THE TREATISE, Consisting of three parts.
pp. 32–198425 passagespart 1 of 11
Modern spelling is a reading aid: the words are the author’s, only the spelling is modernized. Original shows the page as printed, with the transcription marks.
pp. 32–198425 passagespart 1 of 11
Modern spelling is a reading aid: the words are the author’s, only the spelling is modernized. Original shows the page as printed, with the transcription marks.
First then, if he that is of this opinion will go about to convert an Infidel, the Infidel will tell him that he knoweth not how to love, nor yet to believe that God to be good and just, which only for his own pleasure hath destined the greatest part of mankind to everlasting torments, without the least consideration of any sin, at least only for the sin of one man, who notwithstanding obtained pardon for himself, after he had wilfully committed it. That herein he seeth not the least trace, either of goodness or wisdom, or justice to use them so cruelly, that are destitute of certain graces and benefits, which this God hath never willed to have given them, and which these miserable wretches could ⟨p. 33⟩obtain no other way, and to whom by an irrevocable decree, he hath imposed a necessity as well of sinning without having any power to repent, as of perishing eternally, which are the very words of Zanchy, one of the principal Doctors of that Synod.
First then, if he that is of this opinion will go about to convert an Infidell, the Infidell will tell him that he knoweth not how to love, nor yet to beleeve that God to be good and just, which only for his owne pleasure hath destinyed the greatest part of mankind to everlasting torments, without the least consideration of any sinne, at least only for the sinne of one man, who notwithstanding obteyned pardon for himself, after he had willfully committed it. That herein he seeth not the least trace, either of goodnesse or wisedome, or justice to use them so cruelly, that are destitute of certaine graces and benefites, which this God hath never willed to have given them, and which these miserable wretches could ⟨p. 33⟩obtaine no other way, and to whom by an irrevocable decree, he hath imposed a necessitie as well of sinning without having any power to repent, as of perishing aeternally, which are the very words of Zanchy, one of the principall Doctors of that Synod.
That it cannot be, that God, who in his word doth make himself the lover of mankind, who would, that all men should be saved, and that none perish, who sweareth by himself, that he will not the death of a sinner, but that he repent and live. Yea he will still the more abhor that doctrine, when it persuadeth him, that God useth double dealing, and hath a double will, the one exterior, whereby he inviteth a sinner, making as though he were desirous of his salvation; the other interior and hidden, which is always accomplished, whereby he leadeth him, by inevitable means, as well unto sin as unto damnation.
That it cannot be, that God, who in his word doth make himself the lover of mankind, who would, that all men should be saved, and that none perish, who sweareth by himselfe, that he will not the death of a sinner, but that he repent and live. Yea he will still the more abhorre that doctrine, when it persuadeth him, that God useth double dealing, and hath a double will, the one exterior, whereby he inviteth a sinner, making as though he were desirous of his salvation; the other interior and hidden, which is allwayes accomplished, whereby he leadeth him, by inevitable meanes, as well unto sinne as unto damnation.
The infidel will say unto his converter, that Homer were sooner to be believed then he, when he saith, that: He who speaketh contrary to what he thinketh ought to be held as an enemy, and hated as the gates of Hell. And that, in the judgement of these Apostles of Dort and Arles, the most wicked Hypocrite and Traitor in the World, would most lively represent the image of that God, which he speaketh of.
The infidell will say unto his converter, that Homer were sooner to be beleeved then he, when he sayth, that: He who speaketh contrary to what he thinketh ought to be held as an enemye, and hated as the gates of Hell. And that, in the judgement of these Apostles of Dort and Arles, the most wicked Hypocrite and Traytor in the World, would most lively repraesent the image of that God, which he speaketh of.
Consid. We read of a strange judgement of God, in sending strong delusions amongst men, that they should believe lies, 2. Thes. 2.11. And the reason hereof also is discovered unto us, v. 10. namely, because they did not receive the love of the truth. This judgement of God seems to have course in these times as much as ever; or rather in far greater measure then ever. The Apostle telleth us of false teachers in his days, who were but [Greek or Hebrew], vain discoursers, 1yet were they [Greek or Hebrew]. For even illusions do prevail too oft. And is it not very strange, that our Churches, our reformed churches; our Universities, our reformed Universities, should be ⟨p. 34⟩carried away with such base and senseless discourses as these. Let us then cease to wonder at the simplicity of Savages, which are taken with copper in stead of gold; and receive vitre•s pro gemmis, and make as much reckoning of beads, made of glass, as others do of pearl. For observe, I pray, the force of this Authors argument comprised in brief. An infidel is no way likely to brook this doctrine of ours, as touching absolute reprobation; therefore this doctrine is unsound and nothing agreeable to Gods word.
Consid. We read of a strange judgement of God, in sending strong delusions amongst men, that they should beleeve lyes, 2. Thes. 2.11. And the reason hereof also is discovered unto us, v. 10. namely, because they did not receve the love of the truth. This judgement of God seemes to have course in these times as much as ever; or rather in farre greater measure then ever. The Apostle telleth us of false teachers in his dayes, who were but 〈non-Latin alphabet〉, vayne discoursers, 1yet were they 〈non-Latin alphabet〉. For even illusions doe praevayle too oft. And is it not very strange, that our Churches, our reformed churches; our Vniversities, our reformed Vniversities, should be ⟨p. 34⟩caryed away with such base and senselesse discourses as these. Let us then cease to wonder at the simplicitie of Savages, which are taken with coppar in steede of gold; and receave vitre•s pro gemmis, and make as much reckoning of beades, made of glasse, as others doe of pearle. For observe, I pray, the force of this Autors argument comprised in briefe. An infidell is no way likely to brooke this doctrine of ours, as touching absolute reprobation; therefore this doctrine is unsound and nothing agreable to Gods word.
Is it possible, that a Christian should be so far infatuated, as to make the judgement of an infidel to be the rule of his faith in matter of salvation, and as touching the mysteries of godliness? And if some French wit leavened with Arminianism be carried away with such vile fantasies, shall i• spread so far, as to sour the wits of our University also? why then do they not proceed to turn Atheists? For it is well known, that the Gospel of Christ crucified, was both a scandal to the Jews, and foolishness unto the Gentiles, 1. Cor. ••.
Is it possible, that a Christian should be so farre infatuated, as to make the judgement of an infidell to be the rule of his faith in matter of salvation, and as touching the myst•ries of godlinesse? And if some French witt lea•ened with Arminianisme be caryed away with such vile phantasyes, shall i• spread so farre, as to sowre the witts of our Vniversitie also? why then doe they not proceede to turne Atheists? For it is well knowne, that the Gospell of Christ crucified, was both a scandall to the Iewes, and foolishnesse unto the Gentiles, 1. Cor. ••.
