A19142:707
A19142:707
A fresh suit against human ceremonies in God's worship. Or a triplication unto. D. Burgess his rejoinder for D. Morton The first partA fresh suit against human ceremonies in God's vvorship. Or a triplication unto. D. Burgesse his rejoinder for D. Morton The first part
Amsterdam: printed by the successors of Giles Thorp, 1633
Modern spelling is a reading aid: the words are the author’s, only the spelling is modernized. Original shows the page as printed, with the transcription marks.
Calvin also is cited, as more comely expressing the cause to be, that Christ would not, then that he could not determine such matters.
Calvin also is cited, as more comely expressing the cause to be, that Christ would not, then that he could not determine suche matters.
Now though Calvin, being so excellent in his expressions, may easily be granted to have expressed the same meaning in more comely manner then the Repl. yet here was no cause of noting disparity. For the Repl in saying, all things but particular order and decency may be easily appointed, did not say what Christ could do, but what might be easily for us appointed, or with our ease, or with the ease which we do conceive of in law giving, or of an ordinary law giver, having such authority as Christ had. And who doeth not see, that it is not so easy, to appoint every particular place, and time, wherein God shall be worshipped, throughout all the world, then with what worship he shall be served? For that particular description, a thousand books, so great as our one bible, would not have sufficed.
Now though Calvin, being so excellent in his expressions, may easily be granted to have expressed the same meaning in more comely manner then the Repl. yet here was no cause of noting disparitie. For the Repl in saying, all things but particular order and decencie may be easily appointed, did not say what Christ could doe, but what might be easily for us appointed, or with our ease, or with the ease which we doe conceyve of in law giving, or of an ordinarie law giver, having suche authoritie as Christ had. And who doeth not see, that it is not so easie, to appoint every particular place, and time, wherin God shall be worshiped, throughout all the world, then with what worship he shall be served? For that particular description, a thousand books, so great as our one bible, would not have suffized.
The world (as John saith) would not be capable of the Volumes that must have been written. The Rej. himself pag 89. telleth us of cumber, and much ado, that would have been, in naming every particular, is not this as much as less easy? Yet it pleased him to seek matter or altercation about this phrase, and that (which agreeth not) immediately after he had without reason accused the Repl. of picking quarrels pag. 88.
The world (as Iohn sayth) would not be capable of the Volumes that must have been written. The Rej. himself pag 89. telleth us of cumber, and much adoe, that would have been, in naming every particular, is not this as much as lesse easy? Yet it pleased him to seek matter or altercation about this phraze, and that (which agreeth not) immediatly after he had without reason accused the Repl. of picking quarrells pag. 88.
10. A Second reason, of the Repl. his proposition, was, that whatsoever in worship is above order and decency, is worship. Bec. whatsoever is acted by him that worshippeth, in that act, beside ordinary civility, must either be an act or means of worship, or an orderly decent disposing of those acts, or else at the least idle, and so unlawful. The Rej. answereth 1. that a significant ⟨p. 73⟩Ceremony for edification, is lawful, yet cometh not under any of those heads. But he himself confesseth a significant Ceremon: instituted of God, to be essential worship, and instituted of man to be worship, though not in it self, of which distinction, enough hath been said, in the head of worship. Yet this by the way: A significant Ceremony for edification, is the same, in it self, by whomsoever it be instituted: because institution is extrinsical to the thing instituted, and alters it not in it self, internally. If therefore it be essential lawful worship, in it self when it is instituted by God, it is also essential (though not lawful) worship, in it self, when it is instituted by man. Beside that Ceremony whose proper sole end is edification, toward God, is properly done to the honour of God, and so properly divine worship.
10. A Second reason, of the Repl. his proposition, was, that whatsoever in worship is above order and decencie, is worship. Bec. whatsoever is acted by him that worshippeth, in that act, beside ordinarie civilitie, must eyther be an act or meanes of worship, or an orderly decent disposing of those acts, or else at the least idle, and so unlawfull. The Rej. answereth 1. that a significant ⟨p. 73⟩Ceremonie for edification, is lawfull, yet commeth not under any of those heads. But he himself confesseth a significant Ceremon: instituted of God, to be essentiall worship, and instituted of man to be worship, though not in it self, of which distinction, enough hath been sayd, in the head of worship. Yet this by the way: A significant Ceremonie for edification, is the same, in it self, by whomesoever it be insttuted: because institution is extrinsicall to the thing instituted, and alters it not in it self, internally. If therfore it be essentiall lawfull worship, in it self when it is instituted by God, it is also essētiall (though not lawfull) worship, in it self, when it is instituted by man. Beside that Ceremonie whose proper sole ende is edification, toward God, is properly doen to the honor of God, and so properly divine worship.
