A14353:1600
Most learned and fruitful commentaries of D. Peter Martyr Vermilius Florentine, professor of divinity…Most learned and fruitfull commentaries of D. Peter Martir Vermilius Florentine, professor of diuinitie…
Most learned and fruitful commentaries of D. Peter Martyr Vermilius Florentine, professor of divinity in the school of Tigure, upon the Epistle of S. Paul to the Romans wherein are diligently [and] most profitably entreated all such matters and chief common places of religion touched in the same Epistle. With a table of all the common places and expositions upon divers places of the scriptures, and also an index to find all the principal matters contained in the same. Lately tra[n]slated out of Latin into English, by H.B.Most learned and fruitfull commentaries of D. Peter Martir Vermilius Florentine, professor of diuinitie in the schole of Tigure, vpon the Epistle of S. Paul to the Romanes wherin are diligently [and] most profitably entreated all such matters and chiefe common places of religion touched in the same Epistle. With a table of all the common places and expositions vpon diuers places of the scriptures, and also an index to finde all the principall matters conteyned in the same. Lately tra[n]slated out of Latine into Englishe, by H.B.
London: printed by John Daye. Cum gratia & privilegio Regiæ Maiestatis per decennium. These books are to be sold, 1568London: printed by Iohn Daye. Cum gratia & priuilegio Regiæ Maiestatis per decennium. These bookes are to be solde, 1568
Title page typeset from the transcription.
Modern spelling is a reading aid: the words are the author’s, only the spelling is modernized. Original shows the page as printed, with the transcription marks.
Wherefore Augustine saith of him, Those which will be free he maketh sacrilegious persons, so that to defend their liberty they spoil God of his foreknowledge. Ciceroes reason was, If the will be free, there can not be a certain and sure connection of causes: for if it were certain, it could not be broken of our will, and if there be no certain connection, then can there be put no foreknowledge: and therefore he affirmed that God also foreknoweth not what things shall come to pass, for if he should foreknow them, then should there be a certain and firm order of causes, which being granted, there should be nothing remaining in the power of our will. But we ought to hold either of these sentences: for of the one we have by sense experience. For every man may consider in himself, how he worketh by counsels and deliberation, and electeth that which pleaseth him. But the other, that is, the foreknowledge of God, we hold by faith, which knowledge is of no less1 force, then the apprehension both of sense and of reason. Wherefore we deny unto Cicero this consequence. There is a certain and constant order of causes which God foreknew, therefore there is nothing in our will. And we therefore deny the argument, for that our will also is to be placed amongst the causes of things, yea it hath not amongst them the unworthiest place. Wherefore even as God can foreknow, what shall come to pass of other causes, in like sort is he able plainly to see what our wills will elect. And as in foreseeing other causes and their effects he in no wise destroyeth nor changeth the natures of them: so also leaveth he in their full state the wills of men. This also moved Cicero that then nothing should come by chance: But forasmuch as very many things happen by chance and fortune it is manifest that there cannot be a certain or sure order of causes, neither also any foreknowledge. In this sort reasoned he. But we answer, that those things which are said to come by chance, are so called things coming by chance, as they are referred to our understanding, which forasmuch as it is weak, by reason of the dullness thereof seeth not the course or connection of causes: but if their be con pared unto the mind of God from which nothing is hidden, they can not be said to come by chance or rashly.
Wherefore Augustine sayth of him, Those which will be free he maketh sacrilegious persons, so that to defend their liberty they spoyle God of his foreknowledge. Ciceroes reason was, If the wil be frée, there can not be a certaine and sure connexion of causes: for if it were certaine, it could not be broken of our will, and if there be no certaine connexion, then can there be put no foreknowledge: and therfore he affirmed that God also foreknoweth not what thinges shall come to passe, for if he should foreknow them, then should there be a certaine and firme order of causes, which being graunted, there shoulde bee nothing remayning in the power of our will. But we ought to hold either of these sentences: for of the one we haue by sence experience. For euery man may consider in himselfe, how he woorketh by counsels and deliberation, and electeth that whiche pleaseth him. But the other, that is, the foreknowledge of God, we hold by faith, whiche knowledge is of no les