A14353:1009
Most learned and fruitful commentaries of D. Peter Martyr Vermilius Florentine, professor of divinity…Most learned and fruitfull commentaries of D. Peter Martir Vermilius Florentine, professor of diuinitie…
Most learned and fruitful commentaries of D. Peter Martyr Vermilius Florentine, professor of divinity in the school of Tigure, upon the Epistle of S. Paul to the Romans wherein are diligently [and] most profitably entreated all such matters and chief common places of religion touched in the same Epistle. With a table of all the common places and expositions upon divers places of the scriptures, and also an index to find all the principal matters contained in the same. Lately tra[n]slated out of Latin into English, by H.B.Most learned and fruitfull commentaries of D. Peter Martir Vermilius Florentine, professor of diuinitie in the schole of Tigure, vpon the Epistle of S. Paul to the Romanes wherin are diligently [and] most profitably entreated all such matters and chiefe common places of religion touched in the same Epistle. With a table of all the common places and expositions vpon diuers places of the scriptures, and also an index to finde all the principall matters conteyned in the same. Lately tra[n]slated out of Latine into Englishe, by H.B.
London: printed by John Daye. Cum gratia & privilegio Regiæ Maiestatis per decennium. These books are to be sold, 1568London: printed by Iohn Daye. Cum gratia & priuilegio Regiæ Maiestatis per decennium. These bookes are to be solde, 1568
Title page typeset from the transcription.
Chapter 7: The seventh Chapter.Chapter 7: The seuenth Chapter.
Modern spelling is a reading aid: the words are the author’s, only the spelling is modernized. Original shows the page as printed, with the transcription marks.
Herein Augustine agreed with y• Pelagians, y• to be able is of nature. But this thing Augustine added, which Pelagius could not abide, that to will well, and to live uprightly is to be attributed unto grace only. But I think that as touching this power of nature, is to be made a distinction. For if they mean this, that our nature is so made of God, that nether faith, nor hope, nor charity strive against it, if they be given of God, but rather accomplish it, make it perfect, and adorn it, I confess that to be true which they say. But if they will have the power of nature to signify any force that it hath, whereby it can claim unto it self these things, I will by no means grant thereunto. For it is a wicked and damnable sentence. Wherefore we say, that the will of man hath a respect both unto good, and to evil, but yet in a diverse consideration. For it of his own accord may embrace evil: but it can not embrace good, unless it be restored by the grace of God. For, that we have need of a certain divine inspiration to perform those things which are in very deed good, even the Ethnic writers also being forced by the trueth have sometimes declared. For Aristotle in his first book of Ethics saith: If there be any gift of God, we must verily think that felicity is it. And felicity he defineth to be nothing ells, but a most excellent action proceeding from the principallest power of our mind, by a most notable virtue. Plato also in a certain place confesseth, that virtues are ingenerated in men by the inspiration of God. The Schoolmen also (if there were any amongst them that were whom what sunder than the rest) confessed, that unto every good work the grace of God is necessary, to aid humane strengths. Howbeit afterward, howsoever they forgot themselves, they affirm that a man not regenerate may do some good works, which may please God, and which may merit (as they use to speak) of congruity, the grace of Christ. Congruity they call that ⟨p. 180⟩which we may call mete & good: which is when ye rigour & sharpness of the law is remitted. But condignitie they call y• which is of right, due. But these men which1 first devised these terms, considered not, y• those goodly civil works, though in show they seem never so much unto men good, yet before God they are sins, as Augustine by most certain reasons proveth.