A14350:1612
The common places of the most famous and renowned divine Doctor Peter Martyr divided into four principal parts: with a large addition of many theological and necessary discourses, some never extant before. Translated and partly gathered by Anthony Marten, one of the sewers of her Majesties most honourable chamber.The common places of the most famous and renowmed diuine Doctor Peter Martyr diuided into foure principall parts: with a large addition of manie theologicall and necessarie discourses, some neuer extant before. Translated and partlie gathered by Anthonie Marten, one of the sewers of hir Maiesties most honourable chamber.
Imprinted at London : In Pater noster Rowe, by Henry Denham and Henry Middleton at the costs and charges of Henry Denham, Thomas Chard, William Broome, and Andrew Maunsell, 1583Imprinted at London : In Pater noster Rovve, by Henry Denham and Henry Middleton at the costs and charges of Henrie Denham, Thomas Chard, VVilliam Broome, and Andrew Maunsell, 1583
No title page in the transcription: set from the catalogue record.
Modern spelling is a reading aid: the words are the author’s, only the spelling is modernized. Original shows the page as printed, with the transcription marks.
And by this very reason it appeareth, that these affects are not (as the Stoics thought) cogitations or opinions; since these actions consist in the brain. And therefore it remaineth, that if they be not in the brain, they must be placed either in the hart, or in the liver. And verily they cannot be ascribed unto the liver; because those affects, which belong thereunto, cannot be governed by judgment and reason, as hunger, thirst, and moving unto procreation may be. No doubt but judgement or reason may over-rule the power that moveth; to wit, that it shall not eat nor drink, nor procreate children: but it cannot let, that it should disclose it self, that it should provoke, disquiet, and stir up. But those affects, which follow perceiving or knowledge, may be stayed by reason and judgement: and so they be not of the self-same nature that those be, which are placed in the liver. Wherefore, they shall not belong unto that part of the body, but unto the hart. And with this opinion, which we think is Aristotle's, the holy scriptures do agree, which say; 1Thou shalt love the Lord thy God, with all thy hart, with all thy soul, and with all thy strength, and thou shalt fear to offend him.
And by this verie reason it appéereth, that these affects are not (as the Stoiks thought) cogitations or opinions; since these actions consist in the braine. And therfore it remaineth, that if they be not in the braine, they must be placed either in the hart, or in the liuer. And verelie they cannot be ascribed vnto the liuer; bicause those affects, which belong therevnto, cannot be gouerned by iudgment and reason, as hunger, thirst, and moouing vnto procreation may be. No doubt but iudgement or reason may ouer-rule the power that mooueth; to wit, that it shall not eate nor drinke, nor procreate children: but it cannot let, that it should disclose it selfe, that it should prouoke, disquiet, and stir vp. But those affects, which followe perceiuing or knowledge, may be staied by reason and iudgement: and so they be not of the selfe-same nature that those be, which are placed in the liuer. Wherefore, they shall not belong vnto that part of the bodie, but vnto the hart. And with this opinion, which wée thinke is Aristotles, the holie scriptures doo agrée, which saie; 1Thou shalt loue the Lord thy God, with all thy hart, with all thy soule, and with all thy strength, and thou shalt feare to offend him.
36 But we must note, 1that hunger and thirst are sometime understood for the defect it self, when we be quite empty; and in this respect they cannot be governed by judgment and reason, nor yet have their original from thence: but that grief, which doth follow, belongeth to the hart; since the first emptiness is in the organs, which do belong unto the vegetative power. And as touching the affects also, which follow the sense of feeling, there must be two things considered; to wit, the dissolutions of the whole, the rending in pieces, and burnings: which things are done in the flesh and sinews. But the griefs, which follow them, be motions of the hart. Neither must we pass over this, that the hart hath two other motions, beside affects; namely, the pulses. But we are not now at this present to speak of them, and therefore I come again to the affects: which, since we have called ⟨p. 407⟩them motions of the heart, 2we must not think them to be violent: because they have their original from nature it self, for they arise from the powers of the heart. But yet must we understand, that such is the course of nature, that those things which be over vehement, do hurt; yea they mar and corrupt. As for example: if the light be too great, it destroyeth the eyes; over-much heat, or over-much cold do destroy living creatures: but whatsoever is moderate; doth profit and preserve. Which self same thing must be judged of the affects. Vehement grief, fear or gladness be hurtful; but when there is used a mean, they bring very many helps and commodities. Now have we spoken enough of the formal cause: for we have proved, that they be motions of the heart, which do follow the knowledge of the senses; or else follow cogitation or opinion, which nevertheless are natural and not violent. And we have also showed what we must determine as concerning the matter or subject.
