A14216:1000
The Sum of Christian Religion
The sum of Christian religion: delivered by Zacharias Ursinus in his lectures upon the Catechism authorised by the noble Prince Frederick, throughout his dominions: wherein are debated and resolved the questions of whatsoever points of moment, which have been or are controversed in divinity. Translated into English by Henry Parry, out of the last & best Latin editions, together with some supply of wa[n]ts out of his discourses of divinity, and with correction of sundry faults & imperfections, which are [sic] as yet remaining in the best corrected Latin.The summe of Christian religion: deliuered by Zacharias Vrsinus in his lectures vpon the Catechism autorised by the noble Prince Frederick, throughout his dominions: wherein are debated and resolued the questions of whatsoeuer points of moment, which haue beene or are controuersed in diuinitie. Translated into English by Henrie Parrie, out of the last & best Latin editions, together with some supplie of wa[n]ts out of his discourses of diuinitie, and with correction of sundrie faults & imperfections, which ar [sic] as yet remaining in the best corrected Latine.
Oxford: printed by Joseph Barnes, 1587Oxford: printed by Ioseph Barnes, 1587
Modern spelling is a reading aid: the words are the author’s, only the spelling is modernized. Original shows the page as printed, with the transcription marks.
2 Objection. God is unchangeably good; therefore not freely good. Answer. This unchangeableness, doth not diminish, but establish the liberty of Gods will. For it is not the unchangeableness of a nature, but constraint and coaction, which is contrary to liberty: and so much the more freely the will chooseth, with how much the greater and surer force and motion it is carried unto her object.
2 Obiection. God is vnchangeablie good; therefore not freelie good. Aunswere. This vnchangeablenes, dooth not diminish, but establish the libertie of Gods will. For it is not the vnchangeablenes of a nature, but constraint and coaction, which is contrarie to libertie: and so much the more freely the will chooseth, with howe much the greater and surer force and motion it is carried vnto her obiect.
3 Objection It is said also of particular events, that God can only will those things which are best: but only those things which he hath decreed are best; therefore he cannot will other things. But answer is made to the Minor: What things God hath decreed, those are best, not before, but after his decree. For Gods will being the rule and squire of rightness, therefore are things good, because he will them: wherefore if he would have from everlasting had any other thing: that then should have been best. As that Joseph should be sold, and made Lord of Egypt, and give sustenance to his fathers family, was best, because God would ⟨p. 333⟩so Now if God would have any other way exercised Joseph and taken vengeance on his brethren, that should then have been the best. It followeth therefore, that God will no other thing, after he hath once decreed, what he will have done; but that he was able from everlasting to have decreed some other thing: For whatsoever he would, that from everlasting he would most freely. 4 Objection. Moreover, some places of scripture seem to intimate that the will of God may be sometimes hindered by his creatures. As