A14350:1218
The common places of the most famous and renowned divine Doctor Peter Martyr divided into four principal parts: with a large addition of many theological and necessary discourses, some never extant before. Translated and partly gathered by Anthony Marten, one of the sewers of her Majesties most honourable chamber.The common places of the most famous and renowmed diuine Doctor Peter Martyr diuided into foure principall parts: with a large addition of manie theologicall and necessarie discourses, some neuer extant before. Translated and partlie gathered by Anthonie Marten, one of the sewers of hir Maiesties most honourable chamber.
Imprinted at London : In Pater noster Rowe, by Henry Denham and Henry Middleton at the costs and charges of Henry Denham, Thomas Chard, William Broome, and Andrew Maunsell, 1583Imprinted at London : In Pater noster Rovve, by Henry Denham and Henry Middleton at the costs and charges of Henrie Denham, Thomas Chard, VVilliam Broome, and Andrew Maunsell, 1583
No title page in the transcription: set from the catalogue record.
Modern spelling is a reading aid: the words are the author’s, only the spelling is modernized. Original shows the page as printed, with the transcription marks.
5 All the knowledge that we have, is either revealed, or gotten by endeavour: in the former part is divinity, and in the latter is philosophy. The name of philosophy is compounded. Wisdom of some is called a knowledge of all the things that be extant. 1But since that wisdom comprehendeth nothing but a certain and undoubted knowledge, it cannot be as concerning all things; for some certain things are unknown: things that come by chance and casually, cannot be known, because of their uncertainty. Others say, that the same is a knowledge of divine and humane things: howbeit, between divine and humane, there are found many things; namely, the circles of heaven, stars, elements, meteors, stones, mines, plants, herbs, and brute beasts. But they refer heaven unto God; because it is a thing immortal: but inferior things, they say, belong unto men, forsomuch as they be corruptible. But in what place will they account the science Mathematical? Howbeit it seemeth meet that it be defined; to wit, 2that It is an habit given to mens minds by God, increased by diligence & exercise, whereby allthings that be, are comprehended, so far forth as they can certainly & by firm reason be comprehended, that man may attain unto felicity. And here be all the kinds of causes. The form, which is the habit. The matter, wherein it cleaveth; that is to wit, 3the mind and reason of man, and those things about which (as about objects) the same is occupied; namely, about all things that be extant, yet not simply and absolutely, but so far forth as they can be certainly known. The worker is specified; namely, in that God is appointed to be the author: for he hath planted light in our minds, and hath sown in us the seeds, which are the originals of all sciences. Whereupon Cicero in the first book of his Tusculan questions, saith, that Philosophy is the gift and invention of the gods. And this doth Lucretius also grant, although he were an Epicure. And forsomuch as an assured knowledge of all things may rather be desired than hoped for, and is sooner loved than possessed; and that the more we give our selves to the same, so much the more are we stirred up towards it: therefore it is called philosophy. The author of this name was Pythagoras: he, when he was come to Philonta, and had spoken with Leontes, which in this place was a tyrant;
5 All the knowledge that we haue, is either reuealed, or gotten by indeuour: in the former part is diuinitie, and in the latter is philosophie. The name of philosophie is compounded. Wisedome of some is called a knowledge of all the things that be extant. 1But since that wisdome comprehendeth nothing but a certeine and vndoubted knowledge, it cannot be as concerning all things; for some certeine things are vnknowne: things that come by chance and casuallie, cannot be knowne, bicause of their vncerteintie. Others saie, that the same is a knowledge of diuine and humane things: howbeit, betwéene diuine and humane, there are found manie things; namelie, the circles of heauen, starres, elements, meteors, stones, mines, plants, herbes, and brute beasts. But they referre heauen vnto God; bicause it is a thing immortall: but inferiour things, they saie, belong vnto men, forsomuch as they be corruptible. But in what place will they account the science Mathematicall? Howbeit it séemeth méet that it be defined; to wit, 2that It is an habit giuen to mens minds by God, increased by diligence & exercise, wherby althings that be, are comprehended, so far foorth as they can certeinlie & by firme reason be comprehended, that man maie attaine vnto felicitie. And héere be all the kinds of causes. The forme, which is the habit. The matter, wherein it cleaueth; that is to wit, 3the mind and reason of man, and those things about which (as about obiects) the same is occupied; namelie, about all things that be extant, yet not simplie and absolutelie, but so far foorth as they can be certeinelie knowne. The worker is specified; namelie, in that God is appointed to be the author: for he hath planted light in our minds, and hath sowen in vs the séeds, which are the originals of all sciences. Whervpon Cicero in the first booke of his Tusculane questions, saith, that Philosophie is the gift and inuention of the gods. And this dooth Lucretius also grant, although he were an Epicure. And forsomuch as an assured knowledge of all things may rather be desired than hoped for, and is sooner loued than possessed; and that the more we giue our selues to the same, so much the more are we stirred vp towards it: therfore it is called philosophie. The author of this name was Pythagoras: he, when he was come to Philonta, and had spoken with Leontes, which in this place was a tyrant;
marvelling at the wit and eloquence of the man, demanded of him what art or science he would profess: who would not say, that he was a wise man, but one that desired wisdom, that is, a philosopher.
