A14350:1620
The common places of the most famous and renowned divine Doctor Peter Martyr divided into four principal parts: with a large addition of many theological and necessary discourses, some never extant before. Translated and partly gathered by Anthony Marten, one of the sewers of her Majesties most honourable chamber.The common places of the most famous and renowmed diuine Doctor Peter Martyr diuided into foure principall parts: with a large addition of manie theologicall and necessarie discourses, some neuer extant before. Translated and partlie gathered by Anthonie Marten, one of the sewers of hir Maiesties most honourable chamber.
Imprinted at London : In Pater noster Rowe, by Henry Denham and Henry Middleton at the costs and charges of Henry Denham, Thomas Chard, William Broome, and Andrew Maunsell, 1583Imprinted at London : In Pater noster Rovve, by Henry Denham and Henry Middleton at the costs and charges of Henrie Denham, Thomas Chard, VVilliam Broome, and Andrew Maunsell, 1583
No title page in the transcription: set from the catalogue record.
Modern spelling is a reading aid: the words are the author’s, only the spelling is modernized. Original shows the page as printed, with the transcription marks.
1Whereby we may perceive, there are four degrees of men. §1The first are the basest, who be neither endued with moral virtues, nor yet with godliness: in these we may perceive all things to be fraught with perturbations and disorder. §2Secondly, there be others as yet aliens from godliness; howbeit, civill men, who by a certain kind of habit, have after a sort revoked their affections to a mediocrity. §3The third sort are believers in Christ; who notwithstanding they are not without sin, no more than are other mortal men, yet is not their sin imputed unto them. §4In the fourth & last place must those be put, which either were made by God at the beginning, or else are loosed from hence, and be now with Christ. They indeed have no corrupt affections, neither on the second, nor yet on the third cause; but they have them altogether good, absolute, and perfect. Howbeit, in nature there be not any affects so corrupt, and so vicious, but in them may be seen somewhat that is good. 2For in all of them there doth appear some part of the institution of God. For that same first beginning, or (as I may so say) the faculty & strength of these qualities had his original from God; but the confusedness either of imperfection, or of deformedness, which cometh by reason of sin, hath corrupted the same. Neither do those evil affects hurt alone the grosser parts of the soul, 3but they also hurt the will and reason. For so did God fasten and bind together those powers of the mind, as they might serve one another; namely, that the affects should obey reason, and that reason should rule and govern the affects, and temper the motions of the hart. Howbeit, it fareth otherwise; and so great a feebleness there is of the will, as being compared with the affects, it may seem to be even a fearful child, sitting upon a very fierce horse. Wherefore, the moral philosophers have prefixed to themselves this end; namely, to qualify the affections by virtues, and to strengthen reason being weak.
1Wherby we may perceiue, there are foure degrées of men. §1The first are the basest, who be neither indued with morall vertues, nor yet with godlinesse: in these we may perceiue all things to be fraught with perturbations and disorder. §2Secondlie, there be others as yet aliens from godlinesse; howbeit, ciuill men, who by a certeine kind of habit, haue after a sort reuoked their affections to a mediocritie. §3The third sort are beléeuers in Christ; who notwithstanding they are not without sin, no more than are other mortall men, yet is not their sinne imputed vnto them. §4In the fourth & last place must those be put, which either were made by God at the beginning, or else are loosed from hence, and be now with Christ. They indéed haue no corrupt affections, neither on the second, nor yet on the third cause; but they haue them altogither good, absolute, and perfect. Howbeit, in nature there be not anie affects so corrupt, and so vicious, but in them may be séene somwhat that is good. 2For in all of them there dooth appéere some part of the institution of God. For that same first beginning, or (as I may so saie) the facultie & strength of these qualities had his originall from God; but the confusednesse either of imperfection, or of deformednesse, which commeth by reason of sinne, hath corrupted the same. Neither doo those euill affects hurt alone the grosser parts of the soule, 3but they also hurt the will and reason. For so did God fasten and bind togither those powers of the mind, as they might serue one another; namelie, that the affects should obeie reason, and that reason should rule and gouerne the affects, and temper the motions of the hart. Howbeit, it fareth otherwise; and so great a féeblenesse there is of the will, as being compared with the affects, it may séeme to be euen a fearefull child, sitting vpon a verie fierce horsse. Wherefore, the morall philosophers haue prefixed to themselues this end; namelie, to qualifie the affections by vertues, and to strengthen reason being weake.
