A19142:694
A fresh suit against human ceremonies in God's worship. Or a triplication unto. D. Burgess his rejoinder for D. Morton The first partA fresh suit against human ceremonies in God's vvorship. Or a triplication unto. D. Burgesse his rejoinder for D. Morton The first part
Amsterdam: printed by the successors of Giles Thorp, 1633
Modern spelling is a reading aid: the words are the author’s, only the spelling is modernized. Original shows the page as printed, with the transcription marks.
7. A reason was given of the foresaid proposition, out of Jun. de Transl. Imp. l. 1. c. 2. n. 26.27.31. viz. that the Church hath only a Ministry, to observe such things as Christ hath appointed, not authority of appointing new things. Here the Rejoinder 1. observeth, that those words, (new things) have no foot steps in Junius. As if new things could be appointed lawfully without authority of appointing. Surely, he that denieth all authority of appointing, and leaveth only ministerial performance of things appointed, he denieth appointing of new things. 2. He argueth thus: If the Church have a ministry to appoint and do such things as Christ hath commanded, then must she needs have a Commission legative to appoint and use rites serving to order and decency. Add to this only, and then it is not only that, but all that which we require. 3. He crieth out of miserable perversion, either by gross negligence, or mistaking.
7. A reason was given of the foresaid proposition, out of Iun. de Transl. Imp. l. 1. c. 2. n. 26.27.31. viz. that the Churche hath onely a Ministerie, to observe suche thinges as Christ hath appointed, not authoritie of appointing new thinges. Here the Rejoynder 1. observeth, that those words, (new things) have no foot steps in Iunius. As if new things could be appointed lawfully without authoritie of appointing. Surely, he that denieth all authoritie of appointing, and leaveth onely ministeriall performance of things appointed, he denieth appointing of new thinges. 2. He argueth thus: If the Churche have a ministerie to appoint and doe suche thinges as Christ hath commanded, then must she needs have a Commission legative to appoint and use rites serving to order and decencie. Adde to this onely, and then it is not onely that, but all that which we require. 3. He crieth out of miserable perversion, eyther by grosse negligence, or mistaking.
And why so I pray? Because (forsooth) all that Junius saith is good to prove, that no Ecclesiastical person hath any power by his calling over temporal Princes. But this is nothing against their delegated dependant power, by Commission. But 1. these are very strange distinctions: they have not any power by their calling, but some by commission. They have not any power over temporal Princes (though they be members of the Church) but over the Church they have. 2. The Rejoinder maketh Junius only to deny that which Bellarmine never affirmed, viz. absolute independent power of Ecclesiastical persons, as supreme Lords. Nay Bellarmin answereth to Calvin in the very same manner that the Rejoinder doeth: The Pope is not the chief lawgiver but the vicar of Christ, 1& by Christs authority maketh laws. 3. He addeth that Junius disp. de trad. distinguisheth betwixt decency, and the seemliness of order alone.
And why so I pray? Because (forsooth) all that Iunius sayth is good to prove, that no Ecclesiasticall person hath any power by his calling over temporall Princes. But this is nothing against their delegated dependant power, by Commission. But 1. these are very strange distinctions: they have not any power by their calling, but some by commission. They have not any power over temporall Princes (though they be members of the Churche) but over the Churche they have. 2. The Rejoynder maketh Iunius onely to denie that which Bellarmine never affirmed, viz. absolute independent power of Ecclesiasticall persons, as supreme Lords. Nay Bellarmin answereth to Calvin in the very same manner that the Rejoynder doeth: The Pope is not the cheife lawgiver but the vicar of Christ, 1& by Christes authority maketh lawes. 3. He addeth that Iunius disp. de trad. distinguisheth betwixt decencie, and the seemlinesse of order alone.
As if this were the main question? Or any part of the Proposition! or denied by the Repl. at all. The Rejoinder having little to say that was to the purpose, cacheth hold of one word in the end of the Assumption used by the Repl. seemliness of order (which yet is immediately there differenc•d from other decency, as well commanded as this) and that he maketh the main matter of the proposition: whereas the meaning is, that nothing is left unto liberty in Gods worship, above decency and order, for which these testimonies are brought, and not for the other.
