A14095:783
A discovery of D. Jacksons vanity. Or A perspective glass, whereby the admirers of…A discovery of D. Iacksons vanitie. Or A perspective glasse, wherby the admirers of…
A discovery of D. Jacksons vanity. Or A perspective glass, whereby the admirers of D. Jacksons profound discourses, may see the vanity and weakness of them, in sundry passages, and especially so far as they tend to the undermining of the doctrine hitherto received. Written by William Twice, Doctor of Divinity, as they say, from whom the copy came to the pressA discovery of D. Iacksons vanitie. Or A perspective glasse, wherby the admirers of D. Iacksons profound discourses, may see the vanitie and weaknesse of them, in sundry passages, and especially so farre as they tende to the undermining of the doctrine hitherto received. Written by William Twisse, Doctor of Divinitie, as they say, from whom the copie came to the presse
Amsterdam: printed by the successors of Giles Thorp, 1631
Modern spelling is a reading aid: the words are the author’s, only the spelling is modernized. Original shows the page as printed, with the transcription marks.
We come to your second reason; Why we cannot conceive and speak so right concerning Gods knowledge, as concerning other attributes, and that is, say you, because we want fit terms to express it. But how do you prove that we have more fit terms to express Gods other attributes then this? you do not once go about to prove this; the instance you give is in the prescience of God, concerning which Gregory makes a question how it can be attributed unto God; seeing nothing but future things are said to be foreknown, and unto God nothing is future, but all things present. And for the same reason Augustine (you say) would have Gods knowledge of things to come to be termed rather science then prescience, seeing all things are present unto God. Now if this change of terms will serve the turn to avoid incongruity concerning the right apprehension of Gods knowledge, what cause is there to complain of the unfitness of terms, when as with so little ado the unfitness we speak of, may be corrected? It is like enough upon such conceits as these, some have entertained an opinion that all things are actually existent in eternity, not only things present, but things past also still are, and things future already are existent in eternity: and you your self also have already manifested your approbation of this Tenet in the Chapter of eternity: The more I wonder to read you except against this doctrine of Gregory's and Augustine's, as neither clear, nor accurate enough: And here first you tell us that we may not say, nor did Saint Augustine, or Saint Gregory think that God doth not, or cannot know a distinction between times past, present, or to come. Neither indeed do I see any colour why any man should entertain a conceit of any such meaning of Augustine or Gregory; ⟨p. 312⟩neither do they deny that God knows all these things and consequently the differences of them, one from another; Only Gregory makes a doubt how the knowledge of future things in God should be called prescience. And Augustine (as you say) had rather call it Science. But then you demand how it is said by Gregory that nothing to him is future, nothing past. Your self have heretofore laid down that which may answer this; as when you said all things are coexistent in eternity, but not in time: And therefore God may know things to be so differenced in respect of such a course of eternity.
We come to your second reason; Why wee cannot conceive and speake so right concerning Gods knowledge, as concerning other attributes, and that is, say you, because we want fit termes to expresse it. But how doe you prove that we have more fit termes to expresse Gods other attributes then this? you doe not once goe about to prove this; the instance you give is in the praescience of God, concerning which Gregory makes a question how it can bee attributed unto God; seeing nothing but future things are said to be foreknowne, and unto God nothing is future, but all things present. And for the same reason Austine (you say) would have Gods knowledge of things to come to be termed rather science then praescience, seeing all things are present unto God. Now if this change of termes will serve the turne to avoid incongruity concerning the right apprehension of Gods knowledge, what cause is there to complaine of the unfitnesse of termes, when as with so little adoe the unfitnesse we speake of, may be corrected? It is like enough upon such conceits as these, some have entertained an opinion that all things are actually existent in eternity, not onely things present, but things past also still are, and things future already are existent in eternity: and you your selfe also have already manifested your approbation of this Tenet in the Chapter of eternity: The more I wonder to reade you except against this doctrine of Gregories and Austines, as neither cleare, nor accurate enough: And here first you tell us that we may not say, nor did Saint Austine, or Saint Gregory thinke that God doth not, or cannot know a distinction between times past, present, or to come. Neither indeed doe I see any colour why any man should entertaine a conceit of any such meaning of Austine or Gregory;