140 But which be the parts of the mind, that being instructed by vehement affects, do disturb reason, and make it feeble; Plato declared, who in the chief place appointed *[Greek or Hebrew], and in the inferior place, *[Greek or Hebrew], and *[Greek or Hebrew]. So that in these latter parts of the mind are placed the affects. And these powers of the mind, as it was said before, he judged to be in the head, in the liver, and in the hart. But Aristotle, for the general word, took [Greek or Hebrew], which he divided into three parts; to wit, [Greek or Hebrew], that is, Greedy desire, Affectation, or Covetousness: [Greek or Hebrew], that is, Anger, or Vehemency of the mind: & [Greek or Hebrew], that is, Will. Which parts, because they are apparent of themselves, there is no need to expound them any further. Yet this nevertheless will I add, that according to right order, the inferior appetites ought to be moved, governed, and ruled by that same superior, which is [Greek or Hebrew]; to wit, Will: even as the uppermost sphere doth guide the lower, as Aristotle writeth in his 3. book De anima. And thus doubtless the case standeth: the inferior powers, when they be stirred up, and compel us to the doing of any thing, are governed by the cogitation; and the cogitation by reason.
140 But which be the parts of the mind, that being instructed by vehement affects, doo disturbe reason, and make it féeble; Plato declared, who in the chéefe place appointed *〈non-Latin alphabet〉, and in the inferiour place, *〈non-Latin alphabet〉, and *〈non-Latin alphabet〉. So that in these latter parts of the mind are placed the affects. And these powers of the mind, as it was said before, he iudged to be in the head, in the liuer, and in the hart. But Aristotle, for the generall word, tooke , which he diuided into thrée parts; to wit, , that is, Gréedie desire, Affectation, or Couetousnesse: , that is, Anger, or Vehemencie of the mind: & , that is, Will. Which parts, bicause they are apparant of themselues, there is no néed to expound them anie further. Yet this neuerthelesse will I adde, that according to right order, the inferiour appetites ought to be mooued, gouerned, and ruled by that same superiour, which is ; to wit, Will: euen as the vppermost sphere doth guide the lower, as Aristotle writeth in his 3. booke De anima. And thus doubtlesse the case standeth: the inferiour powers, when they be stirred vp, and compell vs to the dooing of anie thing, are gouerned by the cogitation; and the cogitation by reason.
Yea, and every man hath experience in himself, that when any natural reason is applied, the disturbed affections are set in quiet: even as the winds are feigned to be suppressed by Aeolus. Wherefore, in man, the affects are obedient unto the will it self; whereas in brute beasts, action immediately followeth upon the motion of the affects. But our affections do perpetually expect the commandment of the will, unless that some impediment do oppose it self: as in children, and in mad men we see it falleth out. Here perhaps thou wilt say; Do we not see, 1that in those, which are incontinent, the affects are moved even against the will? We answer, that indeed they rebel against the will; but that, as touching the motion and actions, they bring nothing to pass, unless that the will do command them. Indeed the affections do resist the will, and trouble it, and finally overcome it, and lead it away to their own opinion; which will, when it shall have given her assent, and shall have overruled the matter, actions do follow, not as it decreed at the beginning, but as it commandeth when it is overcome.