maruelling at the wit and eloquence of the man, demanded of him what art or science he would professe: who would not saie, that he was a wise man, but one that desired wisedome, that is, a philosopher.
6 And this being defined on this wise, it is divided into the part active and contemplative: 1both which Aristotle entreated of, according as the subject required. These do so differ, as contemplative ⟨p. 301⟩only beholdeth, and active practiseth those things that be known. So as they differ in their ends: for contemplative reposeth it self in the very contemplation of things; for it is not able to exercise them. But active doth therefore behold, that it may in work express the thing which it knoweth. And we see undoubtedly, that in man there be two works: for he understandeth, and afterward he worketh. And even as God not only understandeth himself, and is happy and perfect to himself; but also by his providence doth create, & things being brought forth, governeth them: so likewise is there two sorts of mans felicity; the one, which we may call active, and thereof doth Aristotle write in his first book of Ethics; and the other, which is far more perfect and exquisite, is contemplative, and of that he disputed in the tenth book. Whereby it appeareth, that man, if he become perfect in this double felicity, draweth very near unto the similitude of God. Wherefore Plato, in his book of the immortality of the soul, said: that Philosophy is the imitating of God, according to mans ability. Neither is this distinction of practise and speculation given (as some think) by the works of our own understanding and will: for it ought not thus to be; because knowledges are distinguished by their objects. But if a man will somewhat more diligently consider of the matter, he shall see, that it must be taken according as those things be which are understood: for those either have God and nature for their causes, and then they belong to the kind speculative; because such things we cannot do by our own choice. But there be other things, which have us for their causes, in respect that we do will & choose: and these be of the active faculty.
6 And this being defined on this wise, it is diuided into the part actiue and contemplatiue: 1both which Aristotle intreated of, according as the subiect required. These doo so differ, as contemplatiue ⟨p. 301⟩
But let us see whether of these is the more excellent. By the common and received opinion, the speculative is preferred before the active: 1for action is ordained unto contemplation; but not so on the other part. And no man doubteth, but that which is ordained to another thing, is of less worthiness than that thing. But they again object, that the general word of contemplation belongeth unto action: for therefore do we behold nature, that we may love the author thereof; and therefore do we seek to know God, to the intent we may honour him: and for this cause is our divinity of some, called active. Howbeit, these men, in reasoning after this manner, are very much deceived: for there is no science therefore called active, because there followeth a work of that knowledge, unless the self-same thing be performed which was first known. When we behold nature, and the heaven, albeit of the same there follow a worshipping and loving of God; yet must not such a knowledge be called active, forsomuch as that is not brought to pass which we do behold: for there is no man that can make nature and heaven, and other works that follow thereof. Accidentally they are said to be done: for not all they which do behold these things, do love and honour God; nay rather, they be oftentimes furthest of all from him. And further, the works following that knowledge, & also our divinity, have respect unto this; that we may know God more and more, until we behold him face to face in the kingdom of heaven.
