A fresh suit against human ceremonies in God's worship. Or a triplication unto. D.…A fresh suit against human ceremonies in God's vvorship. Or a triplication unto. D.…

The eight is; That it is not the use or end, ¹which maketh a ceremony to be part of divine worship, or not, but institution: Divine institution maketh any circumstance a part; but human institution, though to the same end and use, maketh only an adjunct of divine worship, because the observance thereof cannot incur the act of any proper worship of God. How this is a consectary following upon the premises it doth not appear. The contrary seemeth to follow from the sixth consectary, where divine and human institution is denied to make a Ceremony, or no Ceremony, but rather to difference arbitrary, and necessary Cerem. For ⟨p. 44⟩by the very like reason; Divine and human institution doth not make worship, or no worship, but rather maketh a difference of necessary or arbitrary will worship. The reason of that is rendered, because relation doth constitute a Ceremo. And the same reason holdeth here, because relation doth constitute worship: The Institution Divine or human doth only difference the efficient cause, not the matter, form, and end, wherein the essence of worship doth consist. If Gods institution did make any circumstance of worship to become worship, then the ceasing from worship should be worship, because there were circumstances of time appointed, when men should cease from solemn worship: The reason which supporteth the other part of this assertion viz: That human institution cannot make an action part of worship, because the observance thereof, cannot incur the act of worship, is just as much, as if it had been so set down: human institution cannot make worship; because that which it maketh, cannot be worship. If men appoint even places, and times, in the same manner, to the same ends, that God did, they are worship as well (though not so good) as the other: If this were not so, then wherefore doth the Scripture tell us, of will worship, taken up at the pleasure of men, or according to the institutions, doctrines, and traditions of men? For by the Rej. his rule, there can be no such thing, and therefore it is vain to forbid it. This may suffice for this consectary, yet because the reflection of it doth often occur in the dispute. I further undertake to prove, that it is neither true in it self: nor 2. is it truly inferred from the definition, and both ⟨p. 45⟩these charges we will endeavour to make good.