His 2, answer is, that comeliness grounded on civill humane considerations, is not mere civility, in sacred actions, and use, but sacred by application. W•ich is very true if civill application be meant by mere civill, but then it is nothing to the purpose. For sacred by application is seemly clothing, put on for to go to Church in, and yet is in it self mere civill. The question is not of application, but of internal nature.
His 2, answer is, that comlinesse grounded on civill humane considerations, is not mere civilitie, in sacred actions, and use, but sacred by application. W•ich is very true if civill application be meant by mere civill, but then it is nothing to the purpose. For sacred by application is seemly clothing, put on for to goe to Churche in, and yet is in it self mere civill. The question is not of application, but of internall nature.
Sacred things applied to Civill business, do not therefore become Civill, for who will say, that Prayer, at the beginning of a Parliament, is a Civill act, though it were used in the Upper, and lower house, and applied to that Civill meeting, as it ought to be? And why then shall application of Civill decency unto ⟨p. 74⟩Sacred business, make it alter the nature or name of it?
Sacred thinges applied to Civill buissinesse, doe not therfore become Civill, for who will say, that Prayer, at the beginning of a Parliament, is a Civill act, though it were used in the Vpper, and lower house, and applied to that Civill meeting, as it ought to be? And why then shall application of Civill decencie unto ⟨p. 74⟩Sacred buisinesse, make it alter the nature or name of it?
His 3. answer is, that all means of worship are not worship. But he knew well enough, that this was meant of proper means of worship.
His 3. answer is, that all meanes of worship are not worship. But he knew well enough, that this was meant of proper means of worship.
His fourth is, that ordering and manner of disposing, is ill divided from comeliness. Neither did the Repl. intend so to divide, but rather to conjoin them, understanding by that manner of disposing, comeliness. But if the Rejoinder had not cached up some show of confounding comeliness with order, which was not intended by the Repl. he had been in this argument wholly at a loss.
His fourth is, that ordering and manner of disposing, is ill divided from comelinesse. Neyther did the Repl. intend so to divide, but rather to conjoine them, understanding by that manner of disposing, comelinesse. But if the Rejoynder had not cached up some shew of confounding comelinesse with order, which was not intended by the Repl. he had been in this argument wholly at a losse.
His 5. and last answer is, that by Basils leave some things, in themselves, may, and sometime must be tolerated. But he should have remembered, that the question here is not of tolerating, but of appointing and using.
His 5. and last answer is, that by Basils leave some thinges, in themselfs, may, and sometime must be tolerated. But he should have remembred, that the question here is not of toleratíng, but of appointing and using.
Now if it be lawful, to appoint and use empty and unprofitable Ceremonies in Gods worship, let those Worshippers judge, that tremble at the Majesty of God, and are afraid in any manner to appear empty and unprofitably before him.1 Nay (to pass by our Divines) let the Papists themselves judge. Bellar. de Pontif. l. 4. c. 17. ad 4. confesseth those Ceremonies to be forbidden, which are unprofitable altogether, and vain precepts, unprofitable & frivolous Ceremonies, only by humane Spirit invented. 2And de effect. Sacrament l. 2. cap. 32. empty and good for nothing. More than needs, and not a jot tending to any Godliness, and who not?
Now if it be lawfull, to appoint and use emptie and unprofitable Ceremonies in Gods worship, let those Worshippers judge, that tremble at the Majestie of God, and are afrayd in any manner to appear emptie and unprofitablie before him.1 Nay (to passe by our Divines) let the Papists themselvs judge. Bellar. de Pontif. l. 4. c. 17. ad 4. confesseth those Ceremonies to be forbidden, which are unprofitable altogether, and vaine praecepts, unproffitable & frivolons Ceremonies, onely by humane Spirit invented. 2And de effect. Sacrament l. 2. cap. 32. empty and good for nothing. Morethen needs, and not a jot tending to any Godines, and who not?
11. Thus far concerning the Proposition of our Argument: the Assumption followeth, which is this: To appoint and use the Ceremonies as we do, is not to order in comely manner, any thing pertaining to Gods worship. The reason is, because order requireth not the institution or usage of any new thing, but only the right placing and disposing of things formerly instituted.
11. Thus farre concerninge the Proposition of our Argument: the Assumtion followeth, which is this: To appoint and use the Ceremonies as we doe, is not to order in comely manner, any thing pertayning to Gods worship. The reason is, because order requireth not the institution or usage of any new thinge, but onely the right placing and disposing of thinges formerly instituted.