But let vs sée whether of these is the more excellent. By the common and receiued opinion, the speculatiue is preferred before the actiue: 1for action is ordeined vnto contemplation; but not so on the other part. And no man doubteth, but that which is ordeined to another thing, is of lesse worthinesse than that thing. But they againe obiect, that the generall word of contemplation belongeth vnto action: for therefore doo we behold nature, that we may loue the author thereof; and therefore doo we séeke to knowe God, to the intent we may honor him: and for this cause is our diuinitie of some, called actiue. Howbeit, these men, in reasoning after this maner, are verie much deceiued: for there is no science therefore called actiue, bicause there followeth a worke of that knowledge, vnlesse the selfe-same thing be performed which was first knowen. When we behold nature, and the heauen, albeit of the same there followe a worshipping and louing of God; yet must not such a knowledge be called actiue, forsomuch as that is not brought to passe which we doo behold: for there is no man that can make nature and heauen, and other works that followe thereof. Accidentallie they are said to be doone: for not all they which doo behold these things, doo loue and honor God; naie rather, they be oftentimes furthest of all from him. And further, the works following that knowledge, & also our diuinitie, haue respect vnto this; that we may knowe God more and more, vntill we behold him face to face in the kingdome of heauen.
And our saviour Christ confirmed this opinion, when he said; This is eternal life, 1that they may know thee the only true God, and Jesus Christ whom thou hast sent. 2And not only do these two points divide philosophy, but they also divide our understanding: whereupon the one is called active, and the other speculative; not as though there can be two powers or faculties of the mind; but because the understanding, according as it is conversant about such and such other things, so is it called either speculative or active. That philosophy which is speculative, is divided into three parts. 3For there be some things even utterly sundered and severed from the matter; so is God, and so are the intelligences, and they are called supernatural: or else they are things so inherent in the matter, as without it they can not so much as be defined, & in that sort they are natural: or else they are after a middle sort; for that they cannot be without a matter, either of iron, or wood, or such like, and yet may be defined or understood without those things; as are the Mathematics.
And our sauiour Christ confirmed this opinion, when he said; This is eternall life, 1that they may knowe thee the onelie true God, and Iesus Christ whom thou hast sent. 2And not onelie doo these two points diuide philosophie, but they also diuide our vnderstanding: wherevpon the one is called actiue, and the other speculatiue; not as though there can be two powers or faculties of the mind; but bicause the vnderstanding, according as it is conuersant about such and such other things, so is it called either speculatiue or actiue. That philosophie which is speculatiue, is diuided into thrée parts. 3For there be some things euen vtterlie sundred and seuered from the matter; so is God, and so are the intelligences, and they are called supernaturall: or else they are things so inherent in the matter, as without it they can not so much as be defined, & in that sort they are naturall: or else they are after a middle sort; for that they cannot be without a matter, either of iron, or wood, or such like, and yet may be defined or vnderstood without those things; as are the Mathematiks.
7 These things may be yet further distinguished; but I cease, 1and I will so divide active philosophy, as therein may be taught precepts touching the life and instruction either of one or of many. If it be of one, it is a book of moral philosophy: if of many, they are either more in number, or fewer. If they be fewer, they concern household government: if they be more, they belong to the common weal. But in what place shall we leave arts? 2They are comprehended under the third active kind, and belong unto politic government; neither must they be excluded from the nature of wisdom. For art is [Greek or Hebrew]. In this definition there appear two things. First, that art is an habit belonging to knowledge, whereby some things are certainly comprehended; namely, through exercise and experience, so as it can not be excluded from wisdom. And it is not to be doubted, that the ancients called them, Wise men, which found out these arts, or else did excel in them. Whereupon Bezeleel and Aoliab in the holy scriptures ⟨p. 302⟩are called wise men. The other thing that we speak of is, that this knowledge is active; for these things are known by exercise: and by these habits somewhat is done and brought to pass, which helpeth to maintain the life. Wherefore the walkers upon ropes, and jugglers, and such other like, which do nothing profitable unto mans life, must not be called artificers; but deceivers and triflers.