What a base opinion had the K•ng of Assur, concerning the Religion of Samaria, and of Jerusalem, preferring all others before it, Esa. 10.10. Like as mine hand hath found the Kingdoms of the Idols, seeing their idols were above Samaria, and above Jerusalem, v. 11. Shall not I, as I have done to Samaria, and to the Idols thereof, so do to Jerusalem and to the Idols thereof? Where was found a more wise writer amongst Heathens then Tacitus? And why should not his judgement be made the rule of our faith in matter of Religion,1 as soon as the judgement of any infidels. And what was his judgement, 1. Concerning the Jews: Omnia (sayth he, speaking of the Jews) profana illis, quae apud nos sacra. Rursum concessa apud illos omnia, quae apud nos incesta, and comparing their rites with the rites of Bacchus, praeferres those of Bacchus before these of the Jews. Liberum patrem coli, domitorem Orientis quidam arbitrati sunt, nequaquam congruentibus institutis; Quippe liber festos lae•osque ritus posuit; Judcorum mos ⟨p. 35⟩absurdus sordidusque. 2. Concerning Christians, whom he describes to be Hominum genus propter flagitia invisum; This is delivered of Christians in the days of holy Paul, who teacheth us not to do evil that good may come thereof; nor to recompense evil with evil, but to overcome evil with goodness. Yea, and commands every soul to be subject to the higher powers, even then, when souls were at best, and powers at worst. And then, let us proceed a little further, and turn direct Atheists, maintaining the world to have been from everlasting▪ and that all things come to pass by necessity of nature, because forsooth, in the judgement of Aristotle, God being goodness it self, not good by a concrete denomination, but essentially goodness naturally and necessarily communicating it self, doth bring all things to pass by necessity of nature, as Jacobus Naclantus observes in the first of his 4. Tractates, which is of the creation of all things by God, and that according unto Aristotle, but by necessity of nature, which utterly overthrows all providence divine.
What a base opinion had the K•ng of Assur, concerning the Religion of Samaria, and of Ierusalem, preferring all others before it, Esa. 10.10. Like as mine hand hath found the Kingdomes of the Idolls, seeing their idolls were above Samaria, and above Ierusalem, v. 11. Shall not I, as I have done to Samaria, and to the Idolls thereof, so doe to Ierusalem and to the Idolls thereof? Where was found a more wise writer amongst Heathens then Taci•us? And why should not his judgement be made the rule of our faith in matter of Religion,1 as soone as the judgement of any infidells. And what was his judgement, 1. Concerning the Iewes: Omnia (sayth he, speaking of the Iewes) profana illis, quae apud nos sacra. Rursum concessa apud illos omnia, quae apud nos incesta, and comparing their rites with the rites of Bacchus, praeferres those of Bacchus before these of the Iewes. Liberum patrem coli, domitorem Orientis quidam arbitrati sunt, nequaquam congruentibus institutis; Quippe liber festos lae•osque ritus posuit; Iudcorum mos ⟨p. 35⟩absurdus sordidusque. 2. Concerning Christians, whom he describes to be Hominum genus propter flagitia invisum; This is delivered of Christians in the dayes of holy Paul, who teacheth us not to doe evill that good may come thereof; nor to recompense evill with evill, but to overcome evill with goodnesse. Yea, and commandes every soule to be subject to the higher powers, even then, when soules were at best, and powers at worst. And then, let us proceede a littl• further, and turne direct Atheists, maintaining the world to have bene from everlasting▪ and that all things come to passe by necessitie of nature, because fo•sooth, in the judgement of Aristotle, God being goodnesse it self, not good by a concrete denomination, but essentially goodnesse naturally and necessarily communicating it self, doth bring all things to passe by necessitie of nature, as Iacobus Naclantus observes in the first of his 4. Tractates, which is of the creation of all things by God, and that according unto Aristotle, but by necessitie of nature, which utterly overthrowes all providence divine.
Again, Zosimus that bitter Atheist, and enemy to Christians, who writes so basely of Constantine the great▪ Doth he not reproach our Christian profession upon these very terms, that we offer the free forgiveness of all sins to all them who shall embrace Christian faith? And shall we think the worse of Christianity, for his distasting the doctrine of free justification of all by faith in Christ? which distastefulness of his, is not a thing feigned by us, or barely presumed of, as this Authors course is merely to represent the fictions of his own brains, but left upon record by the real profession of Zosimus himself in his history. I have read of an Arian, executed at Norwich, for blasphemy against Jesus Christ, in the days of Queen Elizabeth, that being moved to repent that Christ might pardon him, should reply to this effect: And is that God of yours so merciful indeed, as to pardon so readily those that blaspheme him, then I renounce him and defy him.
Againe, Zosimus that bitter Atheist, and enemye to Christians, who writes so basely of Constantine the great▪ Doth he not reproch our Christian profession upon these very termes, that we offer the free forgivenesse of all sinnes to all them who shall embrace Christian faith? And shall we thinke the worse of Christianity, for his distasting the doctrine of free justification of all by faith in Christ? which distastfullnesse of his, is not a thing feigned by us, or barely presumed of, as this Authors course is meerely to represent the fictions of his owne braines, but left upon record by the reall profession of Zosimus himselfe in his history. I have read of an Arrian, executed at Norwich, for blasphemy against Iesus Christ, in the dayes of Queene Elizabeth, that being mooved to repent that Christ might pardon him, should reply to this effect: And is that God of yours so mercifull indeed, as to pardon so readily those that blaspheme him, then I renounce him and defie him.
Now, shall such a wretches judgement any thing move us, so much as to waver in our faith, as touching the Deity of Jesus Christ the Son of God, as also touching his facility even to pardon blasphemies delivered against him, in case of true repentance? What is the Socinian Tenet, at this day, concerning Christ? do they not professedly deny, that he came into the world, to make satisfaction for sin? For as much, as God, they say, can pardon sin without all satisfaction. So that the preaching of satisfaction made by Christ, is no way fit to work upon them, it is so distasted by them. But shall we think the worse of our doctrine in this particular for that? Consider what is the general judgement of infidels concerning Original sin. Do they think it just for God to condemn an Infant, dying in original sin unto eternal fire? Or can they digest our Christian doctrine, concerning the general condition of all mankind as borne in original sin, and therewithal borne Children of wrath? Especially, in case the soul of the child proceeds not from the parents, but immediately from God, as who by infusing it creates it, and by creating it, infuseth it? Shall therefore we be awed by their judgements▪ from hearkening to Gods word, both touching the sinful condition, wherein we are all borne, and touching the condigne punishment thereof? Nay rather, as the Apostle professeth of the Gospel in general, so let us be bold to profess of every mystery thereof in particular, that If it be hid it is hid from them that perish, in whom the God of this world hath blinded their minds, 1even of Infidels, that the light of the glorious Gospel of Christ, which is the image of God, should not shine unto them. Yet that God, who commanded the light to shine out of darkness is he which hath shined in the hearts of many Infidels, to give the light of the knowledge of the glory of God in the face of Jesus Christ. And in like sort hath God caused the light of this truth, as touching the absoluteness of Reprobation, to shine in the hearts of many, who in the state of nature were no better then Infidels, being borne children of wrath as well as others.
Now, shall such a wretches judgement any thing moove us, so much as to waver in our faith, as touching the Deitie of Iesus Christ the Sonne of God, as also touching his facility even to pardon blasphemies delivered against him, in case of true repentance? What is the Socinian Tenet, at this day, concerning Christ? doe they not professedly deny, that he came into the world, to make satisfaction for sinne? For as much, as God, they say, can pardon sinne without all satisfaction. So that the preaching of satisfactiō made by Christ, is no way fitt to worke upon thē, it is so distasted by thē. But shall we think the worse of our doctrine in this particular for that? Consider what is the generall judgement of infidells concerning Originall sinne. Doe they thinke it just for God to condemne an Infant, dying in originall sinne unto aeternall fire? Or can they digest our Christian doctrine, concerning the generall condition of all mankind as borne in originall sinne, and therewithall borne Children of wrath? Especially, in case the soule of the childe proceedes not from the parents, but immediately from God, as who by infusing it creates it, and by creating it, infuseth it? Shall therefore we be awed by their judgements▪ frō hearkning to Gods word, both touching the sinfull condition, wherein we are all borne, and touching the condigne punishment thereof? Nay rather, as the Apostle professeth of the Gospell in generall, so let us be bolde to professe of every mystery thereof in particular, that If it be hid it is hid from them that perish, in whom the God of this world hath blinded their mindes, 1even of Infidells, that the light of the glorious Gospell of Christ, which is the image of God, should not shine unto them. Yet that God, who commanded the light to shine out of darkenesse is he which hath shined in the hearts of many Infidells, to give the light of the knowledge of the glory of God in the face of Iesus Christ. And in like sort hath God caused the light of this truth, as touching the absolutenesse of Reprobation, to shine in the hearts of many, who in the state of nature were no better then Infidells, being borne children of wrath as well as others.
