A Christian instruction, containing the law and the Gospel Also a summary of the…A Christian instruction, conteyning the law and the Gospell Also a summarie of the…

Examples and similitudes for declaration of the difference that is put between Necessity and Constraint.

Examples and similitudes for declaration of the difference that is put betweene Necessitie and Constraint.

T. I Can not yet throughly well understand that difference.

T. I Can not yet throughly well vnderstand that difference.

T. For so much as in manner all these similitudes are given of things that have no will, show me some others more meet for our purpose.

T. For so much as in maner all these similitudes are giuen of things that haue no will, shewe me some others more méete for our purpose.

D. I will so do. We may not doubt but that God is necessarily good, just, wise, holy, almighty and perfect, for he can be none other, nor do any thing but that which is godly, justly, wisely and ⟨p. 475⟩holily done, and yet can he in nowise be constrained. In like sort the Angels, for so much as they be Angels, and do continue still in that nature, wherein they were created of God, they can not necessarily do any other thing, but praise God, and serve to his glory: for if they did the contrary, they should be no more Angels, such as they were created by God, but they should be Devils, like unto their fellows, which are fallen from their first state: And further, if they did that which they do by constraint and not willingly, then should they have no praise with God, nor should be any more accepted, than is the Devil, for the good which he is constrained to do, for so much as God doth turn will he nill he, his wicked will, & also his wicked works, making them to serve to his glory: on the other side, the Devil being such as he is now at this present, fallen from the Angelical state, wherein he was created of God, can necessarily do nothing but evil, and dishonour God, for if he should do otherwise, he should be no more a Devil, and yet surely he doth not that which he doth of ⟨p. 476⟩constraint, but voluntarily: For who should constrain him to do evil? should God so do, who hath forbidden & condemned it, & can do nothing but that which is good? it is very true that there is none other constraint, but only of his own wicked will, which hath as great delight in doing evil, as that of the Angels of heaven hath in doing well: But the like is not in the doing of the good that he doth: for in that he doth nothing but by constraint, and that which is always evil, in so much as it proceedeth from him: & can not be good, but so far forth as God through his power & infinite goodness, will he or will he not, doth draw out goodness of it, & maketh it to serve to an other end, than to that whereunto the Devil did pretend.

D. I will so do. We may not doubt but that God is necessarily good, iuste, wise, holy, almightie and perfecte, for he can be none other, nor do any thing but that which is godly, iustly, wisely and ⟨p. 475⟩holily done, and yet can he in nowise be constrained. In like sorte the Angels, for so much as they be Angels, and doe continue still in that nature, wherein they were created of God, they can not necessarily doe any other thing, but prayse God, and serue to his glory: for if they did the contrary, they should be no more Angels, such as they were created by God, but they should be Diuels, like vnto their felowes, which are fallen from their first state: And further, if they did that which they do by constraint and not willingly, thē should they haue no praise with God, nor should be any more accepted, than is the Deuill, for the good which he is constrained to doe, for so much as God dothe turne will he nill he, his wicked will, & also his wicked workes, making them to serue to his glory: on the other side, the Deuill being suche as he is now at this present, fallen from the Angelicall state, wherein he was created of God, can necessarily doe nothing but euill, and dishonour God, for if he should doe otherwise, he should be no more a Deuill, and yet surely he doth not that which he doth of

T. I do now begin already to discern more perfectly in this matter, than I did before.

T. I do now begin already to discerne more perfectly in this matter, than I did before.

Of the free necessity to do well, that was in man before sin: and of the necessity to do evil, unconstrained notwithstanding, into the which he is fallen through the same, and in what meaning this word of necessity ought to be taken, when it hath regard to good things.

Of the free necessitie to do vvell, that vvas in man before sinne: and of the necessitie to doe euill, vnconstrayned notvvithstanding, into the vvhich he is fallen through the same, and in vvhat meaning this vvord of necessitie ought to be taken, vvhen it hath regard to good things.