Yea, and euerie man hath experience in himselfe, that when anie naturall reason is applied, the disturbed affections are set in quiet: euen as the winds are feined to be suppressed by Aeolus. Wherefore, in man, the affects are obedient vnto the will it selfe; whereas in brute beasts, action immediatelie followeth vpon the motion of the affects. But our affections do perpetuallie expect the commandement of the will, vnlesse that some impediment doo oppose it selfe: as in children, and in mad men we sée it falleth out. Here perhaps thou wilt saie; Doo we not sée, 1that in those, which are incontinent, the affects are mooued euen against the will? We answer, that indéed they rebell against the will; but that, as touching the motion and actions, they bring nothing to passe, vnlesse that the will doo command them. Indéed the affections doo resist the will, and trouble it, and finallie ouercome it, and lead it awaie to their owne opinion; which will, when it shall haue giuen hir assent, and shall haue ouerruled the matter, actions doo followe, not as it decréed at the beginning, but as it commandeth when it is ouercome.
41 But some think, 1that the power of desiring, and of being angry, is all one; because contraries belong all unto one faculty: but things agreeable unto nature, and things hurtful to the same, are contrary; and therefore they be both objects of one part of the mind. As white and black, are objects of the sight; a right and crooked line, are objects of one and the same science; namely, of the science Mathematical; and a whole and a sick man, are objects of physic. Hereunto we answer, that the objects of the angry and of the desiring power, are not so to be distinguished, by that which is agreeable, and that which is hurtful, but that either of these parts hath respect unto good and evil; howbeit, not after the like manner. The power, which desireth, hath respect unto good and to evil absolutely; that is to wit, that it may attain the one, ⟨p. 410⟩and avoid another. Nevertheless, otherwhile impediments and things that do corrupt it, do fall out between: so that it is a difficult thing to obtain this, or to avoid that. And there doth the power of anger show it self, for the overcoming of these difficulties; it wrestleth, and it earnestly resisteth the impediments, to the intent we may either apprehend the good, or avoid the evil, according as we do desire. So then the object of the angry power is good and evil, according as the thing difficult and hard offereth it self. Hope is chiefly an affection of the angry power: for it is carried unto that which is good, but yet a good that is absent, to the obtaining whereof must be devoured the impediment of expectation; yea, the power and the difficulty of the impediments must be overcome.
41 But some thinke, 1that the power of desiring, and of being angrie, is all one; bicause contraries belong all vnto one facultie: but things agréeable vnto nature, and things hurtfull to the same, are contrarie; and therefore they be both obiects of one part of the mind. As white and blacke, are obiects of the sight; a right and crooked line, are obiects of one and the same science; namelie, of the science Mathematicall; and a whole and a sicke man, are obiects of physicke. Herevnto we answer, that the obiects of the angrie and of the desiring power, are not so to be distinguished, by that which is agréeable, and that which is hurtfull, but that either of these parts hath respect vnto good and euill; howbeit, not after the like maner. The power, which desireth, hath respect vnto good and to euill absolutelie; that is to wit, that it may atteine the one,
But in what order those faculties shall be placed among themselves, it hereby appeareth; in that the force of the angry power beginneth at the power of desire, and endeth also at the same. For when any man hath an injury done unto him, he is sad: but the affect of sadness pertaineth to the faculty of desire. Against this evil (whereby the offended party is made sad, to the intent it may be avoided) doth anger interpose it self; which, by revenge, coveteth to repulse that evil. But revenge (as we all know) is a hard matter; which when it is performed, then succeedeth gladness, which belongeth to the power of desire, and there we cease to be angry. Wherefore the power of anger is a defender, and also a striver against, and doth resist the desiring part. For the angry part flieth from labours and griefs, but the part desiring overcometh them, endureth them, and entereth into them, whether it will or no: and when the one of them enforceth her action, the other contrariwise doth slacken it. They which lust very inordinately after women, are not angry with them: and they which be angry with them, are less inflamed with the desire of them. Wherefore the object of the angry part, offendeth the desiring part; because (as we said right now) it flieth from labours and difficulties, whereunto the angry part offereth it self, & maketh it self ready to get the victory. And it is a manifest thing, that of those two powers of the mind, the angry part cometh the nearer unto reason; for it is a helper of the same, to execute wholesome counsels: but the desiring part cometh nearer to the sense. And to deal by examples, in a matter which yet I think is plain enough. Boldness and fear, being parts of this mind, be affects: for boldness doth affect a good thing, which is difficult. But fear flieth an evil thing, which is hard to be avoided: for we fear not the evils, which urge us not, and may easily be avoided. And thus much of the affects in general; whereof not only the moral philosopher disputeth, but also the natural philosopher, and the Physician, and Rhetorician.