But come we to grapple with this man of war, and try the metal he is made of. The Infidel (he saith) will tell him, that goeth about to convert him, that he knows not how to love, nor yet believe that God to be good and just, which only for his own pleasure hath destined the greatest part of mankind, to everlasting torments, without the least consideration of any sin, or at least only for the sin of one man, &c. Observe first, how this Tragedian carieth himself in the making of his plea, to serve his own turn. (For, Po•ta, cum primum animum ad scribendum appulit, id •ibi negoti credidit solum dari▪ populo ut placerent quas fecisset fabulas.) And therefore he feigneth that, before any man sets hand to the converting of an Infidel, the Infidel is acquainted already with our doctrine, concerning absolute reprobation. This is like the making of his own bed, that he may lye the more easily. Secondly, what if he will not love such a God, or believe such a doctrine? shall the doctrine be the less true, for this? In the sixth of John we read how some distasted the doctrine of our Saviour, concerning the eating of his flesh, and said that this was an hard saying, and thereupon many of his disciples departed from him, was our Saviours doctrine the less true, or did it deserve the less credit for this? If a man should preach unto an Infidel, that doctrine of Paul, where he saith: Before the children were borne and when they had neither done good nor evil, that the purpose of God according to election might stand, not of works, but of him that calleth, it was said, The elder shall serve the younger; As it is written, I have loved Jacob, and have hated Esau. If an Infidel will not believe this, nor love such a God as is set forth unto us herein; what therefore shall not we believe it, and acknowledge God to be good and just, notwithstanding this? what Christian that is not infatuated, doth not perceive the vanity and absurdity of this Authors argumentation? and that in the investigation of divine truth, we are not to regard, how an Infidel is likely to be affected with it in our fancy, but whether such a doctrine be agreeable to Gods word or no?
But come we to grapple with this man of warre, and try the mettall he is made of. The Infidell (he saith) will tell him, that goeth about to convert him, that he knowes not how to love, nor yet beleeve that God to be good and just, which onely for his owne pleasure hath destined the greatest part of mankind, to everlasting torments, without the least consideration of any sinne, or at least only for the sin of one man, &c. Observe first, how this Tragaedian caryeth himself in the making of his plea, to serve his owne turne. (For, Po•ta, cum primum animum ad scribendum appulit, id •ibi negoti credidit solum dari▪ populo ut placerent quas fecisset fabulas.) And therefore he feigneth that, before any man setts hand to the converting of an Infidell, the Infidell is acquainted already with our doctrine, concerning absolute reprobation. This is like the making of his owne bed, that he may lye the more easily. Secondly, what if he will not love such a God, or beleeve such a doctrine? shall the doctrine be the lesse true, for this? In the sixt of Iohn we reade how some distasted the doctrine of our Saviour, concerning the eating of his flesh, and saide that this was an hard saying, and thereupon many of his disciples departed from him, was our Saviours doctrine the lesse true, or did it deserve the lesse credite for this? If a man should preach unto an Infidell, that doctrine of Paul, where he sayth: Before the children were borne and when they had neyther done good nor evill, that the purpose of God according to election might stand, not of workes, but of him that calleth, it was said, The elder shall serve the younger; As it is written, I have loved Iacob, and have hated Esau. If an Infidell will not beleeve this, nor love such a God as is sett forth unto us herein; what therefore shall not we beleeve it, and acknowledge God to be good and just, notwithstanding this? what Christian that is not infatuated, doth not perceive the vanitie and absurdity of this Authors argumentation? and that in the investigation of divine truth, we are not to regard, how an Infidell is likely to be affected with it in our fancie, but whether such a doctrine be agreable to Gods word or no?
Now, by the Apostles argumentation, which is this; Before Esau and Jacob were borne or had done good or evil, it was said, The elder shall serve the younger, ergo election is not of works (to wit of good works) but of the mere pleasure of God who calleth whom he will, as afterwards it is said that, he hath mercy on whom he will. It doth as manifestly follow:
Now, by the Apostles argumentation, which is this; Before Esau and Iacob were borne or had done good or evill, it was sayde, The elder shall serve the younger, ergo election is not of workes (to witt of good workes) but of the mere pleasure of God who calleth whom he will, as afterwards it is sayde that, he hath mercy on whom he will. It doth as manifestly follow:
1. Concerning Election that as it is not of works, so neither is it of faith; seeing before they were borne, they were equally as uncapable of faith as of works, and consequently that Gods ordaining men unto salvation, proceeds merely according to the good pleasure of God, and not upon consideration either of works or faith.
1. Concerning Election that as it is not of workes, so neyther is it of faith; seing before they were borne, they were aequally as uncapable of faith as of workes, and consequently that Gods ordeyning men unto salvation, proceedes merely according to the good pleasure of God, and not upon consideration eyther of workes or faith.
2. As touching reprobation, that it is no more of evil works then election is of good works, for as much as before they were borne they were equally uncapable of the one as well as of the other, and the doing of evil is expressly excluded as well as the doing of good; whence it followeth manifestly, that Gods ordaining men unto damnation proceeds as much of the mere pleasure of God, and with as little consideration of sin, as Gods ordaining men unto salvation, proceeds of the mere pleasure of God, & without consideration of any righteousness in man; though flesh and blood be far more apt to tumultuate and make insurrection against this doctrine of reprobation, then against the proportionable doctrine of election.
2. As touching reprobation, that it is no more of evill workes then election is of good workes, for as much as before they were borne they were aequally uncapable of the one as well as of the other, and the doing of evill is expressely excluded as well as the doing of good; whence it followeth manifestly, that Gods ordeyning men unto damnation proceedes as much of the mere pleasure of God, and with as litle consideration of sinne, as Gods ordeyning men unto salvation, proceedes of the mere pleasure of God, & without consideration of any righteousnes in man; though fleshe and blood be farre more apt to tumultuate and make insurrection against this doctrine of reprobation, then against the proportionable doctrine of election.
Thirdly, consider the vanity of his amplifications in two particulars.
Thirdly, consider the vanitie of his amplifications in two particulars.
First, in that he aggravates the matter by the circumstance of the greatest part of mankind; whereas it is manifest by reason, that if it be just with God to deal thus with the least part of mankind, yea with any one; it is as just with God to deal in like manner with the greatest part of mankind, yea with all and every one.
First, in that he aggravates the matter by the circumstance of the greatest part of mankind; wheras it is manifest by reason, that if it be just with God to deale thus with the least part of mankinde, yea with any one; it is as just with God to deale in like manner with the greatest part of mankinde, yea with all and every one.
Secondly, he aggravates it by the circumstance of the least consideration of sin which we are said to deny to have ⟨p. 39⟩place in reprobation; whereas divine consideration hath no degrees at all whereby it may be capable of greater or less; sin indeed hath degrees in man, but divine consideration hath no degrees at all.