D. WE may easily understand by these examples, what we may judge of man, concerning this matter whereof we do now entreat. For after that man was created by God, in so much as he was created of God, good, just, & holy, he did necessarily & willingly all that wherefore God had created him: For seeing that God had created him good, as he did all his other creatures, it was natural for him to do well, & continuing in the same, being joined to God: & hearing his voice, he could none otherwise do. For in as much as his will was good, he could not will, nor yet do, following that good will, but that which was good: but when he once gave ear to the counsel of the devil, & changing both his will & nature, by following of him is fallen into an other necessity wholly contrary to the first: For in the stead that before he did necessarily good, & was wholly given to God, for that of his nature he could not then will nor do otherwise, through constraint, having changed both nature & will, he can not but follow his nature: wherefore this necessity of well doing, did not proceed of any want that was in him, as it seemeth unto ⟨p. 478⟩us that the word doth signify, for when we speak of good things, we do not in that behalf take necessity, for need or lacks, but for a disposition of things which can not be other but such as she is her self, according to the declaration that hath been already made: if we speak of evil, we may well then say that the necessity whereof we speak, is joined with lack of goodness, contrary to this evil. For the evil which man doth, is not done but for want of goodness which ought to be in him in the stead of the evil into the which the good was changed: the which evil of his nature engendereth evil, where as the good engendereth good: We see the like again of this in some other thing, as in the darknesses which the night doth bring unto us, & in that which followeth: for what is the cause of the night, but only the shadow of the earth which taketh from us the light of the sun, & bringeth unto us darknesses, contrary to that light? by means whereof we have the day turned into night, and then when we are covered all over with the night, we can not do that which we do in the day, nor go ⟨p. 479⟩forth right but clean contrary:

D. WE may easily vnderstād by these exāples, what we may iudge of mā, cōcerning this matter wherof we doe now intreat. For after yt mā was created by God, in so much as he was created of God, good, iust, & holy, he did necessarily & willingly all yt wherfore God had created him: For seing yt God had created him good, as he did all his other creatures, it was naturall for him to do well, & continuing in the same, being ioined to God: & hearing his voyce, he coulde none otherwise do. For in as much as his will was good, he could not will, nor yet do, folowing that good will, but yt which was good: but when he once gaue eare to the coūsel of ye deuill, & chaūging both his will & nature, by folowing of him is fallen into an other necessitie wholy cōtrary to ye first: For in the stead yt before he did necessarily good, & was wholy giuen to God, for that of his nature he coulde not then will nor do otherwise, through constraint, hauing changed both nature & will, he can not but folow his nature: wherefore this necessitie of wel doing, did not procéede of any wāt yt was in him, as it séemeth vnto

and that, because that we have darkness in the stead of light, without the which we can not walk directly, & yet all this while, is the necessity without constraint: For albeit that the lack which may be in a man (the which we call necessity) be by chance an occasion to make him to steal, yet notwithstanding he cannot justly say that he was constrained to steal, for if he had been an honest man, and not a thief, he would rather have endured all kind of miseries & necessities, than to have stolen: but for so much as he had rather live at his ease, than he would endure pain & misery according to the will of God, he had rather steal than to obey God.

and that, bicause that wée haue darknesse in the steade of light, without the which we can not walke directly, & yet all this while, is the necessitie without constraint: For albeit that the lacke which may be in a mā (the which we cal necessitie) be by chaūce an occasion to make him to steale, yet notwithstāding he cannot iustly say that he was constrained to steale, for if he had bene an honest man, and not a théefe, he would rather haue endured all kinde of miseries & necessities, than to haue stolen: but for so much as he had rather liue at his ease, than he would endure paine & misery according to the will of God, he had rather steale than to obey God.

How that the necessity that is here spoken of, is free and commendable in good things: and how it ought to be otherwise considered in God than in Creatures.

Hovv that the necessitie that is here spoken of, is free and commendable in good things: and hovv it ought to be othervvise considered in God than in Creatures.

T. Then by as much as I can understand of such matters, if this necessity be sound in a good thing, it is commendable ⟨p. 480⟩& joined with great liberty.

T. THen by as much as I can vnderstand of such matters, if this necessitie be sound in a good thing, it is cōmendable ⟨p. 480⟩& ioined with great libertie.

