A18080:154
The second reply of Thomas CartwrightThe second replie of Thomas Cartwright
The second reply of Thomas Cartwright: against Master Doctor Whitgiftes second answer, touching the Church disciplineThe second replie of Thomas Cartwright: agaynst Maister Doctor Whitgiftes second answer, touching the Churche discipline
Heidelberg: printed by Michael Schirat, 1575
Title page typeset from the transcription.
Modern spelling is a reading aid: the words are the author’s, only the spelling is modernized. Original shows the page as printed, with the transcription marks.
he speaketh off things / which have a likelihood / and may be disputed off on both sides: and not of things / which are to be received without gainsaying. And I marvel that the A. will not see / that amongest men / the cunningest in any profession / have in diverse things been off those which followed them justly found faults with. And if he will both stick to Aristotle / and interpret• him as he doth / that a man ought to believe every one, in that as to and profession where in he is conning: then every learned Divine in his profession / is to be believed whatsoever he saith. Which being absurd / and seeing it hath been before showed / that an argument of the authority of man affirmatively is not good: let us hold that for so much as man / cannot come (through his infirmity) unto the perfection of any thing / (which reason being assigned of me / is untouched of the A.) and forasmuch as the gifts off god / are given in measure / and not in perfection: that an argument off •he authority off man / can not enforce us / and that it is proper unto the Apostles / and Prophets / whom the Lord had chosen to be his notaries / and whose hands he holds continually / to be without the hazard off error.
he speaketh off thinges / which haue a likelihoode / and may be disputed off on bothe sydes: and not of thinges / which are to be receiued without gainesaying. And I merueile that the A. will not see / that amongest men / the cunningest in any profession / haue in diuerse thinges bene off those which followed them iustly founde fauls with. And if he will bothe sticke to Aristotle / and interpret• him as he dothe / that a man ought to beleue euerie one, in that as to and profession where in he is conninge: then euerie learned Deuine in his profession / is to be beleued whatsoeuer he saithe. Which beinge absurd / and seinge it hathe bene before shewed / that an argumēt of the authoritie of mā affirmatiuely is not good: let vs holde that for somuche as mā / cānot come (through his infirmitie) vnto the perfectiō of any thinge / (which reason being assigned of me / is vntouched of the A.) and forasmuche as the giftes off god / are giuen in measure / and not in perfection: that an argument off •he authoritie off man / can not enforcevs / and that it is proper vnto the Aposties / and Prophetes / whom the Lorde had chosen to be his notaries / and whose handes he helds continually / to be without the hazarde off errour.