A14350:684
The Common Places
The common places of the most famous and renowned divine Doctor Peter Martyr divided into four principal parts: with a large addition of many theological and necessary discourses, some never extant before. Translated and partly gathered by Anthony Marten, one of the sewers of her Majesties most honourable chamber.The common places of the most famous and renowmed diuine Doctor Peter Martyr diuided into foure principall parts: with a large addition of manie theologicall and necessarie discourses, some neuer extant before. Translated and partlie gathered by Anthonie Marten, one of the sewers of hir Maiesties most honourable chamber.
Imprinted at London : In Pater noster Rowe, by Henry Denham and Henry Middleton at the costs and charges of Henry Denham, Thomas Chard, William Broome, and Andrew Maunsell, 1583Imprinted at London : In Pater noster Rovve, by Henry Denham and Henry Middleton at the costs and charges of Henrie Denham, Thomas Chard, VVilliam Broome, and Andrew Maunsell, 1583
No title page in the transcription: set from the catalogue record.
Modern spelling is a reading aid: the words are the author’s, only the spelling is modernized. Original shows the page as printed, with the transcription marks.
One reason, whereby Aristotle proveth fortune to be no cause of felicity is this; The chiefest good ought not to be referred unto a vile and abject cause; Felicity is the chiefest good, & fortune is but vile among the causes; Wherefore blessedness ought not to be reduced unto fortune, being a cause less worthy than others. And hereof dependeth the force of this argument: for although a noble cause do otherwhile bring forth a vile effect (as we know that the sun doth not only breed a man, but also frogs, fleas, and flies) yet excellent effects cannot proceed but of noble causes. Here we see, that by evident and most manifest words Aristotle excludeth fortune, as he that would not number the same among the causes of felicity, and taketh propositions as well out of his book of natural philosophy, as also out of his metaphysics: the very which certainly he might have done, in affirming God to be the cause of mans blessedness. So that he excludeth from this number both God and fortune: GOD, as over-worthy and too high; but fortune, as an unworthy and a more vile cause. For it is a most inconstant thing, and hath no substantial ground-work: which nevertheless is so excluded, as it can do nothing about the nature and ⟨p. 157⟩substance of felicity; and yet undoubtedly it can do somewhat about those good things which help unto felicity, & be the instruments thereof. But if it be of power, concerning riches, and honours, and such like, which (as it hath been said) do not a little further unto felicity; why do they deny them to be the cause thereof? We grant indeed, that these things do accomplish, and do service unto felicity, and do such service, as it may not be without them; but we deny that it doth properly cause the same. For it so fareth not, that as the lack of these things may hinder blessedness; so if they be present, they can perform and bring the same to pass. For thou shalt see many men that be noble, rich, strong, and in honours, who nevertheless being wicked, thou wilt not call happy. Which assuredly should not come to pass, if these things were by themselves causes of happiness. But if these kinds of good things be taken away from honest and wise men, they suffer them not to be happy, although (as it hath been said) those things themselves are not the causes of blessedness.
One reason, whereby Aristotle prooueth fortune to be no cause of felicitie is this; The chéefest good ought not to be referred vnto a vile and abiect cause; Felicitie is the chéefest good, & fortune is but vile among the causes; Wherefore blessednes ought not to be reduced vnto fortune, being a cause lesse woorthie than others. And hereof dependeth the force of this argument: for although a noble cause doo otherwhile bring foorth a vile effect (as we knowe that the sunne dooth not onelie bréed a man, but also frogs, fleas, and flies) yet excellent effects cannot procéed but of noble causes. Here we sée, that by euident and most manifest words Aristotle excludeth fortune, as he that would not number the same among the causes of felicitie, and taketh propositions as well out of his booke of naturall philosophie, as also out of his metaphysicks: the verie which certeinlie he might haue doone, in affirming God to be the cause of mans blessednes. So that he excludeth from this number both God and fortune: GOD, as ouer-woorthie and too high; but fortune, as an vnwoorthie and a more vile cause. For it is a most inconstant thing, and hath no substantiall ground-worke: which neuertheles is so excluded, as it can doo nothing about the nature and