A fresh suit against human ceremonies in God's worship. Or a triplication unto. D.…A fresh suit against human ceremonies in God's vvorship. Or a triplication unto. D.…

The appointing of wine for the Supper, is no snare, though some Countries have it not, and some men cannot well drink it. See Beza ep. 2. Pareus and Symb. Sacram. l. 1. cap. 9.2. I would know, whether it had been a snare, if God had appointed sitting at the Table, with exception of such extra ordinary cases? if yea, then m•che more when men appoint kneeling, sirplicing, and crossing, if no, then our Argument may proceed.

The appointing of wine for the Supper, is no snare, though some Countries have it not, and some mē cannot wel drinke it. See Beza ep. 2. Pareus and Symb. Sacram. l. 1. cap. 9.2. I would know, whether it had beē a snare, if God had appointed sitting at the Table, with exception of suche extra ordinarie cases? if yea, then m•che more when men appoint kneeling, sirplicing, and crossing, if no, then our Argument may proceed.

Kneeling in public prayer, might have been appointed without snaring, as appearing before the Lord thrice in the year, was appointed to every Male in Israel. Deut: 16.16. For (without doubt) many men in Israel, were, by accident, more unable to travel up to Jerusalem, then any Christian that hath knees, is to kneel.

Kneeling in publicke prayer, might have been appointed without snaring, as appearing before the Lord thrise in the yeer, was appointed to every Male in Israel. Deut: 16.16. For (without doubt) many men in Israel, were, by accident, more unable to travel up to Ierusalem, then any Christian that hath knees, is to kneel.

After this observation, of which the Rejoinder saith it may be as we will, he answereth, that our Lord hath left nothing absolute to the will of his Officers: but hath left even ambulatory Rites, under general rules, which will try them as perfectly, as if every one had been named, and with less cumber. But 1. this is nothing to the purpose: because so the imperfectest law that is in any nation upon the earth, if it be worthy the name of Law, leaveth nothing ⟨p. 70⟩so absolute to the will of inferior Officers, as that it should be without the general rules of justice, common good, etc. Nay not without the rules of order & decency. 2. Concerning the comparison of perfection, betwixt general and particular rules, though enough hath been said before, upon like occasion, yet this I will add.

After this observation, of which the Rejoynder sayth it may be as we will, he answereth, that our Lord hath left nothing absolute to the will of his Officers: but hath left even ambulatorie Rites, under generall rules, which will trie them as perfectly, as if every one had been named, and with lesse cumber. But 1. this is nothing to the purpose: because so the imperfectest law that is in any nation upon the earth, if it be worthy the name of Law, leaveth nothing ⟨p. 70⟩so absolute to the will of inferior Officers, as that it should be without the generall rules of justice, common good, etc. Nay not without the rules of order & decencie. 2. Concerning the comparison of perfection, betwixt generall and particular rules, though enough hath been sayd before, upon like occasion, yet this I will adde.

Neither do I believe, that he himself is so fully persuaded in Crossing the Baptized, by any rule which he hath out of Gods word, for that, as he is for Baptizing, by the rule of that.

Neyther doe I beleiv, that he himself is so fully perswaded in Crossing the Baptized, by any rule which he hath out of Gods word, for that, as he is for Baptizing, by the rule of that.

9. The Repl. having (as he thought sufficiently grounded the general, that a perfect law leaveth nothing more then needs must, unto inferior Officers, goeth on to assume, that in the worship of God, all, but particular Circumstances of order, might easily, be (as indeed they, were) appointed by Christ, and therefore need not be left to the Churches wisdom. Upon this, it pleaseth the Rejoinder to say little to the purpose, in many words. 1. He saith, that Circumstances of order were not harder to determine, then those of ⟨p. 71⟩decency. Now it is plain enough, that the Repl. here, naming Order, did also understand Decency, though he named Order only. 2. He asketh, what School of Divinity hath taught the Repl. to say, that our Lord forbore the determining of such circumstances, because all else was easy. I Answer, no rule of Divinity did either teach the Repl. to say so, nor yet the Rejoinder to impute unto him, which he never said.

