A14350:293
The Common Places
The common places of the most famous and renowned divine Doctor Peter Martyr divided into four principal parts: with a large addition of many theological and necessary discourses, some never extant before. Translated and partly gathered by Anthony Marten, one of the sewers of her Majesties most honourable chamber.The common places of the most famous and renowmed diuine Doctor Peter Martyr diuided into foure principall parts: with a large addition of manie theologicall and necessarie discourses, some neuer extant before. Translated and partlie gathered by Anthonie Marten, one of the sewers of hir Maiesties most honourable chamber.
Imprinted at London : In Pater noster Rowe, by Henry Denham and Henry Middleton at the costs and charges of Henry Denham, Thomas Chard, William Broome, and Andrew Maunsell, 1583Imprinted at London : In Pater noster Rovve, by Henry Denham and Henry Middleton at the costs and charges of Henrie Denham, Thomas Chard, VVilliam Broome, and Andrew Maunsell, 1583
No title page in the transcription: set from the catalogue record.
Modern spelling is a reading aid: the words are the author’s, only the spelling is modernized. Original shows the page as printed, with the transcription marks.
IT should seem that Aristotle may for just cause be blamed, when he would exclude a young man from hearing of moral philosophy: for thus he saith; He will hear in vain, & without fruit, because he hath not experience: and that although he have his right reason, yet is he overcome with lusts and affections, and so overcome, as he cannot do those things that he would: and therefore (he saith) that as his reason is overcome, so is this learning understood of him overcome, & that since he is not able to produce the same into act, his labour in hearing will be frustrate. Howbeit hereof is gathered an argument of the contrary, to wit; that they by this faculty are very greatly holpen, which do suffer their affections to be ruled by reason. Again, it belongeth to those that be perfect men, to subdue the affections of their mind to reason: and young and incontinent men, which have most need of amendment, are not judged meet for these things. These being plucked away from hearing, there will be no kind of men left, unto whom these things will bring any commodity. Whereupon Aristotle shall hardly avoid it, but that this will become superfluous. Eustratius answereth, that there be some men, and those not a few, which are lead only by custom to become good; but they cannot proceed therein by an order and way prescribed, seeing they are destitute of infallible rules, which when they have afterward procured to themselves by this doctrine, they are most of all established in just and honest actions, not being now any more led by customs, but throughly persuaded by a full assurance of their mind. And there be some, which of a certain natural inclination do fly from wickedness, and desire goodness; but how those things do differ one from another, or by what means they may, ⟨p. 53⟩of the good things, which without doubt are manifold, follow the better, they are ignorant by themselves: neither is there any doubt, but that they which be so framed, may thereby obtain great helps. 1And therefore we are not to think that the incontinent, and they which be subject to their affections, shall (as we have heard of Aristotle) be altogether unprofitable hearers:
IT should séeme that Aristotle may for iust cause be blamed, when he wold exclude a yoong man frō hearing of morall philosophie: for thus he saith; He will heare in vaine, & without fruit, bicause he hath not experience: and that although he haue his right reason, yet is he ouercome with lusts and affections, and so ouercome, as he cannot doo those things that he would: and therfore (he saith) that as his reason is ouercome, so is this learning vnderstood of him ouercome, & that since he is not able to produce the same into act, his labor in hearing will be frustrate. Howbeit hereof is gathered an argument of the contrarie, to wit; that they by this facultie are verie greatlie holpen, which doo suffer their affections to be ruled by reason. Againe, it belongeth to those that be perfect men, to subdue the affections of their mind to reason: and yoong and incontinent men, which haue most néed of amendement, are not iudged méet for these things. These being plucked awaie from hearing, there will be no kind of men left, vnto whom these things will bring anie commoditie. Whervpon Aristotle shall hardlie auoid it, but that this will become superfluous. Eustratius answereth, that there be some men, and those not a few, which are lead onlie by custome to become good; but they cannot procéed therein by an order and waie prescribed, séeing they are destitute of infallible rules, which when they haue afterward procured to themselues by this doctrine, they are most of all established in iust and honest actions, not being now anie more led by customs, but throughlie persuaded by a full assurance of their mind. And there be some, which of a certeine naturall inclination doo flie from wickednes, and desire goodnes; but how those things doo differ one from another, or by what meanes they may,