A14095:705
A discovery of D. Jacksons vanity. Or A perspective glass, whereby the admirers of…A discovery of D. Iacksons vanitie. Or A perspective glasse, wherby the admirers of…
A discovery of D. Jacksons vanity. Or A perspective glass, whereby the admirers of D. Jacksons profound discourses, may see the vanity and weakness of them, in sundry passages, and especially so far as they tend to the undermining of the doctrine hitherto received. Written by William Twice, Doctor of Divinity, as they say, from whom the copy came to the pressA discovery of D. Iacksons vanitie. Or A perspective glasse, wherby the admirers of D. Iacksons profound discourses, may see the vanitie and weaknesse of them, in sundry passages, and especially so farre as they tende to the undermining of the doctrine hitherto received. Written by William Twisse, Doctor of Divinitie, as they say, from whom the copie came to the presse
Amsterdam: printed by the successors of Giles Thorp, 1631
Modern spelling is a reading aid: the words are the author’s, only the spelling is modernized. Original shows the page as printed, with the transcription marks.
First certain ends proposed by God to be accomplished. Secondly means appointed for the accomplishing of these ends. Thirdly Gods forecast of the accomplishment of these ends. Touching the first I desire some instance of those ends you speak of. One instance you give in the sequence of his action, and it is the apprehension of a Traitor ⟨p. 261⟩which you suppose to be ordained by God. Yet is this as absolute a contingent as ought else. And contingents are no otherwise ordained by God, then to be contingents. For you have already signified that it is by Gods unalterable decree; So then God hath decreed them to be contingents. Therefore this action also to wit the apprehension of a Traitor, God hath ordained to be of a contingent nature.
First certeyne ends proposed by God to be accomplished. Secondly meanes appointed for the accomplishinge of these ends. Thirdly Gods forecast of the accomplishment of these ends. Touching the first I desire some instance of those ends you speake of. One instance you give in the sequence of his action, and it is the apprehension of a Traytor ⟨p. 261⟩which you suppose to be ordeyned by God. Yet is this as absolute a contingent as ought else. And contingents are no otherwise ordeyned by God, then to be contingents. For you have already signified that it is by Gods unalterable decree; So then God hath decreed them to be contingents. Therfore this action allso to witt the apprehension of a Traytor, God hath ordeyned to be of a contingent nature.
The meaning whereof is no more then this, it may come to pass, it may not come to pass. It shall be, or it shall not be, and accordingly in other treatises of yours you have discoursed of a disjunctive decree of God, so called from the disjunctive object thereof, as to say, God hath decreed that such a Traitor either shall be apprehended, or shall not be apprehended. Now there is no need of any means to procure the accomplishment of such an end thus determined. For any man is able to avouch that a Traitor shall be apprehended, or no, and nothing at all to fail in the truth hereof; much less need is there of such variety of means, and those mixed with such possibility of miscarriage, as you treat of, to bring to pass such a decree, such an intention of this. But let the end pass as you have shaped it; this being of a contingent nature, and yet absolutely intended by God; for you neither express, nor intimate the signification of any condition, it will hence follow, that any thing of the like nature may be absolutely ordained by God notwithstanding the contingency thereof. That is, be it never so contingent and free, as the apprehension of a Traitor is a free act of man (for you do not suppose him to be apprehended by dogs or cats but by men rather) yet notwithstanding God is able absolutely to ordain that such a thing shall come to pass. Therefore God is as well able to ordain that at such a time a man shall believe, shall repent, yea or do any thing though never so free, notwithstanding the contingent nature thereof. Now I can no where find (though I have perused throughly divers of your treatises) that you like of this. Yet here ere you are aware (as it seems) you are fallen upon it, and take upon you to acquaint us with mysterious conceits of yours, concerning