9. The Repl. having (as he thought sufficiently grounded the generall, that a perfect law leaveth nothing more then needs must, unto inferior Officers, goeth on to assume, that in the worship of God, all, but particular Circumstances of order, might easily, be (as indeed they, were) appointed by Christ, and therfore need not be left to the Churches wisdome. Vpon this, it pleaseth the Rejoynder to say litle to the purpose, in many words. 1. He sayth, that Circumstances of order were not harder to determine, then those of ⟨p. 71⟩decencie. Now it is plaine enough, that the Repl. here, naming Order, did also understād Decencie, though he named Order onely. 2. He asketh, what School of Divinitie hath taught the Repl. to say, that our Lord forbore the determining of suche circumstances, because all else was easy. I Answer, no rule of Divinitie did eyther teache the Repl. to say so, nor yet the Rejoynder to impute unto him, which he never sayd.

But if he meaneth (as it seemeth he doeth) because it was not so easy to determine circumstances of time and place as real worship.

But if he meaneth (as it seemeth he doeth) because it was not so easie to determine circumstances of time and place as reall worship.

I then answer, that this (as I think) the Replier learned out of that Divinity School, out of which the Def. and Rejoinder learned. That which they cite out of Calvin, pag, 15.16. Junius is cited to the contrary, out of Cont. 3. l 4. cap. 17. n. 12. (which place the Rej. looked upon, by occasion of the Repl. his former citation of it.) But he in that very place, distinguisheth betwixt laws, properly so called, and cautions, leaving only cautions to the Churches liberty, which is the very same that the Repl. meaneth. The plain trueth is, that supposing Gods will to be, we should worship him in any place, and any time fitting, it was necessary, that the particular choice of fitting time and place, should be left undetermined to any particular time or place, exclusively.

I then answer, that this (as I thinke) the Replier learned out of that Divinitie School, out of which the Def. and Rejoynder learned. That which they cite out of Calvin, pag, 15.16. Iunius is cited to the contrarie, out of Cont. 3. l 4. cap. 17. n. 12. (which place the Rej. looked upon, by occasion of the Repl. his former citation of it.) But hee in that very place, distinguisheth betwixt laws, properly so called, and cautions, leaving onely cautions to the Churches libertie, which is the very same that the Repl. meaneth. The plaine trueth is, that supposing Gods will to be, we should worship him in any place, and any time fitting, it was necessarie, that the particular choise of fitting time and place, should be left undetermined to any particular time or place, exclusively.

Calvin also is cited, as more comely expressing the cause to be, that Christ would not, then that he could not determine such matters.

Calvin also is cited, as more comely expressing the cause to be, that Christ would not, then that he could not determine suche matters.

Now though Calvin, being so excellent in his expressions, may easily be granted to have expressed the same meaning in more comely manner then the Repl. yet here was no cause of noting disparity. For the Repl in saying, all things but particular order and decency may be easily appointed, did not say what Christ could do, but what might be easily for us appointed, or with our ease, or with the ease which we do conceive of in law giving, or of an ordinary law giver, having such authority as Christ had. And who doeth not see, that it is not so easy, to appoint every particular place, and time, wherein God shall be worshipped, throughout all the world, then with what worship he shall be served? For that particular description, a thousand books, so great as our one bible, would not have sufficed.

Now though Calvin, being so excellent in his expressions, may easily be granted to have expressed the same meaning in more comely manner then the Repl. yet here was no cause of noting disparitie. For the Repl in saying, all things but particular order and decencie may be easily appointed, did not say what Christ could doe, but what might be easily for us appointed, or with our ease, or with the ease which we doe conceyve of in law giving, or of an ordinarie law giver, having suche authoritie as Christ had. And who doeth not see, that it is not so easie, to appoint every particular place, and time, wherin God shall be worshiped, throughout all the world, then with what worship he shall be served? For that particular description, a thousand books, so great as our one bible, would not have suffized.

The world (as John saith) would not be capable of the Volumes that must have been written. The Rej. himself pag 89. telleth us of cumber, and much ado, that would have been, in naming every particular, is not this as much as less easy? Yet it pleased him to seek matter or altercation about this phrase, and that (which agreeth not) immediately after he had without reason accused the Repl. of picking quarrels pag. 88.

The world (as Iohn sayth) would not be capable of the Volumes that must have been written. The Rej. himself pag 89. telleth us of cumber, and much adoe, that would have been, in naming every particular, is not this as much as lesse easy? Yet it pleased him to seek matter or altercation about this phraze, and that (which agreeth not) immediatly after he had without reason accused the Repl. of picking quarrells pag. 88.