36 But we must note, 1that hunger and thirst are sometime vnderstood for the defect it selfe, when we be quite emptie; and in this respect they cannot be gouerned by iudgment and reason, nor yet haue their originall from thence: but that gréefe, which dooth followe, belongeth to the hart; since the first emptinesse is in the organs, which doo belong vnto the vegetatiue power. And as touching the affects also, which followe the sense of féeling, there must be two things considered; to wit, the dissolutions of the whole, the rending in péeces, and burnings: which things are doone in the flesh and sinewes. But the gréefes, which followe them, be motions of the hart. Neither must we passe ouer this, that the hart hath two other motions, beside affects; namelie, the pulses. But we are not now at this present to speake of them, and therefore I come againe to the affects: which, since we haue called
1Now it remaineth, that we speak of the efficient cause. As for this, it is the object, whereby the sense or cogitation is moved; namely, that good thing or evil thing, which offereth it self, either present or to come. And moreover, the efficient cause is a power of the heart, which forthwith moveth the same to pursue or to shun that which is offered. Howbeit, between the object and power stirred up of the hart, there cometh between a middle knowledge: for the power of the heart is not stirred up by the object, unless it be through knowledge. For immediately, so soon as the objects are apprehended, either by the sense, or by the knowledge; the spirits faculties, which do attend upon the knowledge, do strike the hart it self, and the power of the hart is awakened, whereby it is moved either to fly from, 2or to pursue. But yet it must be noted, that according to the divers temperature of the body, so is this motion of the heart, either slowly or speedily stirred up; and by reason of the affects, do become more vehement in some, and in other some more feeble. Hot and dry humours do easily and vehemently stir up; but those which be cold and moist, be somewhat slower: from which the affects must of necessity proceed somewhat slackly. And further, the humours are moved, according to the nature or condition of th'affects. In grief or fear is raised melancholy; in gladness, blood; and in anger, yellow choler. Over this, the motions be either of the property of drawing together, or of spreading abroad. When the object, which is offered, shall be good; the heart spreadeth it self abroad to receive it: but if the object shall be evil, then the humours withdraw themselves to the inward parts. And hence proceedeth paleness of the face; and from hence arise blushings, according as the blood either retireth unto the inward parts, or else poureth out it self into the outward parts. And thus much shall suffice as touching the cause.
1Now it remaineth, that we speake of the efficient cause. As for this, it is the obiect, whereby the sense or cogitation is mooued; namelie, that good thing or euill thing, which offereth it selfe, either present or to come. And moreouer, the efficient cause is a power of the heart, which foorthwith mooueth the same to pursue or to shun that which is offered. Howbeit, betwéene the obiect and power stirred vp of the hart, there commeth betwéene a middle knowledge: for the power of the heart is not stirred vp by the obiect, vnlesse it be through knowledge. For immediatlie, so soone as the obiects are apprehended, either by the sense, or by the knowledge; the spirits faculties, which doo attend vpon the knowledge, doo strike the hart it selfe, and the power of the hart is awakened, whereby it is mooued either to flie from,
37 Now remaineth, 1that we consider of two things. First, that these affects be not either cogitations, or opinions; as the Stoics thought them to be. Secondly, that they must not be all condemned as vicious and evil. First it may evidently be proved in those affects that be called natural, as are hunger and thirst: which affects invade us without any cogitation. Also, who will call it a cogitation or opinion, when we be afflicted with a dissolution of the whole, with a breaking of the sinews, or burning by flame or fire? They may as well persuade us, as touching the natural affections of parents towards their children, which are not only vehement in men, but in brute beasts also. Howbeit, since the matter is plain; I think it needles to stand much thereupon. Now, as concerning the second; I will not deny, 2but some affects have their faults joined with them. But I will show, that many of them are good; and that those, which are evil, are evil through mans fault, not in their own nature. And first may we speak of the error of judgement, for we do not always judge aright of the objects which are before us. That which is evil, is otherwhile taken for that which is good; and that which is good, is esteemed to be evil. But the affects, as we have declared, do accompany the judgements of the mind; and so the fault passeth from the judgement unto the affect. 3The apostles judged the contumelies, which they suffered for the name of Christ, to be honourable unto them, and therefore departed with joy and gladness from the Council.