But in what order those faculties shalbe placed among themselues, it héereby appéereth; in that the force of the angrie power beginneth at the power of desire, and endeth also at the same. For when anie man hath an iniurie doone vnto him, he is sad: but the affect of sadnesse perteineth to the facultie of desire. Against this euill (whereby the offended partie is made sad, to the intent it may be auoided) dooth anger interpose it selfe; which, by reuenge, coueteth to repulse that euill. But reuenge (as we all knowe) is a hard matter; which when it is performed, then succéedeth gladnesse, which belongeth to the power of desire, and there we cease to be angrie. Wherefore the power of anger is a defender, and also a striuer against, and dooth resist the desiring part. For the angrie part flieth from labours and gréefes, but the part desiring ouercommeth them, endureth them, and entereth into them, whether it will or no: and when the one of them enforceth hir action, the other contrariwise dooth slacken it. They which lust verie inordinatelie after women, are not angrie with them: and they which be angrie with them, are lesse inflamed with the desire of them. Wherfore the obiect of the angrie part, offendeth the desiring part; bicause (as we said right now) it flieth from labours and difficulties, wherevnto the angrie part offreth it selfe, & maketh it selfe readie to get the victorie. And it is a manifest thing, that of those two powers of the mind, the angrie part commeth the néerer vnto reason; for it is a helper of the same, to execute wholesome counsels: but the desiring part commeth néerer to the sense. And to deale by examples, in a matter which yet I thinke is plaine enough. Boldnesse and feare, being parts of this mind, be affects: for boldnesse dooth affect a good thing, which is difficult. But feare flieth an euill thing, which is hard to be auoided: for we feare not the euils, which vrge vs not, and may easilie be auoided. And thus much of the affects in generall; whereof not onlie the morall philosopher disputeth, but also the naturall philosopher, and the Physician, and Rhetorician.
42 Now to set aside natural philosophers and Physicians, 1I will speak somewhat of Rhetoricians. They doubtless (as Aristotle testifieth in his second book of Rhetorics) do first endeavour by arguments, to make men believe, that those things be true, which they affirm. And then do they consider of the minds and affections of the judges, and of those which hear them: for that carrieth a great weight unto the cause. For they which favour him that is guilty, do believe, that either he sinned not, or else that he made a very small fault. But on the other side, if they shall hate him, they think with them selves, that either he is no innocent at all, or else that he is most guilty of all. These affections, unless that an Orator can change, qualify, or turn unto the contrary; he shall labour in vain. Wherefore Aristotle teacheth, that three things there must be considered. First, who they be that are prone to be affected, either this way or that. Secondly, towards whom they are wont to be so affected. And finally, for what causes their affections are moved, either one way or an other; to the intent that these things being known, they may easily make them serve their purpose. But there be some, which think, 2that this is not just, or to be permitted; that in pleading of causes, affections should be moved, since that the minds of the judges, in discerning, ought to be at quiet: which cannot come to pass if the affects be troubled by an artificial speech of Orators.