Secondly, he aggravates it by the circumstance of the least consideration of sinne which we are sayde to deny to have ⟨p. 39⟩place in reprobation; wheras divine consideration hath no degrees at all wherby it may be capable of greater or lesse; sin indeede hath degrees in man, but divine consideration hath no degrees at all.
Fourthly, to come nearer to the point, and to discover their juggling in stating our Tenet most calumniously. Consider, I pray, do any of our divines maintain, that God did ordain to damn any man but for sin? It is apparent they do not; all acknowledging that like as God doth damn no man but for sin, so doth he ordain to dam no man but for sin. For do they not all profess that the end intended by God in the reprobation of certain men is the manifestation of Gods justice; which if God doth intend, how can it be otherwise, but that whom he ordains to the suffering of everlasting torments, those he ordains to the suffering of everlasting torments for their sin, and for nothing else. And, to add one thing more, not for their sin which they sinned in Adam only (for thus I had rather express my self according to scripture phrase, then as this obscure Author doth in calling it only Adams sin) but for those very actual sins and transgressions which they are guilty of. Now this Author carieth the ma•ter so, as if our doctrine were, that God ordains men to be tormented not for sin, but merely for his own pleasure. And to this purpose he carieth himself very judiciously for the advantage of his own cause, in confounding the cause of the decree with the cause of the execution thereof. Confounding the most received distinction of the Schools, concerning the will of God as considerable; either quoad actum volentis, as touching the act of God willing, or, quoad res voli•as, as touching the things willed, by God.
Fourthly, to come nearer to the point, and to discover their jugling in stating our Tenet most calumniously. Consider, I pray, doe any of our divines meynteyne, that God did ordeyne to damne any man but for sinne? It is apparent they doe not; all acknowledging that like as God doth damne no man but for sinne, so doth he ordeyne to damme no man but for sinne. For doe they not all professe that the ende intended by God in the reprobation of certein men is the manifestation of Gods justice; which if God doth intende, how can it be otherwise, but that whom he ordeynes to the suffering of everlasting torments, those he ordeynes to the suffering of everlast•ng torments for their sinne, and for nothing els. And, to adde one thing more, not for their sinne which they sinned in Adam only (for thus I had rather expresse my selfe according to scripture phrase, then as this obscure Author doth in calling it only Adams sinne) but for those very actuall sinnes and transgressions which they are guilty of. Now this Author caryeth the ma•ter so, as if our doctrine were, that God ordeynes men to be tormented not for sinne, but merely for his owne pleasure. And to this purpose he caryeth himselfe very judiciously for the advantage of his owne cause, in confounding the cause of the decree with the cause of the execution therof. Confounding the most receaved distinction of the Schooles, concerning the will of God as considerable; eyther quoad actum volentis, as touching the act of God willing, or, quoad res voli•as, as touching the thinges willed, by God.
The act of God willing can have no cause, saith Aquinas, neither do I find any crossing of this amongst School divines until the Jesuits arose. And the same Aquinas, applying the same distinction to predestination, which is the very will of God in a certain kind, spares not to profess ⟨p. 40⟩that Never any man was so mad as to affirm that merits are the cause of predestination, quoad actum praedestinantis as touching the act of God predestinating. It seems, he knew of none so mad as to affirm this, but, since his days, there hath risen up a sect of Jesuits, a sect of Arminians more then enough, that are so mad, and yet carry this mad doctrine of theirs in such a confidentiary strain, as if they were the only sober men of the world. Then again the things willed by God in predestination are of different condition, and that so different; that look what alone is the cause of Gods decree, that, and that alone is the cause of the execution; look what alone is the cause of the decree quoad actum decernentis, that and that alone is the cause of the decree quoad rem volitam or decretam; but not so of the other, as for example, the things willed by God in predestination are grace and glory; by grace I understand the grace of faith and repentance. Now like as the act of Gods decree is of the mere pleasure of God, no temporal thing being fit to be the cause of the eternal decree of God; in like sort, the giving of faith and repentance proceeds merely of the good pleasure of God, according to that, God hath mercy on whom he will, Rom. 9.18. and to obtain mercy at the hands of God is to obtain faith, Rom. 11.30. But as for glory and salvation, we do not say that God, in conferring it, proceeds according to the mere pleasure of his will, but according to a law; which is this, whosoever believeth shall be saved; which law we willingly profess he made according to the mere pleasure of his will, but having made such a law, he proceeds according to it. No such law hath he made, according whereunto to proceed in the dispensation of grace, of faith, of repentance. And, in like sort, though God finds men equal when he bestows grace on some and not others; yet he finds them not equal, when he comes to bestow salvation on some and not on others.
The act of God willing can have no cause, sayth Aquinas, neyther doe I finde any crossing of this amongst Schoole divines untill the Iesuites arose. And the same Aquinas, applying the same distinction to praedestination, which is the very will of God in a certeyne kinde, spares not to professe ⟨p. 40⟩that Never any man was so madde as to affirme that merits are the cause of predestination, quoad actum praedestinantis as touching the act of God predestinating. It seemes, he knewe of none so madde as to affirme this, but, since his dayes, there hath risen up a sect of Iesuites, a sect of Arminians more then enough, that are so madde, and yet cary this madde doctrine of theirs in such a confidentiary streyne, as if they were the only sober men of the world. Then agayne the thinges willed by God in predestination are of different condition, and that so different; that looke what alone is the cause of Gods decree, that, and that alone is the cause of the execution; looke what alone is the cause of the decree quoad actum decernentis, that and that alone is the cause of the decree quoad rem volitam or decretam; but not so of the other, as for example, the things willed by God in predestination are grace and glory; by grace I understand the grace of faith and repentance. Now like as the act of Gods decree is of the mere pleasure of God, no temporall thing being fitt to be the cause of the aeternall decree of God; in like sort, the giving of faith and repentance proceedes merely of the good pleasure of God, according to that, God hath mercy on whom he will, Rom. 9.18. and to obteyne mercy at the handes of God is to obteyne faith, Rom. 11.30. But as for glory and salvation, we doe not say that God, in conferring it, proceedes according to the mere pleasure of his will, but according to a lawe; which is this, whosoever believeth shall be saved; which lawe we willingly professe he made according to the mere pleasure of his will, but having made such a lawe, he proceedes according to it. No such lawe hath he made, according wherunto to proceede in the dispensation of grace, of faith, of repentance. And, in like sort, though God findes men aequall when he bestowes grace on some and not others; yet he findes them not aequall, when he comes to bestowe salvation on some and not on others.
The like distinction is considerable on the part of reprobation, which also is the will of God in a certain kind; I say we must distinguish in this ⟨p. 41⟩decree, the act of God decreeing, and the things decreed by h•m. And these things are of a different nature, and so different, that look what alone is the cause of the act, that alone is the cause of one thing decreed by it, but not so of the other. As, for example, the things decreed by reprobation are: 1. The denial of grace, (by grace I mean) faith and repentance whereby that infidelity & hardness of heart which is natural to all, is cured. 2. The denial of glory, together with the inflicting of damnation. As touching the first of these; look what is the cause of reprobation as touching the act of God reprobating, that and that alone is the cause of the denial of Grace, to wit the mere pleasure of God: For the Apostle plainly teacheth us that as God hath mercy on whom he will, to wit, in giving faith and repentance; so he hardeneth whom he will, by refusing to give them faith and repentance.