10. A Second reason, of the Repl. his proposition, was, that whatsoever in worship is above order and decency, is worship. Bec. whatsoever is acted by him that worshippeth, in that act, beside ordinary civility, must either be an act or means of worship, or an orderly decent disposing of those acts, or else at the least idle, and so unlawful. The Rej. answereth 1. that a significant ⟨p. 73⟩Ceremony for edification, is lawful, yet cometh not under any of those heads. But he himself confesseth a significant Ceremon: instituted of God, to be essential worship, and instituted of man to be worship, though not in it self, of which distinction, enough hath been said, in the head of worship. Yet this by the way: A significant Ceremony for edification, is the same, in it self, by whomsoever it be instituted: because institution is extrinsical to the thing instituted, and alters it not in it self, internally. If therefore it be essential lawful worship, in it self when it is instituted by God, it is also essential (though not lawful) worship, in it self, when it is instituted by man. Beside that Ceremony whose proper sole end is edification, toward God, is properly done to the honour of God, and so properly divine worship.

10. A Second reason, of the Repl. his proposition, was, that whatsoever in worship is above order and decencie, is worship. Bec. whatsoever is acted by him that worshippeth, in that act, beside ordinarie civilitie, must eyther be an act or meanes of worship, or an orderly decent disposing of those acts, or else at the least idle, and so unlawfull. The Rej. answereth 1. that a significant ⟨p. 73⟩Ceremonie for edification, is lawfull, yet commeth not under any of those heads. But he himself confesseth a significant Ceremon: instituted of God, to be essentiall worship, and instituted of man to be worship, though not in it self, of which distinction, enough hath been sayd, in the head of worship. Yet this by the way: A significant Ceremonie for edification, is the same, in it self, by whomesoever it be inst•tuted: because institution is extrinsicall to the thing instituted, and alters it not in it self, internally. If therfore it be essentiall lawfull worship, in it self when it is instituted by God, it is also essētiall (though not lawfull) worship, in it self, when it is instituted by man. Beside that Ceremonie whose proper sole ende is edification, toward God, is properly doen to the honor of God, and so properly divine worship.

His 2, answer is, that comeliness grounded on civill humane considerations, is not mere civility, in sacred actions, and use, but sacred by application. W•ich is very true if civill application be meant by mere civill, but then it is nothing to the purpose. For sacred by application is seemly clothing, put on for to go to Church in, and yet is in it self mere civill. The question is not of application, but of internal nature.

His 2, answer is, that comlinesse grounded on civill humane considerations, is not mere civilitie, in sacred actions, and use, but sacred by application. W•ich is very true if civill application be meant by mere civill, but then it is nothing to the purpose. For sacred by application is seemly clothing, put on for to goe to Churche in, and yet is in it self mere civill. The question is not of application, but of internall nature.

Sacred things applied to Civill business, do not therefore become Civill, for who will say, that Prayer, at the beginning of a Parliament, is a Civill act, though it were used in the Upper, and lower house, and applied to that Civill meeting, as it ought to be? And why then shall application of Civill decency unto ⟨p. 74⟩Sacred business, make it alter the nature or name of it?

Sacred thinges applied to Civill buissinesse, doe not therfore become Civill, for who will say, that Prayer, at the beginning of a Parliament, is a Civill act, though it were used in the Vpper, and lower house, and applied to that Civill meeting, as it ought to be? And why then shall application of Civill decencie unto ⟨p. 74⟩Sacred buisinesse, make it alter the nature or name of it?

His 3. answer is, that all means of worship are not worship. But he knew well enough, that this was meant of proper means of worship.

His 3. answer is, that all meanes of worship are not worship. But he knew well enough, that this was meant of proper means of worship.

His fourth is, that ordering and manner of disposing, is ill divided from comeliness. Neither did the Repl. intend so to divide, but rather to conjoin them, understanding by that manner of disposing, comeliness. But if the Rejoinder had not cached up some show of confounding comeliness with order, which was not intended by the Repl. he had been in this argument wholly at a loss.

His fourth is, that ordering and manner of disposing, is ill divided from comelinesse. Neyther did the Repl. intend so to divide, but rather to conjoine them, understanding by that manner of disposing, comelinesse. But if the Rejoynder had not cached up some shew of confounding comelinesse with order, which was not intended by the Repl. he had been in this argument wholly at a losse.