make it false. Hee may take my life from me, but that is not a course to make that proposition false. For it was true onely for that time when it was pronounced, not for the time to come when my life is taken from mee. So when Socrates is dead this proposition is false, Socrates is alive, neither is it in the power of God to make it true: for though hee can restore life to Socrates, yet thereby he shall not make that proposition true. For that proposition was true for that time only, when it was pronounced, not for the time to come, least of all for that time when God had restored life to Socrates. But you will say, the being of a thing is the cause why a proposition concerning the being of that thing is said to be true, not on the contrary. And God is the cause of the being of things.