1. The Rejoinder answer 1. that order requireth new time, place, and measure: which is a Sophistry in the Proposition before abused, and confuted.
1. The Rejoynder answer 1. that order requireth new time, place, and measure: which is a Sophistrie in the Proposition before abused, and confuted.
2. His second is, that ordering in comely manner, or comeliness requireth the institution of such formalities, as shall be suitable to the dignity and variety of divine actions. Where the term formalities is not so formal, that a man may spy in it the difference it hath from other things, the Rejoynd. in his manuduction, pag. 36. appropriateth it to Bishops Roshe•s etc. even as they are distinct from Surplices: the Bishops went before the Hearse in •heir formalities, the Clerks in their Surplices. So that it seemeth to mean some Ceremonies of state, and dignity: of which kind neither Cross, nor Surplice is any. Howsoever, unto ordering of one thing doeth not require another new thing, but only disposing of that one. For if it did, then that new thing (because that also must be ordered) would require another new thing, and that also for order sake another, so that no one thing could be ordered, without an infinite heap of new things.
2. His second is, that ordering in comely manner, or comelinesse requireth the institution of suche formalities, as shall be sutable to the dignitie and varietie of divine actions. Where the terme formalities is not so formall, that a man may spie in it the difference it hath from other thinges, the Rejoynd. in his manuduction, pag. 36. appropriateth it to Bishops Roshe•s etc. evē as they are distinct from Surplices: the Bishops went before the Hearse in •heir formalities, the Clearks in their Surplices. So that it seemeth to mean some Ceremonies of state, and dignitie: of which kinde neyther Crosse, nor Surplice is any. Howsoever, unto ordering of one thing doeth not require another new thing, but onely disposing of that one. For if it did, then that new thing (because that also must be ordered) would require another new thing, and that also for order sake another, so that no one thing could be ordered, without an infinite heap of new thinges.
As for the Dignity of divine actions, that is best suited with mans reverent and humble simplicity, not with outward shows of dignity, invented by man. The woman's ordinary veil was more suitable to the dignity of Gods worship, then if she had adorned her self with gold, and precious stones.
As for the Dignitie of divine actions, that is best suited with mans reverent and humble simplicitie, not with outward shews of dignitie, invented by man. The womans ordinarie vaile was more suitable to the dignitie of Gods worship, then if she had adorned her self with golde, and pretious stones.
Pauls plain cloak was more suitable then the richest Cope in all Rome. If Order requireth outward shows of dignity, then Rome, which is a confused Babel, may be to all Churches an imitable example of religious order, for the Council of Trent sess. 22. professeth, their mass Ceremonies to be invented. That the Majesty of such a Sacrifice might be set out.
Pauls plaine cloak was more suitable then the richest Coap in all Rome. If Order requireth outward shews of dignitie, then Rome, which is a confused Babel, may be to all Churches an imitable exāple of religious order, for the Councel of Trent sess. 22. professeth, their masse Ceremonies to be invented. That the Majesty of such a Sacrifice might be set out.
112. To show further that Order requireth not such Ceremony as ours, the notation of the word was brought in, signifying no such thing. Now the Rejoinder granteth that originally the word doeth not contain within the compass of it, such kind of Ceremonies, though by usage it may. Which is very true: but helpeth not, except the Def. or Rejoinder whose principal Argument is taken from this place, and only retorted by us, can prove, that in this place, the word order is extended beyond his original signification. He will not therefore stand with us, about the signification of the word in this place: let order (saith he) in this place signify no more then placing. But he maketh his retreat to the word Comeliness: asking if comeliness be nothing? I answer yes, it is some thing: but the Replier did not insist in that word, because he ⟨p. 77⟩took the force of the Def. his Argument from this place principally to lie upon order.
112. To shew further that Order requireth not suche Ceremonie as ours, the notation of the word was brought in, signifying no suche thing. Now the Rejoynder granteth that originally the word doeth not conteyne within the compasse of it, suche kinde of Ceremonies, though by usage it may. Which is very true: but helpeth not, except the Def. or Rejoynder whose principall Argument is taken from this place, and onely retorted by us, can prove, that in this place, the word order is extended beyond his originall signification. He will not therfore stand with us, about the signification of the word in this place: let order (sayth he) in this place signifie no more then placing. But he maketh his retrait to the word Comelinesse: asking if comelinesse be nothing? I answer yes, it is some thing: but the Replier did not insist in that word, because he ⟨p. 77⟩tooke the force of the Def. his Argument from this place principally to lie upon order.