A Christian instruction, containing the law and the Gospel Also a summary of the…

Ma. What meanest thou by this? For the first, a thing is called first in respect of time when it is before an other, and more ancient than the same.

Ma. What meanest thou by this? For the firste, a thing is called firste in respecte of tyme when it is before an other, and more aunciente than the same.

Matthew. Thou haste declared unto me that I must not so take it in the divine essence and nature, for so much as in the same all is there eternal without beginning and without end.

Mathevv. Thou haste declared vnto me that I must not so take it in the dyuine essence and nature, for somuche as in the same all is there eternall withoute beginning and withoute ende.

Peter. It is true, but for the second, a thing may be before an other in honour and dignity, albeit that it be not first in time, as a king or prince shall be first in dignity amongst his subjects, albeit many of them may be more aged than he.

Peter. It is true, but for the seconde, a thing maye bée before an other in honoure and dignitie, albeit that it be not firste in time, as a king or prince shall be first in dignitie amongst his subiects, albeit many of them may be more aged than he.

Peter. No. For in the divine nature there is nothing of more or less, but there is equality in all things.

Peter. No. For in the diuine nature there is nothyng of more or lesse, but there is equalitie in all thinges.

M. Thy meaning is then that ⟨p. 212⟩no one person of the Trinity which is in the unity of god, is more worthy or more great than the other.

M. Thy meaning is then that ⟨p. 212⟩no one person of the Trinitie which is in the vnitie of god, is more worthy or more great than the other.

P. We may not otherwise understand it, for if it were otherwise, either there should not be one very essence and divinity, but sundry, and consequently sundry Gods, of which some should be greater, and some less: or else it must needs be that God should be greater and more worthy than him self.

P. We may not otherwise vnderstande it, for if it were otherwise, eyther there shoulde not be one very essence and diuinitie, but sundry, and consequently sundry Gods, of which some should be greater, and some lesse: or els it must néeds be that God should be greater and more worthy than him selfe.

M. All these consequences would be very strange.

M. All these cōsequences would be very strāge.

P. There is no doubt. For if they were sundry Gods, they should be no Gods, no not at all. For God cannot be but almighty, all perfect, and all infinite.

P. There is no doubt. For if they were sundry Gods, they should be no Gods, no not at all. For God cannot be but almightie, all perfecte, and all infinite.

M. Thy meaning is then that he must necessarily be all alone.

P. Thou mayest so very well understand it, for sundry cannot be all might, all perfect, & all infinite.

P. Thou maist so very well vnderstande it, for sundry cannot be all mighte, all perfecte, & all infinite.

M. I do well understand all that.

M. I do well vnderstand all that.

P. There is also a third manner whereby one thing may be before an other.

P. There is also a third maner whereby one thing may be before an other.

M. What is it?

P. It is when a thing is of such nature, that it may be without an other, the which notwithstanding cannot be without it.

P. It is when a thing is of suche nature, that it may be without an other, the whiche notwithstanding cannot be without it.

M. I cannot well understand what thou sayest unto me, unless thou declare it more ⟨p. 213⟩plainly unto me by example.

M. I cannot well vnderstand what thou sayst vnto me, vnlesse thou declare it more ⟨p. 213⟩plainly vnto me by example.