37 Now remaineth, 1that we consider of two things. First, that these affects be not either cogitations, or opinions; as the Stoiks thought them to be. Secondlie, that they must not be all condemned as vitious and euill. First it may euidentlie be prooued in those affects that be called naturall, as are hunger and thirst: which affects inuade vs without anie cogitation. Also, who will call it a cogitation or opinion, when we be afflicted with a dissolution of the whole, with a breaking of the sinewes, or burning by flame or fire? They may as well persuade vs, as touching the naturall affections of parents towards their children, which are not onlie vehement in men, but in brute beasts also. Howbeit, since the matter is plaine; I thinke it néedles to stand much therevpon. Now, as concerning the second; I will not denie,
But contrariwise, when David was driven out of his kingdom by his son, he sorrowed; because he saw, that his casting forth would be an offence unto men, which knew what God promised unto David by the prophets. He saw moreover, that these things did happen through his own fault: and sith that these were evils, he could not choose but sorrow. Either of these both David as the apostles judged rightly of the things objected, albeit in divers manners they judged of the things that happened. Vain men do esteem flatteries to be good things indeed, and therefore are delighted with them. Others judge more rightly of them; for they perceive them to be but mockeries, and for that cause do dislike of them. Those that are good men, do rejoice in mere virtues; for they judge rightly of them. Again, thou shalt see others, which do hate them; because they be infected with a corrupt judgement: so as the naughtiness and ⟨p. 408⟩goodness of the affects, proceedeth of the true or false judgement, concerning the things which are objected. Howbeit, it is not requisite to say, that all the affects are evil; because many men being seduced by error, do light upon those ill motions of the mind: for they which err not, are not hurt by the affects of error.
But contrariwise, when Dauid was driuen out of his kingdome by his sonne, he sorrowed; bicause he sawe, that his casting foorth would be an offense vnto men, which knew what God promised vnto Dauid by the prophets. He sawe moreouer, that these things did happen through his owne fault: and sith that these were euils, he could not choose but sorrowe. Either of these both Dauid as the apostles iudged rightlie of the things obiected, albeit in diuers maners they iudged of the things that happened. Vaine men doo estéeme flatteries to be good things indéed, and therefore are delighted with them. Others iudge more rightlie of them; for they perceiue them to be but mockeries, and for that cause doo dislike of them. Those that are good men, doo reioise in méere vertues; for they iudge rightlie of them. Againe, thou shalt sée others, which doo hate them; bicause they be infected with a corrupt iudgement: so as the naughtinesse and ⟨p. 408⟩goodnes of the affects, procéedeth of the true or false iudgement, concerning the things which are obiected. Howbeit, it is not requisite to saie, that all the affects are euill; bicause manie men being seduced by error, doo light vpon those ill motions of the mind: for they which erre not, are not hurt by the affects of error.
138 An other evil there is in the affects, which in very deed proceedeth not of error; but for that there be some, which are adversaries unto right reason: such is the desire of other mens goods, of murder, of adultery, and such like. These affects must of good right be condemned; but yet for these sakes must not sentence be given generally; sith there be other affects, which are agreeable to right reason and sound judgement; namely, love towards virtue, and hatred and anger against sins. 2Which affects, being agreeable to reason, are not only honest and laudable, but also very profitable: for they are given as certain spurs to godly life. For it is not sufficient to know those things that are good, but we must be earnestly stirred up unto them. For the affects be as it were sinews, by whose stretching forth, or shrinking in, we are the earnestlier, or the lightlier stirred up. Who seeth not, that this is most true, that anger is as it were a whetstone unto fortitude? We should be very dull even unto honest actions, if we had not these provocations: we should be even as a ship in the sea destitute of wind. Wherefore, the nature it self of affects is not evil, since many of them be very profitable and honest. Undoubtedly, God gave the organs of these affects, and he appointed humours to attend on them, and knowledges to accompany them: so as it can not be denied, but that they are the works of God; and especially since he in his law requireth such affects. For he willeth us to love and to fear God, to love our neighbours, and servants to fear their masters: and full of such precepts are the holy scriptures.