42 Now to set aside naturall philosophers and Physicians, 1I will speake somwhat of Rhetoricians. They doubtlesse (as Aristotle testifieth in his second booke of Rhetoriks) doo first indeuour by arguments, to make men beléeue, that those things be true, which they affirme. And then doo they consider of the minds and affections of the iudges, and of those which heare them: for that carrieth a great weight vnto the cause. For they which fauour him that is guiltie, doo beléeue, that either he sinned not, or else that he made a verie small fault. But on the other side, if they shall hate him, they thinke with them selues, that either he is no innocent at all, or else that he is most guiltie of all. These affections, vnlesse that an Orator can change, qualifie, or turne vnto the contrarie; he shall labour in vaine. Wherefore Aristotle teacheth, that thrée things there must be considered. First, who they be that are prone to be affected, either this way or that. Secondlie, towards whom they are woont to be so affected. And finallie, for what causes their affections are mooued, either one waie or an other; to the intent that these things being knowne, they may easilie make them serue their purpose. But there be some, which thinke,
Howbeit, they which speak this, seem to me, that they distinguish not the nature of affects, by the use of them; because in very deed, the nature of affections is good, albeit that the use of them be otherwhile good, and otherwhile evil. Also swords being made of iron, which is a good creature of God, do serve sometime to a just use; and sometime to an unjust. And wherein (I beseech you shall the Orator offend; if, when in a good and just cause, he shall see the judge ill affected towards the party accused, he do temper him with the art of eloquence, and do draw him unto a contrary mind, yea and stir up the motions of his hart to decree gravely and justly? Here undoubtedly there shall be no offence committed; but humane affections shall be directed unto the ends prescribed unto them. For otherwhile the auditory, and also the judges become cold; as unto whom it shall not suffice to have showed what is to be done, unless they be drawn thereunto, by stirring them up with a very vehement affect. But those Orators are to be reprehended, and restrained, which to this end direct eloquence for the moving of ⟨p. 411⟩affections; that the minds of the judges may be disquieted, and that they may not see what is just. But yet, for these mens ill demeanour, must not that profitable cunning be banished from the affairs of men. For so ought the holy scriptures to be blamed, wherein the spirit of God, not only warneth what things are to be done, and what to be avoided; but also stirreth up the affections, that we may be the more compelled to obedience. And this will I have to suffice as touching this matter.
Howbeit, they which speake this, séeme to me, that they distinguish not the nature of affects, by the vse of them; bicause in verie déed, the nature of affections is good, albeit that the vse of them be otherwhile good, and otherwhile euill. Also swords being made of iron, which is a good creature of God, doo serue sometime to a iust vse; and sometime to an vniust. And wherein (I beséech you shall the Orator offend; if, when in a good and iust cause, he shall sée the iudge ill affected towards the partie accused, he doo temper him with the art of eloquence, and doo drawe him vnto a contrarie mind, yea and stirre vp the motions of his hart to decrée grauelie and iustlie? Héere vndoubtedlie there shalbe no offense committed; but humane affections shalbe directed vnto the ends prescribed vnto them. For otherwhile the auditorie, and also the iudges become cold; as vnto whom it shall not suffice to haue shewed what is to be doone, vnlesse they be drawne therevnto, by stirring them vp with a verie vehement affect. But those Orators are to be reprehended, and restrained, which to this end direct eloquence for the moouing of
143 But now we think it good to speak somewhat of the affects severally. Affects, as it is manifest, do belong unto the general word of quality, and are contained in that kind, which commonly is called passion, and passible quality. But among these, there be two of a grosser sort, and very common; I mean delectation and grief. They chiefly have their place in the sinews, which be dispersed in a manner over all the body: unto which sinews, when things, either agreeable to nature, or else repugnant thereunto be applied, then we be either delighted, or else do sorrow. Moreover, there be other affects, which follow knowledge it self: whereby, as the nature of them is, so the hart doth change his motion, according as good or evil shall be laid hold upon in the knowledge; and that, either present or imminent. For when we feel that good is present, the hart is pleasantly delighted, and sweetly affected therewith: and this affect is called gladness. But if so be we perceive that the good is not present indeed, yet not far off, but ready; and that within a while we shall obtain it, then are we stirred up with hope to pursue the same: and the hart in like manner is pleasantly moved. But when we perceive that evil is present, the hart starteth back with a grieved motion: for it shrinketh, it abhorreth, and it is vexed. And this affection is commonly called as well sorrow as grief of mind. In Greek it is [Greek or Hebrew]; so called, as the Stoics think of [Greek or Hebrew], that is, A loosing. For even as the body of him that is sick, is loosed through sickness; so likewise the mind seemeth, after a sort to be consumed with sadness.