As if this were the maine question? Or any part of the Proposition! or denied by the Repl. at all. The Rejoynder having litle to say that was to the purpose, cacheth hould of one word in the ende of the Assumtion used by the Repl. seemlinesse of order (which yet is immediatly there differēc•d frō other decencie, as well commanded as this) and that he maketh the maine matter of the proposition: whereas the meaning is, that nothing is left unto libertie in Gods worship, above decencie and order, for which these testimonies are brought, and not for the other.
8. For more full support of the foresaid Proposition, a reason is added, from the fullness of a perfect law, which leaveth no more unto Ministerial judges, then needs must.
8. For more full support of the foresaid Proposition, a reason is added, from the fullnesse of a perfect law, which leaveth no more unto Ministeriall judges, then needs must.
For answer, the Rejoinder 1. observeth, that some cases are •f necessity variable, and so left. So the occasions of different Rites and Ceremonies a•e so various, that if our Lord had fixed any one certain fashion, he should have made rather snares then l•ws for his Church. As, if he had appointed sitting at a table in t•e Communion: or kneeling in prayer. This is strange stuff. 1. So much is granted, as is desired, viz. that God hath left nothing (about his worship) undetermined in his word. 1. e. uncommanded, and unforbidden particularly, save only that which he could not command or forbid. Now let any man think▪ and judge, whether it had not been possible for God in his word, either to have commanded, or forbidden the signing of those that are Baptised with the sign of the cross all so well, as Baptizing of them with water? 2, How can that too too bold and inconsiderate assertion be excused: if our Lord had fixed (or commanded) any one certain fashion of Ceremonies, he had made rather snares, then laws for his Church. If it had pleased God to command or forbid the sign of the Cross in particular, what snare had it been? When God appointed all the Ceremonies of the old Testament, he did not (I hope) make snares for his Church, though he did lay a burden upon it. 3. Whereas the Rejoinder maketh sitting at a table, in the Lords Supper, and kneeling at prayer, to be such things as the Lord could not ⟨p. 69⟩command, but as snares, because sometime a table may be wanting, or something to sit on, or ability to sit, and so of kneeling, this is as poor a snare to cache any man of understanding in, as one sh•l lightly see made. For 1. Many affirmative commandments of God there are, which in extraordinary cases cannot be fulfilled, and cease to bind: as praying unto and praising of God, with our voice: which is no snare, to him that cannot speak.
For answer, the Rejoynder 1. observeth, that some cases are •f necessitie variable, and so left. So the occasions of different Rites and Cerem•nies a•e so various, that if our Lord had fixed any one certayn fashon, he should have made rather snares then lws for his Churche. As, if he had appointed sitting at a table in te Communion: or kneeling in prayer. This is strange stuffe. 1. So much is granted, as is desired, viz. that God hath left nothing (about his worship) undertermined in his word. 1. e. uncommanded, and unforbidden particulaly, save onely that which he could not commande or forbid. Now let any man think and judge, whether it had not been possible for God in his word, eyther to have commanded, or forbidden the signing of those that are Baptised with the signe of the crosse all so well, as Baptizing of them with water? 2, How can that too too bolde and inconsiderate assertion be excused: if our Lord had fixed (or commanded) any one certain fashion of Ceremonies, he had made rather snares, then laws for his Churche. If it had pleased God to commande or forbid the signe of the Crosse in particular, what snare had it been? When God appointed all the Ceremonies of the olde Testament, he did not (I hope) make snares for his Churche, though he did lay a burthen upon it. 3. Wheras the Rejoynder maketh sitting at a table, in the Lords Supper, and kneeling at prayer, to be suche thinges as the Lord could not
The appointing of wine for the Supper, is no snare, though some Countries have it not, and some men cannot well drink it. See Beza ep. 2. Pareus and Symb. Sacram. l. 1. cap. 9.2. I would know, whether it had been a snare, if God had appointed sitting at the Table, with exception of such extra ordinary cases? if yea, then m•che more when men appoint kneeling, sirplicing, and crossing, if no, then our Argument may proceed.
The appointing of wine for the Supper, is no snare, though some Countries have it not, and some mē cannot wel drinke it. See Beza ep. 2. Pareus and Symb. Sacram. l. 1. cap. 9.2. I would know, whether it had beē a snare, if God had appointed sitting at the Table, with exception of suche extra ordinarie cases? if yea, then m•che more when men appoint kneeling, sirplicing, and crossing, if no, then our Argument may proceed.