D. We do see it in the nature of God, as it hath been already touched. For that which God can not be necessarily but all mighty, all wise, all just, all good, & all perfect, infinite, eternal & immortal, doth not carry with it a necessity of lack, nor constraint, nor yet doth in any respect diminish the power, the glory, & majesty of him, but on the contrary it doth magnify & declare the great excellency & perfection of his nature. For it is not a true liberty & commendation to be able to sin & to do evil: but it is a token of an excellent nature to be so perfect in goodness, that it doth hold in it continually that goodness which it naturally hath, in such sort that it can not by any accident whatsoever it be, be changed, diminished or abolished, it is as if we should say, that it is impossible that God should not be God, & good, and just. Who would not conclude then by that same, that God is not all mighty, & that there is something impossible to him. Are we more strong than he, because we may be wicked, untrue, unjust, & liars, the which he can not be? For goodness is in him a thing which hath ⟨p. 481⟩subject & substance, & the accidents agreeable to the same, as we do see in the sun & in his light, which doth light all the world: for the evil is nothing else, but a privation, lack & want of the good which ought to be, even as the darknesses are nothing else than privation & lack of light. Or if thou haddest rather to have it spoken in other terms: it is nothing but a corrupted quality & a vicious accident, which are come upon a good substance & creature of God, & have corrupted it: the fault whereof may not be sought in God, albeit that nothing can come to pass without his providence & his eternal counsel: but it must be sought in causes more near unto us, leaving a part the secrete counsels & judgments of God, which is in such sort the cause of causes, that no fault may be imputed unto him, or that he can do any thing other than justly. For he hath in such sort disposed the second causes, that when the evil is a doing, the wicked will either of the Devil or man, cometh between, in such sort that that fault resteth in them, albeit that God doth cause their wicked work and will to serve him, and make the worker good, ⟨p. 482⟩in so much as God is served therewith.

D. We doe sée it in the nature of God, as it hath bene already touched. For yt which God can not bée necessarily but all mighty, all wise, all iust, all good, & al perfect, infinite, eternal & immortall, doth not carrie with it a necessitie of lacke, nor constraint, nor yet doth in any respect diminish ye power, the glory, & maiestie of him, but on the cō trary it doth magnifie & declare the great excellencie & perfection of his nature. For it is not a true libertie & cōmendation to be able to sinne & to doe euill: but it is a token of an excellent nature to be so perfect in goodnesse, that it doth holde in it cō tinually that goodnesse which it naturally hath, in such sorte that it cā not by any accident whatsoeuer it be, be chaunged, diminished or abolished, it is as if we shold say, that it is impossible that God should not be God, & good, and iuste. Who would not cōclude thē by that same, that God is not all mighty, & that there is something impossible to him. Are we more stronge than he, bicause we may be wicked, vntrue, vniust, & liers, ye which he cā not be? For goodnes is in him a thing which hath

As touching the rest, thou oughtest to note, that there is none which of his own nature is of such an unchangeable and infinite goodness, but God only, which is only unchangeable, and the most free of all others, and doth give a law to all creatures, & is above all laws, himself being a law to all creatures. For the same cause our Lord Jesus Christ hath said that none is good,¹ but the only God: because that goodness is to him natural, essential and substantial, and it is inseparable with him, and not accidental and separable, which may be joined unto him, or taken away from him by any manner of means: But the like is not of creatures how excellent so ever they be: as we may see first in the Angels, and afterward in man.

As touching the reste, thou oughtest to note, that there is none which of his own nature is of such an vnchaungeable and infinite goodnesse, but God only, which is onely vnchangeable, and the most frée of all others, and doth giue a law to al creatures, & is aboue all lawes, himselfe being a lawe to all creatures. For the same cause our Lorde Iesus Christe hath saide that none is good,¹ but the onely God: bicause that goodnesse is to him naturall, essentiall and substantiall, and it is inseparable with him, and not accidentall and separable, which may be ioyned vnto him, or taken away from him by any manner of meanes: But the like is not of creatures how excellent so euer they be: as we may sée first in the Angels, and afterwarde in man.

1. 1Matth. 19.

T. I shall also very gladly understand this point.

T. I shall also very gladly vnderstand this point.

Of the creation and fall of the Angels, and how that God in the same hath declared the difference that is between the Creator and the Creature, and how it is only he that is perfect and unchangeable.

Of the creation and fall of the Angels, and hovv that God in the same hath declared the difference that is betvveene the Creator and the Creature, and hovv it is onely he that is perfect and vnchaungeable.