143 But now we thinke it good to speake somwhat of the affects seuerallie. Affects, as it is manifest, doo belong vnto the generall word of qualitie, and are conteined in that kind, which commonlie is called passion, and passible qualitie. But among these, there be two of a grosser sort, and verie common; I meane delectation and gréefe. They chéeflie haue their place in the sinewes, which be dispersed in a maner ouer all the bodie: vnto which sinewes, when things, either agréeable to nature, or else repugnant therevnto be applied, then we be either delited, or else doo sorrowe. Moreouer, there be other affects, which followe knowledge it selfe: whereby, as the nature of them is, so the hart dooth change his motion, according as good or euill shall be laid hold vpon in the knowledge; and that, either present or imminent. For when we féele that good is present, the hart is pleasantlie delited, and swéetlie affected therewith: and this affect is called gladnesse. But if so be we perceiue that the good is not present indéed, yet not far off, but readie; and that within a while we shall obteine it, then are we stirred vp with hope to pursue the same: and the hart in like maner is pleasantlie mooued. But when we perceiue that euill is present, the hart starteth backe with a gréeued motion: for it shrinketh, it abhorreth, and it is vexed. And this affection is commonlie called as well sorrowe as gréefe of mind. In Gréek it is ; so called, as the Stoiks thinke of , that is, A loosing. For euen as the bodie of him that is sicke, is loosed through sicknesse; so likewise the mind séemeth, after a sort to be consumed with sadnesse.
There remaineth another knowledge of evil, the which indeed is not present, but such as is now near at hand: that doth the hart eschew, & evidently enough starteth from it by his motion: and such an affect is called fear. According to these principal affects, we will now entreat of those, which have their original from sadness or grief. And those are likewise reckoned to be four; that is to wit, mercy, 1indignation, envy, and emulation; of the which Aristotle did singularly well write many things in his book of Rhetorics. But before I deal particularly with these, 2we must demand one thing; to wit, whether affects are to be reckoned in the account of good or of evil things? The Stoics accounted them in the number of evil, and condemned them generally: being led by this reason; that by them the mind, the judgement, and sound counsel is greatly troubled. For they so hale and draw the mind and reason to and fro, as it cannot peaceably behold things natural and divine; neither yet determine of doing things orderly and rightly. And further, because with the heavy load of them, they drive men very often to commit dishonest and unjust things: yea, and when they be somewhat more vehement, they hurt the body it self. These in a manner were the reasons of the Stoics.
There remaineth another knowledge of euill, the which indéed is not present, but such as is now néere at hand: that dooth the hart eschew, & euidentlie enough starteth from it by his motion: and such an affect is called feare. According to these principall affects, we will now intreat of those, which haue their originall from sadnesse or gréefe. And those are likewise reckoned to be foure; that is to wit, mercie, 1indignation, enuie, and emulation; of the which Aristotle did singularlie well write manie things in his booke of Rhetoriks. But before I deale particularlie with these, 2we must demand one thing; to wit, whether affects are to be reckoned in the account of good or of euill things? The Stoiks accounted them in the number of euill, and condemned them generallie: being led by this reason; that by them the mind, the iudgement, and sound counsell is greatlie troubled. For they so hale and drawe the mind and reason to and fro, as it cannot peaceablie behold things naturall and diuine; neither yet determine of dooing things orderlie and rightlie. And further, bicause with the heauie loade of them, they driue men verie often to commit dishonest and vniust things: yea, and when they be somewhat more vehement, they hurt the bodie it selfe. These in a manner were the reasons of the Stoiks.
The Peripatetics teach far otherwise; 1namely, that it is not true, which the Stoics declare, except when affections be not chastised by reason, but are suffered to have their immoderate scope. Because those affections, if they be comprised within certain bounds, are both good & profitable: as being the matter of virtues, and which by nature were given, as the whetstone of them. For fortitude is greatly furthered by the means of wrath: and compassion doth attend upon the virtue of clemency. And in the same sort it may be said as touching the most part of them. But among these philosophers, 2so disagreeing in themselves; sentence must be given according to the judgement of the holy scriptures. They declare, that man, in respect both of the body, and of the soul, was created by God: and they add; that All things, 3whatsoever GOD made, were good. Therefore, seeing he himself planted the affects in man (I mean not wicked nor corrupt, as now we have them, but perfect and sound, and which should obey and serve reason) they of necessity be good. Furthermore, the law of God doth in every place commend mercy unto us: it preacheth repentance, which cannot be without sorrow & grief of mind. David also wrote, and Paul repeated it; 4Be ye angry, and sin not. Yea & the matter hath stretched so far forth, that affects are attributed even to God himself; namely, wrath, mercy, sorrow, 5repentance, and such like: which although they be not properly spoken of him, yet this we must observe, that in man, whatsoever by it self is vice and sin in his own nature, is never by the holy scriptures attributed unto God.
