Rich. Baxters apology against the modest exceptions of Mr. T. Blake and the digression…

2. That which you call here perfectio subjecti, is nothing but the truth of the immediate subject, as I understand you. Justitia est vel causae, vel personae, vel saltem considerata vel ut causae vel ut personae. Causa est subjectum proximum: Persons est subjectum primum & principal. Justitia causae, est vel actionum vel habituum aut dispositionum. Perfecti sunt habitus & dispositiones, & actiones vel perfectione essentiali Transcendentali, (& ita perfecti sunt, quia vere sunt, & verè sunt tales:) vel perfectione accidentali: & ita aliquo modo perfecti, & alio imperfecti sunt. It seems therefore that you here say as much at least as I, for the perfection of the matter of our inherent Righteousness, (if not more) for I am sure you speak more unlimitedly.

2. That which you call here perfectio subjecti, is nothing but the truth of the immediate subject, as I understand you. Justitia est vel causae, vel personae, vel saltem considerata vel ut causae vel ut personae. Causa est subjectum proximum: Persons est subjectum primum & principale. Justitia causae, est vel actionum vel habituum aut dispositionum. Perfecti sunt habitus & dispositiones, & actiones vel perfectione essentiali Transcendentali, (& ita perfecti sunt, quia vere sunt, & verè sunt tales:) vel perfectione accidentali: & ita aliquo modo perfecti, & alio imperfecti sunt. It seems therefore that you here say as much at least as I, for the perfection of the matter of our inherent Righteousness, (if not more) for I am sure you speak more unlimitedly.

3. I do charitably conjecture, that when you speak of [a perfection of the object] you do not mean as you speak, but you mean a perfection of our Acts as they respect the object, extensively (for whether you include or exclude intension, I know not.) Here must I distinguish between objects of absolute necessity, (and so of the acts about those objects) which a man cannot be justified or saved without: and 2. Objects of less necessity (and so acts) which its possible to be justified and saved without. In regard of the former, I confess our acts may be said to be [Truly acts that are exercised about such objects] if you will call that perfection (as in a larger sense you may:) But as to the later, I acknowledge no such perfection. And therefore (for that which you call [A perfection of parts] I acknowledge that every righteous man, hath a perfection of the essential parts (that is, he wants them not) but not of the integral always; much less of accidents, which are improperly called parts.