The like distinction is cōsiderable on the part of reprobation, which allso is the will of God in a certeyne kinde; I say we must distingu•she in this ⟨p. 41⟩decree, the act of God decreeing, and the thinges decreed by h•m. And these thinges are of a different nature, and so d•fferent, that looke what alone is the cause of the act, that alone is the cause of one thing decreed by it, but not so of the other. As, for example, the things decreed by reprobation are: 1. The denyall of grace, (by grace I meane) faith and repentance wherby that infidelitie & hardnes of heart which is naturall to all, is cured. 2. The denyall of glory, together with the inflicting of damnation. As touching the first of these; looke what is the cause of reprobation as touching the act of God reprobating, that and that alone is the cause of the denyall of Grace, to witt the mere pleasure of God: For the Apostle playnly teache•h us that as God hath mercy on whom he will, to witt, in giving faith and repentance; so he hardneth whom he will, by refusing to give them faith and repentance.
But as touching the denial of glory and inflicting damnation, God doth not proceed according to the mere pleasure of his will, but according to a law, which is this, whosoever believeth not shall be damned. And, albeit God made that law according to the mere pleasure of his will; yet no wise man will say, that God denies glory and inflicts damnation on men according to the mere pleasure of his will: the case being clear, that God denies the one and infl•cts the other merely for their sins, who are thus dealt withal. And indeed, albeit men are found equal in their morality, when God denies the grace of faith and repentance unto some, which he bestows on others, yet, when he comes to deny glory and inflict damnation on men, dealing otherwise with others, he doth not find all to be equal, but some he finds to have ended their days in the state of faith and true repentance, others to have finished their days in sin, in infidelity or impenitency. And accordingly we distinguish between absolute election unto salvation, & election unto salvation absolute; absolute reprobation unto damnation and ⟨p. 42⟩reprobation unto damnation absolute; we grant absolute election unto salvation; and absolute reprobation unto damnation; but we deny either election to be unto salvation absolute, or reprobation unto damnation absolute. Yet there is a considerable difference between these; for as much as final infidelity and impenitency are the meritorious causes of damnation; but faith, repentance and good works are but the disposing causes of salvation. Yet like as God inflicts not damnation but by way of punishment, so he doth not bestow salvation, on any of ripe years, but by way of reward. Yet here also is a difference; for damnation is inflicted by way of punishment for the evil works sake which are committed: but salvation is not conferred by way of reward for the good works sake which are performed, but merely for Christs sake. All this, this Author, as I said, doth very judiciously confound for the advantage of his cause; taking no notice at all of these distinctions, whether wittingly dissembling them, or ignorantly not discerning them, albeit the genuine condition of our Tenet rightly understood, doth clearly bespeak them.
But as touching the denyall of glory and inflicting damnation, God doth not proceede according to the mere pleasure of his will, but according to a lawe, which is this, whosoever believeth not shall be damned. And, albeit God made that lawe according to the mere pleasure of his will; yet no wise man will say, that God denyes glory and inflicts damnation on men according to the mere pleasure of his will: the case being cleere, that God denyes the one and infl•cts the other merely for their sinnes, who are thus dealt withall. And indeede, albeit men are founde aequall in their moralitie, when God denyes the grace of faith and repentance unto some, which he bestowes on others, yet, when he comes to deny glory and inflict damnation on men, dealing otherwise with others, he doth not finde all to be aequall, but some he findes to have ended their dayes in the state of faith and true repentance, others to have finished their dayes in sinn, in infidelitie or impaenitencye. And accordingly we distinguishe betweene absolute election unto salvation, & election unto salvation absolute; absolute reprobation unto damnation and ⟨p. 42⟩reprobation unto damnation absolute; we grant absolute election unto salvation; and absolute reprobation unto damnation; but we deny eyther election to be unto salvation absolute, or reprobation unto damnation absolute. Yet there is a considerable difference betweene these; for as much as finall infidelitie and impenitency are the meritorious causes of damnation; but faith, repentance and good workes are but the disposing causes of salvation. Yet like as God inflicts not damnation but by way of punishment, so he doth not bestowe salvation, on any of ripe yeares, but by way of reward. Yet here allso is a difference; for damnation is inflicted by way of punishment for the evill workes sake which are committed: but salvation is not conferred by way of reward for the good workes sake which are performed, but merely for Christs sake. All this, this Author, as I sayde, doth very judiciously confounde for the advantage of his cause; taking no notice at all of these distinctions, whether wittingly dissembling them, or ignorantly not discerning them, albeit the genuine condition of our Tenet rightly understood, doth clearly bespeake them.
So that, if he would fairly set himself to the impugning of our Tenet as touching the absoluteness of Gods decree, he should leave the consideration of election and reprobation as touching those things willed by them which we call salvation and damnation, & insist upon the consideration of election and reprobation, as touching those other things willed thereby, which we call the giving of faith and repentance unto some, and the denial of faith and repentance unto others; wherein we willingly profess, that God carieth himself absolutely throughout; not only decreeing th•se according to the mere pleasure of his will, without all consideration of ought in man; but giving them also unto some and denying them unto others, according to the mere pleasure of his will, without the consideration of ought in man. Now in this point, this Author is content to be silent; for he finds no such harshness imputable unto us, in this Tenet of ours: Neither indeed can he stand to maintain his own Tenet, ⟨p. 43⟩without plunging himself into manifest Pelagianism. For, if God doth not give faith & repentance unto men according to the mere pleasure of his will, but upon consideration of somewhat found in man, then grace shall be given according unto works, which was condemned in the Synod of Palestine above 1200. years ago, & all along impugned, by the orthodox, in opposition to the Pelagians and Semipelagians. But I am willing to proceed further with this Author and to prove that God should not be unjust, though he inflict torment upon a creature though never so innocent. For, consider, shall it not be lawful with God to do what he will with his creature?
So that, if he woulde fairely sett h•mselfe to the impugning of our Tenet as touching the absolutenes of Gods decree, he should leave the consideration of election and reprobation as touching those things willed by them which we call salvation and damnation, & insist upon the consideration of election and reprobation, as touching those other things willed therby, which we call the giving of faith and repentance unto some, and the denyall of faith and repentance unto others; wherin we willingly professe, that God caryeth himselfe absolutely throughout; not only decreeing th•se according to the mere pleasure of his will, without all consideration of ought in man; but giving them allso unto some and denying them unto others, according to the mere pleasure of his will, without the consideration of ought in man. Now in this point, this Author is content to be silent; for he findes no such harshnes imputable unto us, in this Tenet of ours: Neyther indeede can he stande to maynteyne his owne Tenet, ⟨p. 43⟩without plunging himselfe into manifest Pelagianisme. For, if God doth not give faith & repentance unto men according to the mere pleasure of his will, but upon consideration of somewhat founde in man, then grace shall be given according unto workes, which was condemned in the Synod of Palestine above 1200. yeares agoe, & all along impugned, by the orthodoxe, in opposition to the Pelagians and Semipelagians. But I am willing to proceede further with this Author and to proove that God shoulde not be unjust, though he inflict torment upon a creature though never so innocent. For, consider, shall it not be lawfull with God to doe what he will with his creature?
Hath not man power to do what he will with the workmanship of his own hands? And shall this power be denied unto God? How did he afflict his most holy and innocent Son only to make his soul an offering for the sins of others? And what power hath God given us over inferior creatures, that are not capable of sin, are capable of pain enough through diseases, and through our employment of them to do us their faithful services; we put them to death after such a manner as whereby they may prove beneficial unto us, either for food, or physic, neither do we offend God in this, though some kinds of death prove more painful unto them, yet so long as hereby they prove more useful unto us we do not transgress.