138 An other euill there is in the affects, which in verie déed procéedeth not of error; but for that there be some, which are aduersaries vnto right reason: such is the desire of other mens goods, of murther, of adulterie, and such like. These affects must of good right be condemned; but yet for these sakes must not sentence be giuen generallie; sith there be other affects, which are agréeable to right reason and sound iudgement; namelie, loue towards vertue, and hatred and anger against sinnes. 2Which affects, being agréeable to reason, are not onelie honest and laudable, but also verie profitable: for they are giuen as certeine spurs to godlie life. For it is not sufficient to knowe those things that are good, but we must be earnestlie stirred vp vnto them. For the affects be as it were sinewes, by whose stretching foorth, or shrinking in, we are the earnestlier, or the lightlier stirred vp. Who séeth not, that this is most true, that anger is as it were a whetstone vnto fortitude? We should be verie dull euen vnto honest actions, if we had not these prouocations: we should be euen as a ship in the sea destitute of wind. Wherefore, the nature it selfe of affects is not euill, since manie of them be verie profitable and honest. Vndoubtedlie, God gaue the organs of these affects, and he appointed humors to attend on them, and knowledges to accompanie them: so as it can not be denied, but that they are the works of God; and especiallie since he in his lawe requireth such affects. For he willeth vs to loue and to feare God, to loue our neighbours, and seruants to feare their masters: and full of such precepts are the holie scriptures.
1That same impassibility then of affects, which the Stoics would have (albeit that Basil, Nazianzen, and certain other of the fathers, otherwhile seem greatly to commend) must utterly be refused. Christ wept, was sad unto death, was moved with mercy: so then he was not without affects. And therefore affects are not repugnant even to the perfection of our humane nature. True it is, there happen evils many times, through the fault of our corrupt nature: but we must endeavour our selves to correct our vicious affects, and to confirm and restore those that be good and agreeable to reason. And this we read, that the holy and godly heroical men did, both in the old, and in the new testament. These fathers did not follow their affections, as guided by them; but used them unto those virtues and noble acts, which God commanded. And it is apparent in the holy scriptures, that those heroical men were stirred up of God, with certain more vehement affections, than other men are. But it may be doubted of, 2from whence the exceeding corruptions of affects, or else so great a disagreement from reason in some of them (such as is the greedy desire of other mens goods, of murder, rape, & adultery, which can not any manner of way be allowed) had their original. Unto which question an answer may easily be made out of the holy scriptures; because that By one man, that is by Adams fall, sin entered into the world. But the philosophers, which understand not this, do fly unto temperatures of the body; and unto aspects and motions of the stars: howbeit, as the thing it self declareth, they can not by those causes yield a perfect reason.
1That same impassibilitie then of affects, which the Stoiks would haue (albeit that Basil, Nazianzen, and certeine other of the fathers, otherwhile séeme greatlie to commend) must vtterlie be refused. Christ wept, was sad vnto death, was mooued with mercie: so then he was not without affects. And therefore affects are not repugnant euen to the perfection of our humane nature. True it is, there happen euils manie times, through the fault of our corrupt nature: but we must indeuor our selues to correct our vitious affects, and to confirme and restore those that be good and agréeable to reason. And this we read, that the holie and godlie heroicall men did, both in the old, and in the new testament. These fathers did not followe their affections, as guided by them; but vsed them vnto those vertues and noble acts, which God commanded. And it is apparant in the holie scriptures, that those heroicall men were stirred vp of God, with certein more vehement affections, than other men are. But it may be doubted of,
39 Now let us see, 1how those affects may be ruled and corrected. The first way is civill; to wit, through moral virtues. For those do reduce them to a mediocrity; and those would suffice; if we should only have respect unto the present life. But in truth, before God they are not sufficient; neither doth this civill justice suffice before his tribunal seat. And therefore another rule is yet necessary; namely, the rule of the divine scriptures, the which do profit nothing at all, unless they be apprehended by faith. This rule bringeth two manner of commodities with it. The first is, that that which is wanting unto true righteousness (considering the moral state wherein we be) is not imputed to us, and that the whole fulfilling is ascribed to us out of Christ his fullness. Besides this, there is given unto us greater strength to withstand lusts. And finally by faith, the very actions of virtues, & good affects, are altogether referred to God: which without faith cannot be done. And therefore, in men, which are estranged from Christ, those moderate affects, how gorgeous soever they were, are sins; not that they be so in their own nature, but they so become through our natural corruption. For we be even as fusty vessels, the which do corrupt the wine, though it be good that is poured into us. And therefore, sith God is the author of all creatures, and that he made nothing but is good, and made no bare substances, and such as are furnished with no kind of helps, but gave unto every one a proneness and inclination unto those things which be wholesome and profitable: it followeth, that not only natures and substances be good; but also the affects, which are by God engrafted in them. Albeit, that in those which be wicked men, they draw unto them these two evils, ⟨p. 409⟩which otherwise of themselves are good. First, by reason of original sin, nature is so corrupted and weakened, that good affects are not of such efficacy as they ought to be. Secondly, they are not directed unto God, as it behooveth that they should be; but rather to the embracing of pleasures and earthly delectations.