7 These things may be yet further distinguished; but I cease, 1and I will so diuide actiue philosophie, as therein may be taught precepts touching the life and instruction either of one or of manie. If it be of one, it is a booke of morall philosophie: if of manie, they are either more in number, or fewer. If they be fewer, they concerne houshold gouernment: if they be more, they belong to the common weale. But in what place shall we leaue arts? 2They are comprehended vnder the third actiue kind, and belong vnto politike gouernment; neither must they be excluded from the nature of wisedome. For art is . In this definition there appéere two things. First, that art is an habit belonging to knowledge, whereby some things are certeinlie comprehended; namelie, through exercise and experience, so as it can not be excluded from wisedome. And it is not to be doubted, that the ancients called them, Wise men, which found out these arts, or else did excell in them. Wherevpon Bezeleel and Aoliab in the holie scriptures
1But arts may be divided into those, which bring forth some work; and into those, which in the very action are consumed. Now doth it appear by these things, what we are to judge concerning Logic: for even the same also must be reckoned among the arts, and it worketh most profitable things in the life; so as it ought not to be divided from wisdom, especially seeing it is a ready mean, instrument, and way to procure wisdom unto us. Neither must the way be cut off from his scope appointed. Yea moreover, Cicero distinguished the parts of philosophy; so that it is partly touching life and manners, partly touching nature and things hidden; or else it concerneth the art of disputing: in the first of his Academ. which he rehearseth out of Plato. Neither doth Galen disagree from this opinion. But as concerning the authors of philosophy, we must understand, that they brought more profit to the world, than did Ceres, that invented the increase of corn and grain; than did Bacchus, that found out the wines; or than Hercules, that rid the world of monsters: for these things belong to the maintenance of bodily life; but philosophy nourisheth and instructeth the soul it self.
1But arts may be diuided into those, which bring foorth some worke; and into those, which in the verie action are consumed. Now dooth it appéere by these things, what we are to iudge concerning Logike: for euen the same also must be reckoned among the arts, and it worketh most profitable things in the life; so as it ought not to be diuided from wisedome, especiallie séeing it is a readie meane, instrument, and waie to procure wisedome vnto vs. Neither must the waie be cut off from his scope appointed. Yea moreouer, Cicero distinguished the parts of philosophie; so that it is partlie touching life and maners, partlie touching nature and things hidden; or else it concerneth the art of disputing: in the first of his Academ. which he rehearseth out of Plato. Neither dooth Galen disagrée from this opinion. But as concerning the authors of philosophie, we must vnderstand, that they brought more profit to the world, than did Ceres, that inuented the increase of corne and graine; than did Bacchus, that found out the wines; or than Hercules, that rid the world of monsters: for these things belong to the maintenance of bodilie life; but philosophie nourisheth and instructeth the soule it selfe.
8 Now must we remove a certain small impediment: and it is that which Paul saith in the second chapter to the Colossians; 1Beware least there be any man that spoil you through philosophy. 2By which words in very deed he seemeth to terrify christian men from the study of philosophy: howbeit, if ye mark well the apostles meaning, I am sure that ye will be nothing troubled. True philosophy, since it is gathered by the knowledge of the creatures, and by those propositions concludeth many things as touching the justice and goodness, which God planted naturally in the minds of men, it cannot be justly accused. For it is the work of God, and without his special gift it cannot be had of men. But Paul reproveth that philosophy, which is corrupted through the inventions of men, & ambitious contentions of philosophers. For if they had kept themselves within certain bounds, and had only pronounced those things, which the knowledge of the creatures did by most assured reasons declare, as touching God and nature; they should not have erred from the truth. Wherefore the apostle saith; Through philosophy and vain deceit: 3and he addeth; Which are according to the traditions of men, and rudiments of the world. Not the creatures, but men did teach, that the world should be everlasting.