Hath not man power to doe what he will with the workmanship of his owne handes? And shall this power be denyed unto God? How did he afflict his most holy and innocent Sonne only to make his soule an offering for the sins of others? And what power hath God given us over inferior creatures, that are not capable of sinne, are capable of payne enough through diseases, and through our imployment of them to doe us their faithfull services; we put them to death after such a manner as wherby they may proove beneficiall unto us, eyther for food, or physicke, neyther doe we offende God in this, though some kindes of death proove more paynfull unto them, yet so long as hereby they proove more usefull unto us we doe not transgresse.
And now adays all sides confess, that it is in the power of God to annihilate the holiest Angel in heaven, and that in the execution hereof, he should execute no other then a lawful power. And who had not rather be content to suffer a continual pain (so it be tolerable,) then to dye, much more then to have both body & soul turned into nothing?
And now adayes all sides confesse, that it is in the power of God to annihilate the holiest Angell in heaven, and that in the execution herof, he shoulde execute no other then a lawfull power. And who had not rather be content to suffer a continuall payne (so it be tolerable,) then to dye, much more then to have both body & soule turned into nothing?
When the old world was drowned, how many thousands of infants perished in that deluge, choked in the waters, which were guilty of no other sin, then what they sinned in our common Father Adam? So in the destruction of Sodom and Gomorrah by fire, how many Infants were burnt ⟨p. 44⟩to ashes, some in their mothers womb, some hanging on their mothers breasts; when the earth opened and swallowed up the congregation of Dathan and Ab•ram, their little ones were swallowed up together with their rebellious parents; and shall we say that God was unjust in the execution of these and such like judgments?
When the old world was drowned, how many thousands of infants perished in that deluge, choaked in the waters, which were guiltie of no other sinne, then what they sinned in our common Father Adam? So in the destruction of Sodom and Gommorrha by fire, how many Infants were burnt ⟨p. 44⟩to ashes, some in their mothers wombe, some hanging on their mothers breasts; when the earth opened and swallowed up the congregation of Dathan and Ab•ram, their litle ones were swallowed up together with their rebellious parents; and shall we say that God was unjust in the execution of these and such like judgments?
Yet Medina professeth that God, as Lord of life and death, hath power to inflict any pain on any creature be he never so innocent, and this he delivers ex concordi omnium Theologorum Sententia. And indeed, no reason can define those bounds & limits of pain and sorrow, either as touching intension, or duration, within which, in the execution of pain, God must consist, & beyond which he cannot proceed incolumi justitia. And will th•s Author deny that by the sin of one man sin entered into the world, and death by sin hath spread it self over all, even over those that did not sin after the similitude of Adams transgression, that is, over Infants? Is this the fruit of God his making us after his own image, that hereupon we should circumscribe and limit the execution of his power over us in comparison with others, and that only by rules devised by flesh and blood? And if he doth execute no other then a lawful power, can he be justly censured of cruelty? But seeing he ordains no man to damnation but for sin, and that to the manifestation of his justice, which is his glory; is he less good, or wise or just in this? The scripture plainly teacheth us that God made all things for himself, even the wicked against the day of evil, 1and shall we suspend our judgements, as touching our adherence unto this divine and sacred truth, until such time as we have made trial how this doctrine will relish with infidels? What if they are destitute of certain graces, and that it was Gods will never to bestow any such grace upon them. What disparagement (I say) is this to Gods goodness, wisdom, or justice, in damning men for sin voluntarily and freely committed by them? Or, is his meaning that God doth damn them for being destitute of such certain graces? ⟨p. 45⟩Why did he not speak it out plainly? Was he ashamed expressly to deliver so shameful an untruth? would he rather have the propitious Reader, to apprehend by […] way a belief of that which he was ashamed to utter? What divine of ours was ever known to affirm, that God doth damn a man, because God doth not regenerate him, or for the want of regeneration? God damns no man but for sin, and that actual, most freely committed by him, in case he live to the committing of sins actual. It is true, that all are born children of wrath, by virtue of that sin, which we all sinned in Adam;
Yet Medina professeth that God, as Lord of life and death, hath power to inflict any payne on any creature be he never so innocent, and this he delivers ex concordi omnium Theologorum Sententia. And indeed, no reason can define those boundes & limits of payne and sorrowe, eyther as touching intension, or duration, within which, in the execution of payne, God must consist, & beyond which he cannot proceede incolumi justitia. And will th•s Author deny that by the sinne of one man sinne entred into the world, and death by sinne hath spread it selfe over all, even over those that did not sinne after the similitude of Adams transgression, that is, over Infants? Is this the fruite of God his making us after his owne image, that herupon we shoulde circumscribe and l•mit the execution of his power over us in comparison with others, and that only by rules devised by fleshe and blood? And if he doth execute no other then a lawfull power, can he be justly censured of crueltie? But seing he ordeynes no man to damnation but for sinne, and that to the manifestation of his justice, which is his glory; is he lesse good, or wise or just in this? The scripture playnely teacheth us that God made all thinges for himselfe, even the wicked against the day of evill, 1and shall we suspende our judgements, as touching our adherence unto this divine and sacred truth, untill such time as we have made triall how this doctrine will relish with infidells? What if they are destitute of certaine graces, and that it was Gods will never to bestow any such grace upon them. What disparagement (I say) is this to Gods goodnesse, wisedome, or justice, in damning men for sinne voluntarily and freely committed by them? Or, is his meaning that God doth damne them for being destitute of such certeyne graces? ⟨p. 45⟩Why did he not speake it out plainly? Was he ashamed expressely to deliver so shamefull an untruth? would he rather have the propitious Reader, to apprehend by 〈…〉 way a beliefe of that which he was ashamed to utter? What divine of ours was ever knowne to affirm, that God doth damne a man, because God doth not regenerate him, or for the want of regeneration? God damnes no man but for sinne, and that actuall, most freely committed by him, in case he live to the committing of sinnes actuall. It is true, that all are born children of wrath, by vertue of that sinne, which we all sinned in Adam;
This is as true as the word of God is true, and that the Epistles of S. Paul to the Romans, and to the Ephesians are a part of Gods word. And if he hath a tooth against our doctrine, touching original sin, either touching the nature, or touching the guilt of it, even the guilt of eternal death, why did he not show his strength in the impugning of it? Yet, what are these graces, which God (he saith) hath never willed to have given them who are damned, according to our opinion, implying that, according to his opinion, God did well to bestow them even on those, who never enjoyed them? Why doth he scu•k in this manner, and conceal himself, for fear of coming to the light? Is it because he cherisheth an evil conscience in hugging some erroneous points in his bosom, therefore he hateth the light? Is faith one of those graces, which God did will to bestow on them, who yet never had faith? If God doth will to bestow faith on them, how comes it, that they have not faith? Is not God able to give them faith? Look but upon our selves, whatsoever we will do, and are able to do, that we do; if then God be able to work faith in any man, if withal he will work it, how is it possible that such a one should want faith? Who hath resisted his will? Again, to give a man faith, is to show him mercy, for to obtain faith, is to obtain mercy, Rom. 11.30. If then God will give faith to any, he doth give faith unto him; For, he doth show mercy on whom he will, Rom. 9.18.
