Secondly, why do they not beleeve but quia nō ••••, and Austin, both in his lib. 3. de Gen. ad literam cap. 1. and his retraction thereof, both saith and justifies, as omnino true, that even natural men may both believe, if they will, and from the love of temporal things convert themselves to the the keeping of Gods commandments, if they will. For, indeed, this impotency, which is found in all, of doing that which is good, is not so much natural as moral, having the ⟨p. 48⟩the root thereof either only or chiefly in the will of man; And, if they may believe if they will, is it not just with God to punish them for not believing? Therefore, if a question be made, why the wicked do not this or that, which is good, his answer is quia nolunt; but, saith he, if you further demand, Quare nolunt? Imus in l•gum, saith Austin, yet without prejudice to a more diligent inquisition of the truth, I answer, saith the same divine, that the reason is, either because it appears not unto them what it is, or, appearing what it is, yet it doth not delight them; Sed ut innotescat quòd latebat, & suave fiat, quod minime delectabat, gratiae Dei est, quae humanas adjuvat voluntates. But, to prosecute this argument farther then this Author dreams of, we say there are but three sorts of supernatural acts, and they are either faith divine, or hope divine, or charity divine, all other acts are natural and performable by a natural man, whether they be the acts of all moral virtues, or an exterior conformity to the means of grace, whereby it comes to pass that some doe proficere ad exteriorem vitae emendationem; but none of these acts are acceptable with God unless they proceed from, and are rightly qualified by those three theological virtues, faith, hope, and love, all which are divine and supernatural; the love of God being such as is joined with the contempt of our selves; as for faith and hope it appears how supernatural they are, by the supernatural condition of their objects. Now suppose that a man were so exact, both in natural morality, and in an outward conformity to the means of grace, as not to fail in any particular, as he hath power to perform any particular hereof naturally;
Secondly, why doe they not beleeve but quia nō ••••, and Austin, both in his lib. 3. de Gen. ad literam cap. 1. and his retraction thereof, both sayth and justifyes, as omnino true, that even naturall men may both beleeve, if they will, and from the love of temporall things convert themselves to the the keeping of Gods commandements, if they will. For, indeed, this impotency, which is found in all, of doing that which is good, is not so much naturall as morall, having the ⟨p. 48⟩the roote therof eyther only or che•fly in the will of man; And, if they may believe if they will, is it not just with God to punish them for not believinge? Therfore, if a quaestion be made, why the wicked doe not this or that, which is good, his answeare is quia nolunt; but, sayth he, if you further demaund, Quare nolunt? Imus in l•gum, sayth Austin, yet without prejudice to a more diligent inquisition of the truth, I answere, sayth the same divine, that the reason is, eyther because it appeares not unto them what it is, or, appearing what it is, yet it doth not delight them; Sed ut innotescat quòd latebat, & suave fiat, quod minime delectabat, gratiae Dei est, quae humanas adjuvat voluntates. But, to prosecute this argument farther then this Author dreames of, we say there are but three sorts of supernaturall acts, and they are eyther faith devine, or hope devine, or charitie divine, all other acts are naturall and performable by a naturall man, whether they be the acts of all morall vertues, or an •xterior conformitie to the meanes of grace, wherby it comes to passe that some doe proficere ad exteriorem vitae emendationem; but none of these acts are acceptable with God unles they proceede from, and are rightly qualified by those three theologicall vertues, faith, hope, and love, all which are divine and supernaturall; the love of God being such as is joyned with the contempt of our selfes; as for faith and hope it appears how supernaturall they are, by the supernaturall condition of theire objects. Now suppose that a man were so exact, both in naturall moralitie, and in an outward conformitie to the meanes of grace, as not to fayle in any particular, as he hath power to performe any particular hereof naturally;