A14095:796
A discovery of D. Jacksons vanity. Or A perspective glass, whereby the admirers of…A discovery of D. Iacksons vanitie. Or A perspective glasse, wherby the admirers of…
A discovery of D. Jacksons vanity. Or A perspective glass, whereby the admirers of D. Jacksons profound discourses, may see the vanity and weakness of them, in sundry passages, and especially so far as they tend to the undermining of the doctrine hitherto received. Written by William Twice, Doctor of Divinity, as they say, from whom the copy came to the pressA discovery of D. Iacksons vanitie. Or A perspective glasse, wherby the admirers of D. Iacksons profound discourses, may see the vanitie and weaknesse of them, in sundry passages, and especially so farre as they tende to the undermining of the doctrine hitherto received. Written by William Twisse, Doctor of Divinitie, as they say, from whom the copie came to the presse
Amsterdam: printed by the successors of Giles Thorp, 1631
Modern spelling is a reading aid: the words are the author’s, only the spelling is modernized. Original shows the page as printed, with the transcription marks.
But usually mans foreknowledge of things to come is accounted in respect of things natural, and such as are out of the power of the determination of his own will. And as for such things as are subject to his will, it is an undoubted truth, that he cannot infallibly foreknow such things upon the knowledge of his purpose to produce them; and that for two reasons. First, because his will is mutable from within. Secondly, because his power is resistible from without. But give we you leave to proceed.
But usually mans foreknowledge of things to come is accompted in respect of thinges naturall, and such as are out of the power of the determination of his owne will. And as for such thinges as are subject to his will, it is an undoubted truth, that he cannot infallibly foreknowe such thinges upon the knowledge of his purpose to produce them; and that for two reasons. First, because his will is mutable from within. Secondly, because his power is resistible from without. But give we you leave to proceede.
In the next place you tell us, That some push our proneness to this error forward, by another, not distinguishing between contingency and uncertainty; who argue thus, That which is in it self uncertain, cannot certainly be known. Every future contingent is in it self uncertain, Ergo it is not possible that a future contingent should certainly be known. Thus another Hare is started by the way, which hindereth the pursuing of our first game, where we might have experience of your performance in opposing the ground of Gods foreknowing future contingents, laid in the determination of his will, whereof God cannot be ignorant. And first you address your self to the removing of this new rub, by a distinction of a two fold uncertainty, one formally relative, another only denominative or fundamental. And, as if these terms needed no explication, you proceed to a resolution thus; That which is relatively uncertain, cannot be certainly known, for so it should be certain to him, to whom it is uncertain: But a future contingent, as it is contingent, doth not necessarily or formally include this relative uncertainty, although it usually be in part the foundation or cofounder of it. By relative uncertainty you understand uncertainty in relation to knowledge, in which sense to be uncertain, is to be such as whereof there cannot be certain knowledge. In which sense if the proposition proceeded, it were very idle, and identical, as if it were expressed thus; That which cannot certainly be known, cannot certainly be known: And they undoubtedly are very prone to error, that suffer themselves to be pushed forwards thereinto by such arguments as these, and thus interpreted. But we were wont to distinguish of Certitudo scientiae, & certitudo rei scitae, or scibilis; and you intimate such a distinction. For the relative uncertainty you speak of is the uncertainty of the knowledge, and the fundamental uncertainty is the uncertainty of the thing it self, and indeed the foundation of the uncertainty of knowledge. Now the argument proceeds manifestly from the one to the other, and the Medius terminus man fests its own meaning to be of fundamental uncertainty, whence it doth infer uncertainty of knowledge, for it proceeds thus: That which is uncertain in it self cannot