This is as true as the word of God is true, and that the Epistles of S. Paul to the Romans, and to the Ephesians are a part of Gods word. And if he hath a tooth against our doctrine, touching originall sinne, eyther touching the nature, or touching the guilt of it, even the guilt of aeternall death, why did he not shew his strength in the impugning of it? Yet, what are these graces, which God (he sayth) hath never willed to have given them who are damned, according to our opinion, implying that, according to his opinion, God did well to bestow them even on those, who never enjoyed them? Why doth he scu•k in this manner, and conceal himself, for fear of comming to the light? Is it because he cherisheth an evill conscience in hugging some erroneous points in his bosome, therefore he hateth the light? Is faith one of those graces, which God did will to bestow on them, who yet neuer had faith? If God doth will to bestow faith on them, how comes it, that they have not faith? Is not God able to give them faith? Looke but upon our selves, whatsoever we will doe, and are able to doe, that we doe; if then God be able to worke faith in any man, if withall he will worke it, how is it possible that such a one should want faith? Who hath resist•d his will? Againe, to give a man faith, is to shew him mercy, for to obteyne faith, is to obteyne mercy, Rom. 11.30. If then God will give faith to any, he doth give faith unto him; For, he doth shew mercy on whom he will, Rom. 9.18.
But let us devise what is this Authors meaning, as touching God his willing faith to them that never have it; It may be, his meaning is, that God is ready to work faith in man upon a condition; Now, what is that condition? Can it be any other thing then some work of man? And what follows herehence? but that God gives faith according to mens works, which is pure Pelagianism, condemned for heresy in the Church of God from time to time. Or will they say, that God is ready to work faith in man, provided that man will; but let them speak out, and say plainly, that God is ready to work faith in man, provided that he doth first work it in himself. For even the will is Gods work, Phil. 3.13. and God works in us every thing that is pleasing in his sight, through Jesus Christ. And what shall be the condition of Gods working in us the very will? Yet still they frame themselves to the Pelagian Tenet, as if grace were conferred according unto works, directly contrary to the doctrine of S. Paul, 2. Tim. 1.9. Who hath saved us, and called us with an holy calling, not according unto our works, but according to his own purpose & grace.
But let us devise what is this Authors meaning, as touching God his willing faith to them that never have it; It may be, his meaning is, that God is ready to worke faith in man upon a condition; Now, what is that condition? Can it be any other thing then some worke of man? And what followes herehēce? but that God gives faith according to mens works, which is pure Pelagianisme, condemned for heresie in the Church of God from time to time. Or will they say, that God is ready to worke faith in man, provided that man will; but let them speake out, and say plainly, that God is ready to worke faith in man, provided that he doth first worke it in himself. For even the will is Gods worke, Phil. 3.13. and God workes in us every thing that is pleasing in his sight, through Iesus Christ. And what shall be the condition of Gods working in us the very will? Yet still they frame themselves to the Pelagian Tenet, as if grace were conferred according unto workes, directly contrary to the doctrine of S. Paul, 2. Tim. 1.9. Who hath saved us, and called us with an holy calling, not according unto our workes, but according to his owne purpose & grace.
Lastly, is their meaning this, God will concur with us to the working of faith, so we will concur with him; And do any of our divines deny Gods concurrence to every good work? though this concurrence we hold to be merely impossible; For in like sort it is as true, that man will concur to the working of faith, if so be God will concur with him; and this is maintained by Jesuits and Arminians, and Gods foresight of this is their scientia media.
Lastly, is their meaning this, God will concurre with us to the working of faith, so we will concurre with him; And doe any of our divines denye Gods concurrence to every good worke? though this concurrence we hold to be meerely impossible; For in like sort it is as true, that man will concurre to the working of faith, if so be God will concurre with him; and this is mainteyned by Iesuites and Arminians, and Gods foresight of this is their scientia media.
Now, consider, I pray, the absurdity hereof. For, upon this mutual supposition on both sides, it is utterly impossible any action should proceed. As, for example, if you say you will go to London, if so be, I will go with you; and I say likewise, that I will go with you, if so be you will go with me; so long as neither of us do absolutely resolve to go to London, it is impossible either of us should go to London at all.
Now, consider, I pray, the absurditie hereof. For, upon this mutuall supposition on both sides, it is utterly impossible any action should proceede. As, for example, if you say you will go to London, if so be, I will go with you; and I say likewise, that I will go with you, if so be you will go with me; so long as neyther of us doe absolutely resolve to go to London, it is impossible eyther of us should go to London at all.
Again, if God doth thus only concur to the working of faith, and this be sufficient to make him the Author of faith; why may he not as well be accounted the Author of every evil act, that is committed throughout the world? For, do not your selves maintain, that God in like sort concurs to the producing of every evil act?
Againe, if God doth thus onely concurre to the working of faith, and this be sufficient to make him the Author of faith; why may he not as well be accompted the Author of every evill act, that is committed throughout the world? For, doe not your selves mainteyne, that God in like sort concurres to the producing of every evill act?
But perhaps by Gods will, in this place, is meant Gods commandment, For, it is a juggling world, wherein we live, & equivocation is most congruous to their courses, who desire to play fast & loose.
But perhaps by Gods will, in this place, is meant Gods commandement, For, it is a jugling world, wherein we live, & aequivocation is most congruous to their courses, who desire to play fast & loose.
Now, do any of our divines deny that God commands all in the Church, all that hear the Gospel to believe, whether they be the elect of God, or whether they be reprobates? But will it follow herehence, that Gods purpose is to give them faith? Or will they deny faith, to be the gift of God, & oppose Paul to his face, Phil. 1 29. and Eph. 2.8?
Now, doe any of our divines deny that God commands all in the Church, all that heare the Gospell to beleeve, whether they be the elect of God, or whether they be reprobates? But will it follow herehence, that Gods purpose is to give them faith? Or will they deny faith, to be the gift of God, & oppose Paul to his face, Phil. 1 29. and Eph. 2.8?
Yet you will say, God punisheth them for refusing to believe; I grant he doth: For this refusal is the free act of their wills; and by mere power of nature, they might abstain from this refusal, and have believed as well as Simon Magus did, as well as profane persons do, as many an hypocrite do; which is only fides acquisita; And, it is well known, they believe many a vile legend.
Yet you will say, God punisheth them for refusing to beleeve; I grant he doth: For this refusall is the free act of their wills; and by mere power of nature, they might absteyne from this refusall, and have beleeved as well as Simon Magus did, as well as profane persons doe, as many an hypocrite doe; which is only fides acquisita; And, it is well knowne, they beleeve many a vile legend.
But then he will say, such a faith shall never save them; and I willingly confess, it shall not; For it never brings forth any love of the truth, any conformity thereunto in their lives. Yet are they never a whit the less inexcusable that refuse to believe.
But then he will say, such a faith shall never save them; and I willingly confesse, it shall not; For it never brings forth any love of the truth, any conformity thereunto in their lifes. Yet are they never a whit the lesse inexcusable that refuse to beleeve.