8 Now must we remooue a certeine small impediment: and it is that which Paule saith in the second chapter to the Colossians; 1Beware least there be anie man that spoile you through philosophie. 2By which words in verie déed he semeth to terrifie christian men from the studie of philosophie: howbeit, if ye marke well the apostles meaning, I am sure that ye will be nothing troubled. True philosophie, since it is gathered by the knowledge of the creatures, and by those propositions concludeth manie things as touching the iustice and goodnes, which God planted naturallie in the minds of men, it cannot be iustlie accused. For it is the worke of God, and without his speciall gift it cannot be had of men. But Paule reprooueth that philosophie, which is corrupted through the inuentions of men, & ambitious contentions of philosophers. For if they had kept themselues within certeine bounds, and had onelie pronounced those things, which the knowledge of the creatures did by most assured reasons declare, as touching God and nature; they should not haue erred from the truth. Wherfore the apostle saith; Through philosophie and vaine deceit:
It was not nature that showed, but it was vain cogitations that devised the world to be compact of the concourse of such small and indivisible moats as we see in the sun-shine, and to consist as it were of no ground. And who doubteth, but that the fate and impassibility of the Stoics, the perpetual doubting of the Academics, and the idle and unoccupied deity of the Epicures, was this vain deceit? Men dreamt of a community of things, of the intermingling of wives one with another in Common-weals, of pleasure to be the chiefest good, and of gods to be worshipped after the manner of common people; but they took no knowledge by a natural light, and by usual propositions known of themselves by assured reasons. These in very deed are the venoms and corruptions, wherewith the devil by naughty men corrupteth philosophy, being the gift of God; and this being so defiled and corrupted, Paul would have to be eschewed.
It was not nature that shewed, but it was vaine cogitations that deuised the world to be compact of the concourse of such small and indiuisible moates as we sée in the sunne-shine, and to consist as it were of no ground. And who doubteth, but that the fate and impassibilitie of the Stoiks, the perpetuall doubting of the Academiks, and the idle and vnoccupied deitie of the Epicures, was this vaine deceit? Men dreamt of a communitie of things, of the intermingling of wiues one with another in Common-weales, of pleasure to be the chéefest good, and of gods to be worshipped after the maner of common people; but they tooke no knowledge by a naturall light, and by vsuall propositions knowen of themselues by assured reasons. These in verie déed are the venoms and corruptions, wherewith the diuell by naughtie men corrupteth philosophie, being the gift of God; and this being so defiled and corrupted, Paule would haue to be eschewed.
9 Howbeit, 1now must we see how these things that we have hitherto spoken, will agree with the holy scriptures; for there also have we philosophy active and contemplative. Those things that we believe, and are comprehended in the articles of the faith, do belong unto contemplation; for those we perceive by knowledge, but we do them not: and albeit they are not comprehended in science, yet nevertheless are they understood. Unto the active kind are those referred, which are contained in laws, counsels, and exhortations. Thus far do these agree: yet do they differ, because in philosophy, that which is active goeth before that which is speculative. For (as it hath been said) we cannot with humane strength behold either God or nature, till first our affections be at quiet. 2But in the holy scriptures, speculation taketh the first place; insomuch as we must first believe and be justified by faith: and then afterward do follow good works, and that the more and more abundantly, as we be daily renewed by the holy Ghost. Thus doth Paul set it forth in his epistles: for he first handleth doctrine, and afterward he descendeth to the instruction of manners, and framing of the life. And so were the children of Israel first gathered in Egypt under the faith of one God the saviour; and afterward in the desert they received laws, which serve unto the knowledge, which consisteth in practise. Again, in the table of the ten commandments is observed the same order, for it saith first; I am the Lord thy God: the which thing ⟨p. 303⟩belongeth to faith, or speculative knowledge: afterward do follow precepts, which belong to the works required of God. The cause of this difference is, that humane contemplations are gotten by searching out, and by the endeavour of meditation; & therefore moderate affects are necessary. But those things that we believe, are received by the inspiration of God; so that there is no need of those preparations. And in mans reason, it behooveth men first to do just things, before they be justified. But the order of divine sanctification, is far otherwise appointed: for we first believe, and afterward be justified; then by the spirit and by grace are our minds renewed; finally, there follow just and honest deeds.