39 Now let vs sée, 1how those affects may be ruled and corrected. The first waie is ciuill; to wit, through morall vertues. For those doo reduce them to a mediocritie; and those would suffice; if we should onelie haue respect vnto the present life. But in truth, before God they are not sufficient; neither dooth this ciuill iustice suffice before his tribunall seate. And therefore another rule is yet necessarie; namelie, the rule of the diuine scriptures, the which doo profit nothing at all, vnlesse they be apprehended by faith. This rule bringeth two maner of commodities with it. The first is, that that which is wanting vnto true righteousnes (considering the morall state wherein we be) is not imputed to vs, and that the whole fulfilling is ascribed to vs out of Christ his fulnesse. Besides this, there is giuen vnto vs greater strength to withstand lusts. And finallie by faith, the verie actions of vertues, & good affects, are altogither referred to God: which without faith cannot be doone. And therefore, in men, which are estranged from Christ, those moderate affects, how gorgious soeuer they were, are sinnes; not that they be so in their owne nature, but they so become through our naturall corruption. For we be euen as fustie vessels, the which doo corrupt the wine, though it be good that is powred into vs. And therefore, sith God is the author of all creatures, and that he made nothing but is good, and made no bare substances, and such as are furnished with no kind of helps, but gaue vnto euerie one a pronesse and inclination vnto those things which be holsome and profitable: it followeth, that not onelie natures and substances be good; but also the affects, which are by God ingraffed in them. Albeit, that in those which be wicked men, they drawe vnto them these two euils,
1Whereby we may perceive, there are four degrees of men. §1The first are the basest, who be neither endued with moral virtues, nor yet with godliness: in these we may perceive all things to be fraught with perturbations and disorder. §2Secondly, there be others as yet aliens from godliness; howbeit, civill men, who by a certain kind of habit, have after a sort revoked their affections to a mediocrity. §3The third sort are believers in Christ; who notwithstanding they are not without sin, no more than are other mortal men, yet is not their sin imputed unto them. §4In the fourth & last place must those be put, which either were made by God at the beginning, or else are loosed from hence, and be now with Christ. They indeed have no corrupt affections, neither on the second, nor yet on the third cause; but they have them altogether good, absolute, and perfect. Howbeit, in nature there be not any affects so corrupt, and so vicious, but in them may be seen somewhat that is good. 2For in all of them there doth appear some part of the institution of God. For that same first beginning, or (as I may so say) the faculty & strength of these qualities had his original from God; but the confusedness either of imperfection, or of deformedness, which cometh by reason of sin, hath corrupted the same. Neither do those evil affects hurt alone the grosser parts of the soul, 3but they also hurt the will and reason. For so did God fasten and bind together those powers of the mind, as they might serve one another; namely, that the affects should obey reason, and that reason should rule and govern the affects, and temper the motions of the hart. Howbeit, it fareth otherwise; and so great a feebleness there is of the will, as being compared with the affects, it may seem to be even a fearful child, sitting upon a very fierce horse. Wherefore, the moral philosophers have prefixed to themselves this end; namely, to qualify the affections by virtues, and to strengthen reason being weak.
140 But which be the parts of the mind, that being instructed by vehement affects, do disturb reason, and make it feeble; Plato declared, who in the chief place appointed *[Greek or Hebrew], and in the inferior place, *[Greek or Hebrew], and *[Greek or Hebrew]. So that in these latter parts of the mind are placed the affects. And these powers of the mind, as it was said before, he judged to be in the head, in the liver, and in the hart. But Aristotle, for the general word, took [Greek or Hebrew], which he divided into three parts; to wit, [Greek or Hebrew], that is, Greedy desire, Affectation, or Covetousness: [Greek or Hebrew], that is, Anger, or Vehemency of the mind: & [Greek or Hebrew], that is, Will. Which parts, because they are apparent of themselves, there is no need to expound them any further. Yet this nevertheless will I add, that according to right order, the inferior appetites ought to be moved, governed, and ruled by that same superior, which is [Greek or Hebrew]; to wit, Will: even as the uppermost sphere doth guide the lower, as Aristotle writeth in his 3. book De anima. And thus doubtless the case standeth: the inferior powers, when they be stirred up, and compel us to the doing of any thing, are governed by the cogitation; and the cogitation by reason.