Secondly, why do they not beleeve but quia nō ••••, and Austin, both in his lib. 3. de Gen. ad literam cap. 1. and his retraction thereof, both saith and justifies, as omnino true, that even natural men may both believe, if they will, and from the love of temporal things convert themselves to the the keeping of Gods commandments, if they will. For, indeed, this impotency, which is found in all, of doing that which is good, is not so much natural as moral, having the ⟨p. 48⟩the root thereof either only or chiefly in the will of man; And, if they may believe if they will, is it not just with God to punish them for not believing? Therefore, if a question be made, why the wicked do not this or that, which is good, his answer is quia nolunt; but, saith he, if you further demand, Quare nolunt? Imus in l•gum, saith Austin, yet without prejudice to a more diligent inquisition of the truth, I answer, saith the same divine, that the reason is, either because it appears not unto them what it is, or, appearing what it is, yet it doth not delight them; Sed ut innotescat quòd latebat, & suave fiat, quod minime delectabat, gratiae Dei est, quae humanas adjuvat voluntates. But, to prosecute this argument farther then this Author dreams of, we say there are but three sorts of supernatural acts, and they are either faith divine, or hope divine, or charity divine, all other acts are natural and performable by a natural man, whether they be the acts of all moral virtues, or an exterior conformity to the means of grace, whereby it comes to pass that some doe proficere ad exteriorem vitae emendationem; but none of these acts are acceptable with God unless they proceed from, and are rightly qualified by those three theological virtues, faith, hope, and love, all which are divine and supernatural; the love of God being such as is joined with the contempt of our selves; as for faith and hope it appears how supernatural they are, by the supernatural condition of their objects. Now suppose that a man were so exact, both in natural morality, and in an outward conformity to the means of grace, as not to fail in any particular, as he hath power to perform any particular hereof naturally;
Secondly, why doe they not beleeve but quia nō ••••, and Austin, both in his lib. 3. de Gen. ad literam cap. 1. and his retraction thereof, both sayth and justifyes, as omnino true, that even naturall men may both beleeve, if they will, and from the love of temporall things convert themselves to the the keeping of Gods commandements, if they will. For, indeed, this impotency, which is found in all, of doing that which is good, is not so much naturall as morall, having the ⟨p. 48⟩the roote therof eyther only or che•fly in the will of man; And, if they may believe if they will, is it not just with God to punish them for not believinge? Therfore, if a quaestion be made, why the wicked doe not this or that, which is good, his answeare is quia nolunt; but, sayth he, if you further demaund, Quare nolunt? Imus in l•gum, sayth Austin, yet without prejudice to a more diligent inquisition of the truth, I answere, sayth the same divine, that the reason is, eyther because it appeares not unto them what it is, or, appearing what it is, yet it doth not delight them; Sed ut innotescat quòd latebat, & suave fiat, quod minime delectabat, gratiae Dei est, quae humanas adjuvat voluntates. But, to prosecute this argument farther then this Author dreames of, we say there are but three sorts of supernaturall acts, and they are eyther faith devine, or hope devine, or charitie divine, all other acts are naturall and performable by a naturall man, whether they be the acts of all morall vertues, or an •xterior conformitie to the meanes of grace, wherby it comes to passe that some doe proficere ad exteriorem vitae emendationem; but none of these acts are acceptable with God unles they proceede from, and are rightly qualified by those three theologicall vertues, faith, hope, and love, all which are divine and supernaturall; the love of God being such as is joyned with the contempt of our selfes; as for faith and hope it appears how supernaturall they are, by the supernaturall condition of theire objects. Now suppose that a man were so exact, both in naturall moralitie, and in an outward conformitie to the meanes of grace, as not to fayle in any particular, as he hath power to performe any particular hereof naturally;
in this case, I say, if there were any such, he should be in the same case with those that are guilty of no sin, but sin original, which yet the word of God teacheth us to be sufficient to make all men to be borne children of wrath; though, as Austin speaketh, their poena be omnium mitissima; and that such perhaps (for so as remember he proposeth it) ut mallent paenamillam subire, quam non esse: As for the necessity of sinning, which, he ⟨p. 49⟩saith, God hath imposed upon them, Corvinus confesseth that all men, by the sin of Adam, are conjecti in necessitatem peccandi, and that out of the opinion of Arminius; his words are these;1 Fatetur Arminius hominem sub statu peccati necessariò peccare, nisi Deus istam necessitatem gratiose tollat. And this he calls, a little after, necessitatem peccandi. But yet, to clear this necessity, which he doth not, we do not say that any man sins any particular sin, as the sin of lying, whoring, swearing, stealing, necessarily; for undoubtedly it is in the power of man to abstain from any of these; but this we say, whatsoever they do, they sin in some sort or other; whether they commit fornication, or whether they abstain from fornication, or from any other act forbidden, in as much as they do not abstain from it in a gracious manner and acceptable unto God. For they that are in the flesh cannot please God; as in not abstaining from it, for Gods sake, in conscience of his word, in reference to his glory, out of the sense of his love towards them in Christ, in acknowledgement that all power of doing things pleasing in his sight proceeds from him, &c. As for the imposing of this necessity of sinning upon man▪ When a man, by defiling his body through incontinency, brings some filthy disease upon him which he propagates to his posterity, shall we say God imposeth this disease upon him and his? though it cannot be denied, but even the course of nature is the work of God; in the like sort, when Adam, by sinning against God, corrupted his own nature, and therewithal his whole posterity, shall we lay the blame of this on God, and call him the imposer of it, and not on Adam, yea on our selves, who sinned in Adam, as the Holy Ghost teacheth us to speak?
in this case, I say, if there were any such, he shoulde be in the same case with those that are guilty of no sinne, but sinne originall, which yet the word of God teacheth us to be sufficient to make all men to be borne children of wrath; though, as Austin speaketh, their poena be omnium mitissima; and that such perhaps (for so as remember he proposeth it) ut mallent paenamillam subire, quam non esse: As for the necessitie of sinning, which, he ⟨p. 49⟩saith, God hath imposed upon them, Corvinus confesseth that all men, by the sinne of Adam, are conjecti in necessitatem peccandi, and that out of the opinion of Arminius; his wordes are these;1 Fatetur Arminius hominem sub statu peccati necessariò peccare, nisi Deus istam necessitatem gratiose tollat. And this he calls, a litle after, necessitatem peccandi. But yet, to cleare this necessitie, which he doth not, we doe not say that any man sinnes any particular sinne, as the sinne of lying, whoring, swearing, stealing, necessarily; for undoubtedly it is in the power of man to absteyne from any of these; but this we say, whatsoever they doe, they sinne in some sort or other; whether they committ fornication, or whether they absteyne from fornication, or from any other act forbidden, in as much as they doe not absteyne from it in a gracious manner and acceptable unto God. For they that are in the flesh cannot please God; as in not absteyning from it, for Gods sake, in conscience of his word, in reference to his glory, out of the sence of his love towards them in Christ, in acknowledgment that all power of doing things pleasing in his sight proceedes from him, &c. As for the imposing of this necessitie of sinning upon man▪ When a man, by defiling his body through incontinency, bringes some filthy disease upon him which he propagates to his posteritie, shall we say God imposeth this disease upon him and his? though it cannot be denyed, but even the course of nature is the worke of God; in the like sort, when Adam, by sinning against God, corrupted his owne nature, and therewithall his whole posterity, shall we lay the blame of this on God, and call him the imposer of it, and not on Adam, yea on our selves, who sinned in Adam, as the Holy Ghost teacheth us to speake?
We speak plainly, in saying that the love of God to the contempt of our selves, is not natural to any man, unless he be endued with the Spirit of God, but Adam was created, (and we in him) in the state of grace, and endued with the Spirit of God; by virtue whereof the soul of man was fixed upon God, as upon his end, to enjoy him, and to use all other things even our selves, and all for him, and in reference to his glory.
We speake plainly, in saying that the love of God to the contempt of our selves, is not naturall to any man, unlesse he be indued with the Spirit of God, but Adam was created, (and we in him) in the state of grace, and indued with the Spirit of God; by vertue whereof the soule of man was fixed upon God, as upon his end, to enjoy him, and to use all other things even our selves, and all for him, and in reference to his glory.