9 Howbeit,
10 Moreover, the end of philosophy is, that we should obtain that blessedness or felicity, which may be gotten here by mans strength: but the end of christian godliness is to have repaired in us that image, whereunto we are made in righteousness and holiness of truth, that we may daily grow up in the knowledge of God, until we be brought to see him even as he is, with face discovered. Besides this, in the moral philosophy of Aristotle, we shall not hear of the remission of sins; nor of the fear and confidence towards GOD, nor of justification by faith, nor of Christ, or such other like things: for these things are opened by the will of God, being such as cannot be gathered by a natural knowledge from the creatures. And we deny not, 1but it oftentimes happeneth, that the self-same things are commended in Aristotle's Ethics, which are commanded by God in the holy scriptures; but then are those all one in matter, but not inform, properties, and principles: for in them there is a sundry respect, a difference of properties, and their originals not all one.
10 Moreouer, the end of philosophie is, that we should obteine that blessednesse or felicitie, which may be gotten here by mans strength: but the end of christian godlinesse is to haue repaired in vs that image, wherevnto we are made in righteousnesse and holinesse of truth, that we may dailie growe vp in the knowledge of God, vntill we be brought to sée him euen as he is, with face discouered. Besides this, in the morall philosophie of Aristotle, we shall not heare of the remission of sinnes; nor of the feare and confidence towards GOD, nor of iustification by faith, nor of Christ, or such other like things: for these things are opened by the will of God, being such as cannot be gathered by a naturall knowledge from the creatures. And we denie not, 1but it oftentimes happeneth, that the selfe-same things are commended in Aristotles Ethiks, which are commanded by God in the holie scriptures; but then are those all one in matter, but not informe, properties, and principles: for in them there is a sundrie respect, a difference of properties, and their originals not all one.
1Even in like manner as the rain water, and any fountain water is all one in matter; but the strength, property, & originals be of great diversity: for the one cometh by a heat of the heavens, and by the clouds and coldness of the middle region of the air; but this other is either gathered from the sea, out of the hollow places of the earth, and is so strained as it becometh sweet; or else it cometh by converting the air into water, through the coldness of the place where the spring ariseth. Even so, those things that a christian doth, he doth them by the drift of the holy Ghost: for they which be driven by the holy Ghost, be the children of God; but they which deal by philosophy, according to moral rules, do work by the guide of humane reason. Such be stirred to do these things, because they so judge it to be honest and right; but the christians, because God hath so decreed it. Those think, that if they so do, they profit and make perfect themselves; but these, because they may obey the majesty of God. Those do believe their own selves; but these do believe God, and the words of the law which he hath made. Those be carried with a love of themselves; but these with the love of God alone. Doubtless, of this manifold diversity it cometh to pass, that one and the same thing, as concerning the matter, both pleaseth GOD, and by his judgement is condemned of him. And thus much of these differences, and of the consent that is between the holy scripture and humane philosophy.
1Euen in like maner as the raine water, and anie fountaine water is all one in matter; but the strength, propertie, & originals be of great diuersitie: for the one commeth by a heat of the heauens, and by the clouds and coldnesse of the middle region of the aire; but this other is either gathered from the sea, out of the hollowe places of the earth, and is so strained as it becommeth swéet; or else it commeth by conuerting the aire into water, through the coldnesse of the place where the spring ariseth. Euen so, those things that a christian doth, he doth them by the drift of the holie Ghost: for they which be driuen by the holie Ghost, be the children of God; but they which deale by philosophie, according to morall rules, doo worke by the guide of humane reason. Such be stirred to doo these things, bicause they so iudge it to be honest and right; but the christians, bicause God hath so decréed it. Those thinke, that if they so doo, they profit and make perfect themselues; but these, bicause they may obeie the maiestie of God. Those doo beléeue their owne selues; but these doo beléeue God, and the words of the lawe which he hath made. Those be caried with a loue of themselues; but these with the loue of God alone. Doubtles, of this manifold diuersitie it commeth to passe, that one and the same thing, as concerning the matter, both pleaseth GOD, and by his iudgement is condemned of him. And thus much of these differences, and of the consent that is betwéene the holie scripture and humane philosophie.