140 But which be the parts of the mind, that being instructed by vehement affects, doo disturbe reason, and make it féeble; Plato declared, who in the chéefe place appointed *〈non-Latin alphabet〉, and in the inferiour place, *〈non-Latin alphabet〉, and *〈non-Latin alphabet〉. So that in these latter parts of the mind are placed the affects. And these powers of the mind, as it was said before, he iudged to be in the head, in the liuer, and in the hart. But Aristotle, for the generall word, tooke , which he diuided into thrée parts; to wit, , that is, Gréedie desire, Affectation, or Couetousnesse: , that is, Anger, or Vehemencie of the mind: & , that is, Will. Which parts, bicause they are apparant of themselues, there is no néed to expound them anie further. Yet this neuerthelesse will I adde, that according to right order, the inferiour appetites ought to be mooued, gouerned, and ruled by that same superiour, which is ; to wit, Will: euen as the vppermost sphere doth guide the lower, as Aristotle writeth in his 3. booke De anima. And thus doubtlesse the case standeth: the inferiour powers, when they be stirred vp, and compell vs to the dooing of anie thing, are gouerned by the cogitation; and the cogitation by reason.
Yea, and every man hath experience in himself, that when any natural reason is applied, the disturbed affections are set in quiet: even as the winds are feigned to be suppressed by Aeolus. Wherefore, in man, the affects are obedient unto the will it self; whereas in brute beasts, action immediately followeth upon the motion of the affects. But our affections do perpetually expect the commandment of the will, unless that some impediment do oppose it self: as in children, and in mad men we see it falleth out. Here perhaps thou wilt say; Do we not see, 1that in those, which are incontinent, the affects are moved even against the will? We answer, that indeed they rebel against the will; but that, as touching the motion and actions, they bring nothing to pass, unless that the will do command them. Indeed the affections do resist the will, and trouble it, and finally overcome it, and lead it away to their own opinion; which will, when it shall have given her assent, and shall have overruled the matter, actions do follow, not as it decreed at the beginning, but as it commandeth when it is overcome.
Yea, and euerie man hath experience in himselfe, that when anie naturall reason is applied, the disturbed affections are set in quiet: euen as the winds are feined to be suppressed by Aeolus. Wherefore, in man, the affects are obedient vnto the will it selfe; whereas in brute beasts, action immediatelie followeth vpon the motion of the affects. But our affections do perpetuallie expect the commandement of the will, vnlesse that some impediment doo oppose it selfe: as in children, and in mad men we sée it falleth out. Here perhaps thou wilt saie; Doo we not sée, 1that in those, which are incontinent, the affects are mooued euen against the will? We answer, that indéed they rebell against the will; but that, as touching the motion and actions, they bring nothing to passe, vnlesse that the will doo command them. Indéed the affections doo resist the will, and trouble it, and finallie ouercome it, and lead it awaie to their owne opinion; which will, when it shall haue giuen hir assent, and shall haue ouerruled the matter, actions doo followe, not as it decréed at the beginning, but as it commandeth when it is ouercome.
41 But some think, 1that the power of desiring, and of being angry, is all one; because contraries belong all unto one faculty: but things agreeable unto nature, and things hurtful to the same, are contrary; and therefore they be both objects of one part of the mind. As white and black, are objects of the sight; a right and crooked line, are objects of one and the same science; namely, of the science Mathematical; and a whole and a sick man, are objects of physic. Hereunto we answer, that the objects of the angry and of the desiring power, are not so to be distinguished, by that which is agreeable, and that which is hurtful, but that either of these parts hath respect unto good and evil; howbeit, not after the like manner. The power, which desireth, hath respect unto good and to evil absolutely; that is to wit, that it may attain the one, ⟨p. 410⟩and avoid another. Nevertheless, otherwhile impediments and things that do corrupt it, do fall out between: so that it is a difficult thing to obtain this, or to avoid that. And there doth the power of anger show it self, for the overcoming of these difficulties; it wrestleth, and it earnestly resisteth the impediments, to the intent we may either apprehend the good, or avoid the evil, according as we do desire. So then the object of the angry power is good and evil, according as the thing difficult and hard offereth it self. Hope is chiefly an affection of the angry power: for it is carried unto that which is good, but yet a good that is absent, to the obtaining whereof must be devoured the impediment of expectation; yea, the power and the difficulty of the impediments must be overcome.