Kneeling in public prayer, might have been appointed without snaring, as appearing before the Lord thrice in the year, was appointed to every Male in Israel. Deut: 16.16. For (without doubt) many men in Israel, were, by accident, more unable to travel up to Jerusalem, then any Christian that hath knees, is to kneel.
Kneeling in publicke prayer, might have been appointed without snaring, as appearing before the Lord thrise in the yeer, was appointed to every Male in Israel. Deut: 16.16. For (without doubt) many men in Israel, were, by accident, more unable to travel up to Ierusalem, then any Christian that hath knees, is to kneel.
After this observation, of which the Rejoinder saith it may be as we will, he answereth, that our Lord hath left nothing absolute to the will of his Officers: but hath left even ambulatory Rites, under general rules, which will try them as perfectly, as if every one had been named, and with less cumber. But 1. this is nothing to the purpose: because so the imperfectest law that is in any nation upon the earth, if it be worthy the name of Law, leaveth nothing ⟨p. 70⟩so absolute to the will of inferior Officers, as that it should be without the general rules of justice, common good, etc. Nay not without the rules of order & decency. 2. Concerning the comparison of perfection, betwixt general and particular rules, though enough hath been said before, upon like occasion, yet this I will add.
After this observation, of which the Rejoynder sayth it may be as we will, he answereth, that our Lord hath left nothing absolute to the will of his Officers: but hath left even ambulatorie Rites, under generall rules, which will trie them as perfectly, as if every one had been named, and with lesse cumber. But 1. this is nothing to the purpose: because so the imperfectest law that is in any nation upon the earth, if it be worthy the name of Law, leaveth nothing ⟨p. 70⟩so absolute to the will of inferior Officers, as that it should be without the generall rules of justice, common good, etc. Nay not without the rules of order & decencie. 2. Concerning the comparison of perfection, betwixt generall and particular rules, though enough hath been sayd before, upon like occasion, yet this I will adde.
If he meaneth, that a general rule if it be perfectly understood and applied, doeth as perfectly try as particulars. I grant it to be a trueth. And so was the old Testament as perfect a rule of Christian faith as the New, thou shalt love thy neighbour, as perfect as the six Commandments of the second Table. But if he mean that a general rule is as fit and full for our direction of us imperfect men, as particulars are, then I think no man conscious of humane frailty, will believe him.
If he meaneth, that a generall rule if it be perfectly understood and applied, doeth as perfectly trie as particulars. I grant it to be a trueth. And so was the olde Testament as perfect a rule of Christian faith as the New, thou shalt love thy neighbour, as perfect as the six Commandements of the second Table. But if he mean that a generall rule is as fit and full for our direction of us imperfect men, as particulars are, then I think no man conscious of humane frailtie, will beleiv him.
Neither do I believe, that he himself is so fully persuaded in Crossing the Baptized, by any rule which he hath out of Gods word, for that, as he is for Baptizing, by the rule of that.
Neyther doe I beleiv, that he himself is so fully perswaded in Crossing the Baptized, by any rule which he hath out of Gods word, for that, as he is for Baptizing, by the rule of that.
9. The Repl. having (as he thought sufficiently grounded the general, that a perfect law leaveth nothing more then needs must, unto inferior Officers, goeth on to assume, that in the worship of God, all, but particular Circumstances of order, might easily, be (as indeed they, were) appointed by Christ, and therefore need not be left to the Churches wisdom. Upon this, it pleaseth the Rejoinder to say little to the purpose, in many words. 1. He saith, that Circumstances of order were not harder to determine, then those of ⟨p. 71⟩decency. Now it is plain enough, that the Repl. here, naming Order, did also understand Decency, though he named Order only. 2. He asketh, what School of Divinity hath taught the Repl. to say, that our Lord forbore the determining of such circumstances, because all else was easy. I Answer, no rule of Divinity did either teach the Repl. to say so, nor yet the Rejoinder to impute unto him, which he never said.