11 But to return to that whence we digressed; namely, whether this faculty be repugnant unto godliness: I affirm, that it is no more against the same, than is Astrology, than is the art of mariners or soldiers, than is fishing, hunting, and finally, than is the knowledge of the law of man, which all men know how necessary it is for the government of common-weals. Verily the same picketh out her laws and institutions, which be ingrafted in our minds, concerning justice and goodness; the very which notwithstanding, moral philosophers do discuss and turn most exquisitely, in such sort as they not only know these things very manifestly, but also can with great perspicuity teach them unto others. Hereof it cometh, that in Greek [Greek or Hebrew], which is, wisdom; is called as it were [Greek or Hebrew], that is, perspicuity: and [Greek or Hebrew], wise, as it were [Greek or Hebrew], manifest or perspicuous; 1because it declareth and maketh very plain, those things which it handleth. And so, by this means, the lawyers might easily defend their science to be a part of philosophy: albeit they by their laws do not so gravely decree touching virtue, goodness, and justice, as the philosophers dispute of them. For example sake; Philosophy detesteth ingratitude towards all states of men, but the laws do not punish the same, unless it be committed by children towards their parents; or of late servants towards their patrons. Humane laws compel no man to give their goods to the poor; but philosophy commendeth bountifulness and liberality towards all men. And what shall I say more?
11 But to returne to that whence we digressed; namelie, whether this facultie be repugnant vnto godlinesse: I affirme, that it is no more against the same, than is Astrologie, than is the art of mariners or soldiers, than is fishing, hunting, and finallie, than is the knowledge of the lawe of man, which all men knowe how necessarie it is for the gouernement of common-weales. Verelie the same picketh out hir lawes and institutions, which be ingrafted in our minds, concerning iustice and goodnesse; the verie which notwithstanding, morall philosophers doo discusse and turne most exquisitlie, in such sort as they not onelie knowe these things verie manifestlie, but also can with great perspicuitie teach them vnto others. Héerof it commeth, that in Gréeke 〈non-Latin alphabet〉, which is, wisdome; is called as it were 〈non-Latin alphabet〉, that is, perspicuitie: and , wise, as it were , manifest or perspicuous;
Cicero, 1in the commendation of this kind of philosophy pronounceth thus, in his fifth book of Tusculan questions; O philosophy, the guide of life! O thou that art the searcher out of virtue and expeller of vice! What could not only we, but altogether even the life of men have been without thee? Thou broughtest forth cities, thou gatheredst together the dispersed men into society of life, thou first of all joinedst them together in houses, afterward in marriages, and after that, in the unity of letters and words; thou wast the mistress of manners and discipline, &c. ⟨p. 304⟩All men know what an excellent thing is the strength of herbs, stones, metals, and medicines; and this do not we also deny: but for all that, doth it not follow, that this is a worthy faculty, whereby the acts, the choices, the arts, the methods, the wits, virtues and vices of men be perceived? What can be accounted more excellent, than for a man to know himself? And this do we singularly well know hereby. And moreover, we must call to mind that which Plato said; to wit, that It may easily come to pass, that earnest loves toward virtue, may be stirred up in us, if otherwhile some image thereof might be set before our eyes. And on the other side, we are a great deal to blame, that we do no where behold the same near at hand. There ariseth no small pleasure by this science, to know within what bounds the light of nature ought to keep it self, and how far in his own right it may extend. And Christian religion is exceedingly kindled, by considering the manners of the Ethnics: since by a comparison we perceive, how greatly those things, which be taught in the holy scriptures, do excel the philosophical precepts. For it is a common saying; that Contraries, when they are compared together, do shine with the greater light. And errors can not conveniently be shunned, except they be first known. Wherefore, he that hath known both of these faculties, shall the easilier avoid the faults of the one; namely, of humane philosophy, especially, when they shall be showed plainly in their own proper places.
Cicero, 1in the commendation of this kind of philosophie pronounceth thus, in his fift booke of Tusculane questions; O philosophie, the guide of life! O thou that art the searcher out of vertue and expeller of vice! What could not onelie we, but altogither euen the life of men haue béene without thée? Thou broughtest foorth cities, thou gatheredst togither the dispersed men into societie of life, thou first of all ioinedst them togither in houses, afterward in marriages, and after that, in the vnitie of letters and words; thou wast the mistresse of maners and discipline, &c.