41 But some thinke, 1that the power of desiring, and of being angrie, is all one; bicause contraries belong all vnto one facultie: but things agréeable vnto nature, and things hurtfull to the same, are contrarie; and therefore they be both obiects of one part of the mind. As white and blacke, are obiects of the sight; a right and crooked line, are obiects of one and the same science; namelie, of the science Mathematicall; and a whole and a sicke man, are obiects of physicke. Herevnto we answer, that the obiects of the angrie and of the desiring power, are not so to be distinguished, by that which is agréeable, and that which is hurtfull, but that either of these parts hath respect vnto good and euill; howbeit, not after the like maner. The power, which desireth, hath respect vnto good and to euill absolutelie; that is to wit, that it may atteine the one,
But in what order those faculties shall be placed among themselves, it hereby appeareth; in that the force of the angry power beginneth at the power of desire, and endeth also at the same. For when any man hath an injury done unto him, he is sad: but the affect of sadness pertaineth to the faculty of desire. Against this evil (whereby the offended party is made sad, to the intent it may be avoided) doth anger interpose it self; which, by revenge, coveteth to repulse that evil. But revenge (as we all know) is a hard matter; which when it is performed, then succeedeth gladness, which belongeth to the power of desire, and there we cease to be angry. Wherefore the power of anger is a defender, and also a striver against, and doth resist the desiring part. For the angry part flieth from labours and griefs, but the part desiring overcometh them, endureth them, and entereth into them, whether it will or no: and when the one of them enforceth her action, the other contrariwise doth slacken it. They which lust very inordinately after women, are not angry with them: and they which be angry with them, are less inflamed with the desire of them. Wherefore the object of the angry part, offendeth the desiring part; because (as we said right now) it flieth from labours and difficulties, whereunto the angry part offereth it self, & maketh it self ready to get the victory. And it is a manifest thing, that of those two powers of the mind, the angry part cometh the nearer unto reason; for it is a helper of the same, to execute wholesome counsels: but the desiring part cometh nearer to the sense. And to deal by examples, in a matter which yet I think is plain enough. Boldness and fear, being parts of this mind, be affects: for boldness doth affect a good thing, which is difficult. But fear flieth an evil thing, which is hard to be avoided: for we fear not the evils, which urge us not, and may easily be avoided. And thus much of the affects in general; whereof not only the moral philosopher disputeth, but also the natural philosopher, and the Physician, and Rhetorician.
But in what order those faculties shalbe placed among themselues, it héereby appéereth; in that the force of the angrie power beginneth at the power of desire, and endeth also at the same. For when anie man hath an iniurie doone vnto him, he is sad: but the affect of sadnesse perteineth to the facultie of desire. Against this euill (whereby the offended partie is made sad, to the intent it may be auoided) dooth anger interpose it selfe; which, by reuenge, coueteth to repulse that euill. But reuenge (as we all knowe) is a hard matter; which when it is performed, then succéedeth gladnesse, which belongeth to the power of desire, and there we cease to be angrie. Wherefore the power of anger is a defender, and also a striuer against, and dooth resist the desiring part. For the angrie part flieth from labours and gréefes, but the part desiring ouercommeth them, endureth them, and entereth into them, whether it will or no: and when the one of them enforceth hir action, the other contrariwise dooth slacken it. They which lust verie inordinatelie after women, are not angrie with them: and they which be angrie with them, are lesse inflamed with the desire of them. Wherfore the obiect of the angrie part, offendeth the desiring part; bicause (as we said right now) it flieth from labours and difficulties, wherevnto the angrie part offreth it selfe, & maketh it selfe readie to get the victorie. And it is a manifest thing, that of those two powers of the mind, the angrie part commeth the néerer vnto reason; for it is a helper of the same, to execute wholesome counsels: but the desiring part commeth néerer to the sense. And to deale by examples, in a matter which yet I thinke is plaine enough. Boldnesse and feare, being parts of this mind, be affects: for boldnesse dooth affect a good thing, which is difficult. But feare flieth an euill thing, which is hard to be auoided: for we feare not the euils, which vrge vs not, and may easilie be auoided. And thus much of the affects in generall; whereof not onlie the morall philosopher disputeth, but also the naturall philosopher, and the Physician, and Rhetorician.