9. The Repl. having (as he thought sufficiently grounded the generall, that a perfect law leaveth nothing more then needs must, unto inferior Officers, goeth on to assume, that in the worship of God, all, but particular Circumstances of order, might easily, be (as indeed they, were) appointed by Christ, and therfore need not be left to the Churches wisdome. Vpon this, it pleaseth the Rejoynder to say litle to the purpose, in many words. 1. He sayth, that Circumstances of order were not harder to determine, then those of ⟨p. 71⟩decencie. Now it is plaine enough, that the Repl. here, naming Order, did also understād Decencie, though he named Order onely. 2. He asketh, what School of Divinitie hath taught the Repl. to say, that our Lord forbore the determining of suche circumstances, because all else was easy. I Answer, no rule of Divinitie did eyther teache the Repl. to say so, nor yet the Rejoynder to impute unto him, which he never sayd.
But if he meaneth (as it seemeth he doeth) because it was not so easy to determine circumstances of time and place as real worship.
But if he meaneth (as it seemeth he doeth) because it was not so easie to determine circumstances of time and place as reall worship.
I then answer, that this (as I think) the Replier learned out of that Divinity School, out of which the Def. and Rejoinder learned. That which they cite out of Calvin, pag, 15.16. Junius is cited to the contrary, out of Cont. 3. l 4. cap. 17. n. 12. (which place the Rej. looked upon, by occasion of the Repl. his former citation of it.) But he in that very place, distinguisheth betwixt laws, properly so called, and cautions, leaving only cautions to the Churches liberty, which is the very same that the Repl. meaneth. The plain trueth is, that supposing Gods will to be, we should worship him in any place, and any time fitting, it was necessary, that the particular choice of fitting time and place, should be left undetermined to any particular time or place, exclusively.
I then answer, that this (as I thinke) the Replier learned out of that Divinitie School, out of which the Def. and Rejoynder learned. That which they cite out of Calvin, pag, 15.16. Iunius is cited to the contrarie, out of Cont. 3. l 4. cap. 17. n. 12. (which place the Rej. looked upon, by occasion of the Repl. his former citation of it.) But hee in that very place, distinguisheth betwixt laws, properly so called, and cautions, leaving onely cautions to the Churches libertie, which is the very same that the Repl. meaneth. The plaine trueth is, that supposing Gods will to be, we should worship him in any place, and any time fitting, it was necessarie, that the particular choise of fitting time and place, should be left undetermined to any particular time or place, exclusively.
Calvin also is cited, as more comely expressing the cause to be, that Christ would not, then that he could not determine such matters.
Calvin also is cited, as more comely expressing the cause to be, that Christ would not, then that he could not determine suche matters.
Now though Calvin, being so excellent in his expressions, may easily be granted to have expressed the same meaning in more comely manner then the Repl. yet here was no cause of noting disparity. For the Repl in saying, all things but particular order and decency may be easily appointed, did not say what Christ could do, but what might be easily for us appointed, or with our ease, or with the ease which we do conceive of in law giving, or of an ordinary law giver, having such authority as Christ had. And who doeth not see, that it is not so easy, to appoint every particular place, and time, wherein God shall be worshipped, throughout all the world, then with what worship he shall be served? For that particular description, a thousand books, so great as our one bible, would not have sufficed.
Now though Calvin, being so excellent in his expressions, may easily be granted to have expressed the same meaning in more comely manner then the Repl. yet here was no cause of noting disparitie. For the Repl in saying, all things but particular order and decencie may be easily appointed, did not say what Christ could doe, but what might be easily for us appointed, or with our ease, or with the ease which we doe conceyve of in law giving, or of an ordinarie law giver, having suche authoritie as Christ had. And who doeth not see, that it is not so easie, to appoint every particular place, and time, wherin God shall be worshiped, throughout all the world, then with what worship he shall be served? For that particular description, a thousand books, so great as our one bible, would not have suffized.
The world (as John saith) would not be capable of the Volumes that must have been written. The Rej. himself pag 89. telleth us of cumber, and much ado, that would have been, in naming every particular, is not this as much as less easy? Yet it pleased him to seek matter or altercation about this phrase, and that (which agreeth not) immediately after he had without reason accused the Repl. of picking quarrels pag. 88.
The world (as Iohn sayth) would not be capable of the Volumes that must have been written. The Rej. himself pag 89. telleth us of cumber, and much adoe, that would have been, in naming every particular, is not this as much as lesse easy? Yet it pleased him to seek matter or altercation about this phraze, and that (which agreeth not) immediatly after he had without reason accused the Repl. of picking quarrells pag. 88.