The Peripatetiks teach far otherwise; 1namelie, that it is not true, which the Stoiks declare, except when affections be not chastised by reason, but are suffered to haue their immoderate scope. Bicause those affections, if they be comprised within certeine bounds, are both good & profitable: as being the matter of vertues, and which by nature were giuen, as the whetstone of them. For fortitude is greatlie furthered by the meanes of wrath: and compassion dooth attend vpon the vertue of clemencie. And in the same sort it may be said as touching the most part of them. But among these philosophers,
44 Shamefastness, which is a mean thing, ⟨p. 412⟩is commended; 1yet is it no virtue, because men do naturally run thereinto, and sometime against their wills: for it is a sorrow or fear for some evil that hangeth over our head, or into which we shall fall. But thou wilt say, that affects are neither praised or dispraised, since they be natural; how then can shamefastness be commended, and the extremities thereof condemned? I answer, that a mere affect is neither praised nor dispraised, but the measure thereof is. It is praised, when it is in a mean; it is dispraised, if it be extreme. Here likewise in shamefastness there is found an excess: and he which so exceedeth, is said to be [Greek or Hebrew], that is, Astonied, or abashed, who is ashamed at every thing. And on the other side, he is impudent, who although he be not altogether ashamed, yet he lacketh shamefastness more than becometh him.
44 Shamefastnes, which is a meane thing, ⟨p. 412⟩is commended; 1yet is it no vertue, bicause men doo naturallie run thereinto, and sometime against their wils: for it is a sorrowe or feare for some euill that hangeth ouer our head, or into which we shall fall. But thou wilt saie, that affects are neither praised or dispraised, since they be naturall; how then can shamefastnesse be commended, and the extremities thereof condemned? I answer, that a méere affect is neither praised nor dispraised, but the measure therof is. It is praised, when it is in a meane; it is dispraised, if it be extreame. Here likewise in shamefastnesse there is found an excesse: and he which so excéedeth, is said to be 〈non-Latin alphabet〉, that is, Astonied, or abashed, who is ashamed at euerie thing. And on the other side, he is impudent, who although he be not altogither ashamed, yet he lacketh shamefastnesse more than becommeth him.
45 Between pleasures and griefs, temperance is the mean; and intemperance the excess. The defect hath no name. But because pleasure is of two kinds; some be of the mind, and those be commended of all men; as when a man rejoiceth in the contemplation of God, and of nature: or delighteth in the remembrance of his well doing, either else taketh pleasure in the helping and benefiting of others to his power. But the other kind of pleasure is more gross, and is perceived of the senses, not of the reason: and those are called corporal pleasures. Whereupon Aristotle saith, that this virtue is not conversant about the former virtues: for those things being most pure, have no need of moderation. It remaineth therefore, that temperance is placed in this latter kind. And yet hath it not place about all corporal things; but in those only, which belong unto the sense of touching. But with touching thou must also understand tasting: for those two senses (as it is written in the book De anima) are very near one to another. Wherefore, temperance shall be a mediocrity in pleasures of meat and drink, and fleshly desire. But wherefore doth it not also moderate the pleasures, which come by the sight and by the hearing? Because the desire of those pleasures is not so great and vehement, as it is of these: neither are those so hurtful as these be. For by these, if they be immoderate, men do in a manner degenerate into brute beasts; but so do they not through sounds, smells, or colours.