42 Now to set aside natural philosophers and Physicians, 1I will speak somewhat of Rhetoricians. They doubtless (as Aristotle testifieth in his second book of Rhetorics) do first endeavour by arguments, to make men believe, that those things be true, which they affirm. And then do they consider of the minds and affections of the judges, and of those which hear them: for that carrieth a great weight unto the cause. For they which favour him that is guilty, do believe, that either he sinned not, or else that he made a very small fault. But on the other side, if they shall hate him, they think with them selves, that either he is no innocent at all, or else that he is most guilty of all. These affections, unless that an Orator can change, qualify, or turn unto the contrary; he shall labour in vain. Wherefore Aristotle teacheth, that three things there must be considered. First, who they be that are prone to be affected, either this way or that. Secondly, towards whom they are wont to be so affected. And finally, for what causes their affections are moved, either one way or an other; to the intent that these things being known, they may easily make them serve their purpose. But there be some, which think, 2that this is not just, or to be permitted; that in pleading of causes, affections should be moved, since that the minds of the judges, in discerning, ought to be at quiet: which cannot come to pass if the affects be troubled by an artificial speech of Orators.
42 Now to set aside naturall philosophers and Physicians, 1I will speake somwhat of Rhetoricians. They doubtlesse (as Aristotle testifieth in his second booke of Rhetoriks) doo first indeuour by arguments, to make men beléeue, that those things be true, which they affirme. And then doo they consider of the minds and affections of the iudges, and of those which heare them: for that carrieth a great weight vnto the cause. For they which fauour him that is guiltie, doo beléeue, that either he sinned not, or else that he made a verie small fault. But on the other side, if they shall hate him, they thinke with them selues, that either he is no innocent at all, or else that he is most guiltie of all. These affections, vnlesse that an Orator can change, qualifie, or turne vnto the contrarie; he shall labour in vaine. Wherefore Aristotle teacheth, that thrée things there must be considered. First, who they be that are prone to be affected, either this way or that. Secondlie, towards whom they are woont to be so affected. And finallie, for what causes their affections are mooued, either one waie or an other; to the intent that these things being knowne, they may easilie make them serue their purpose. But there be some, which thinke,
Howbeit, they which speak this, seem to me, that they distinguish not the nature of affects, by the use of them; because in very deed, the nature of affections is good, albeit that the use of them be otherwhile good, and otherwhile evil. Also swords being made of iron, which is a good creature of God, do serve sometime to a just use; and sometime to an unjust. And wherein (I beseech you shall the Orator offend; if, when in a good and just cause, he shall see the judge ill affected towards the party accused, he do temper him with the art of eloquence, and do draw him unto a contrary mind, yea and stir up the motions of his hart to decree gravely and justly? Here undoubtedly there shall be no offence committed; but humane affections shall be directed unto the ends prescribed unto them. For otherwhile the auditory, and also the judges become cold; as unto whom it shall not suffice to have showed what is to be done, unless they be drawn thereunto, by stirring them up with a very vehement affect. But those Orators are to be reprehended, and restrained, which to this end direct eloquence for the moving of ⟨p. 411⟩affections; that the minds of the judges may be disquieted, and that they may not see what is just. But yet, for these mens ill demeanour, must not that profitable cunning be banished from the affairs of men. For so ought the holy scriptures to be blamed, wherein the spirit of God, not only warneth what things are to be done, and what to be avoided; but also stirreth up the affections, that we may be the more compelled to obedience. And this will I have to suffice as touching this matter.
Howbeit, they which speake this, séeme to me, that they distinguish not the nature of affects, by the vse of them; bicause in verie déed, the nature of affections is good, albeit that the vse of them be otherwhile good, and otherwhile euill. Also swords being made of iron, which is a good creature of God, doo serue sometime to a iust vse; and sometime to an vniust. And wherein (I beséech you shall the Orator offend; if, when in a good and iust cause, he shall sée the iudge ill affected towards the partie accused, he doo temper him with the art of eloquence, and doo drawe him vnto a contrarie mind, yea and stirre vp the motions of his hart to decrée grauelie and iustlie? Héere vndoubtedlie there shalbe no offense committed; but humane affections shalbe directed vnto the ends prescribed vnto them. For otherwhile the auditorie, and also the iudges become cold; as vnto whom it shall not suffice to haue shewed what is to be doone, vnlesse they be drawne therevnto, by stirring them vp with a verie vehement affect. But those Orators are to be reprehended, and restrained, which to this end direct eloquence for the moouing of