45 Betwéene pleasures and gréefes, temperance is the meane; and intemperance the excesse. The defect hath no name. But bicause pleasure is of two kinds; some be of the mind, and those be commended of all men; as when a man reioiseth in the contemplation of God, and of nature: or delighteth in the remembrance of his well dooing, either else taketh pleasure in the helping and benefiting of others to his power. But the other kind of pleasure is more grosse, and is perceiued of the senses, not of the reason: and those are called corporall pleasures. Wherevpon Aristotle saith, that this vertue is not conuersant about the former vertues: for those things being most pure, haue no néed of moderation. It remaineth therefore, that temperance is placed in this latter kind. And yet hath it not place about all corporall things; but in those onelie, which belong vnto the sense of touching. But with touching thou must also vnderstand tasting: for those two senses (as it is written in the booke De anima) are verie néere one to another. Wherefore, temperance shall be a mediocritie in pleasures of meate and drinke, and fleshlie desire. But wherefore dooth it not also moderate the pleasures, which come by the sight and by the hearing? Bicause the desire of those pleasures is not so great and vehement, as it is of these: neither are those so hurtfull as these be. For by these, if they be immoderate, men doo in a maner degenerate into brute beasts; but so doo they not through sounds, smels, or colours.
But admit that in this kind of pleasures also, which belong unto the other senses, measure be exceeded; and that there is need of some virtue, that kind of excess is never accounted or called intemperance: but they, which so sin, are accused of a certain other sin, not of intemperance. Wherefore, seeing that the virtue of temperance hath place, as well in pleasures, as in displeasures; whether of these affections is the more frequented matter thereof? Aristotle saith, that those be pleasures: for in the suppressing of them, we have greater labour; and unto the excess of pleasure we seem to be driven by nature. Neither is it so hard a matter to resist displeasure, as it is to temper a mans self from pleasure. Virtue in very deed is chiefly conversant about those things that be difficult. Furthermore, the grief of the mind, which belongeth to this virtue, ariseth of the defect or absence of pleasure. But it is far more easy, to abide the desire of a pleasure that is absent, than not to enjoy a pleasure that is present. The defect or want in this matter had no name. A reason is brought; because there be not many, nay rather, there be very few, which do altogether shun pleasures. Those things, which do seldom happen, or be in a manner never seen, do easily want a name. But yet, saith Aristotle, they be [Greek or Hebrew], that is, Astonied. Nevertheless, we must think that they are properly so called: for that word doth also signify them, which being oppressed with the force of sickness, have no sense. And it may be, that some men, by reason of a sickness, or some dissolution of the sinews, feel no taste of pleasure and fleshly lust.
But admit that in this kind of pleasures also, which belong vnto the other senses, measure be excéeded; and that there is néed of some vertue, that kind of excesse is neuer accounted or called intemperance: but they, which so sinne, are accused of a certeine other sinne, not of intemperance. Wherefore, séeing that the vertue of temperance hath place, as well in pleasures, as in displeasures; whether of these affections is the more frequented matter thereof? Aristotle saith, that those be pleasures: for in the suppressing of them, we haue greater labour; and vnto the excesse of pleasure we séeme to be driuen by nature. Neither is it so hard a matter to resist displeasure, as it is to temper a mans selfe from pleasure. Vertue in verie déed is chéeflie conuersant about those things that be difficult. Furthermore, the gréefe of the mind, which belongeth to this vertue, ariseth of the defect or absence of pleasure. But it is far more easie, to abide the desire of a pleasure that is absent, than not to enioie a pleasure that is present. The defect or want in this matter had no name. A reason is brought; bicause there be not manie, naie rather, there be verie few, which doo altogither shun pleasures. Those things, which doo seldome happen, or be in a maner neuer séene, doo easilie want a name. But yet, saith Aristotle, they be , that is, Astonied. Neuerthelesse, we must thinke that they are properlie so called: for that word dooth also signifie them, which being oppressed with the force of sicknesse, haue no sense. And it may be, that some men, by reason of a sicknesse, or some dissolution of the sinewes, féele no taste of pleasure and fleshlie lust.