Rich. Baxters apology against the modest exceptions of Mr. T. Blake and the digression…

R. B. This is fully answered before, even in my last Section. 1. Dr. Go•d saith but the same that I say: only I distinguish 1. Between that which is purely de fide, and that which is only denominated de fide as the more debile of the Premises. In the latter sense the Doctors conclusions are de fide, in the former not. 2. When a Conclusion is denied to be de fide, it may be meant either as a Diminution of its evidence, or as magnifying its evidence above that which is purely de fide, or as equalling it thereto. When I say this Conclusion is not de fide, A. B. is Justified and shall be saved, I speak it by way of Diminution of its evidence and authority. And I confidently speak it, and doubt not to maintain it. But when I deny this Conclusion to be simply or purely de fide, I R. B. shall rise again, I distinguish nothing of the evidence or necessity of it. And when I thus argue, Omne quod sentit & ratiocinatur, est Animal. Ego R. B. sentio & ratiocinor: therefore ego sum Animal; though I say that here the Conclusion is not de fide, yet I intend thereby to extol it for evidence above that which is de fide. And when I affirm this Conclusion to be de fide, I R. B. shall rise again, as denominated à part debiliore, I do speak it in Diminution of its evidence, in comparison of that which is more evident in nature: The Premises are these, All m•n shall rise again: I am a man; therefore I shall rise again (supposing we spe•k of men that dye). If the Major which is de fide, were as evident as the Minor, which is not, the Conclusion would be more evident then it is: and if neither were de fide, but both known naturally as the Minor is, the Conclusion would not be de fide, but would be more evident. This I speak that you may not think that I deny the Certainty, Evidence or Necessity of every Conclusion, which I deny to be de fide, either pur•ly, or by prevalent participation.

R. B. THis is fully answered before, even in my last Section. 1. Dr. Go•d saith but the same that I say: only I distinguish 1. Between that which is purely de fide, and that which is only denominated de fide as the more debile of the Premises. In the latter sense the Doctors conclusions are de fide, in the former not. 2. When a Conclusion is denyed to be de fide, it may be meant either as a Diminution of its evidence, or as magnifying its evidence above that which is purely de fide, or as equaling it thereto. When I say this Conclusion is not de fide, A. B. is Justified and shall be saved, I speak it by way of Diminution of its evidence and authority. And I confidently speak it, and doubt not to maintain it. But when I deny this Conclusion to be simply or purely de fide, I R. B. shall rise again, I distinguish nothing of the evidence or necessity of it. And when I thus argue, Omne quod sentit & ratiocinatur, est Animal. Ego R. B. sentio & ratiocinor: therefore ego sum Animal; though I say that here the Conclusion is not de fide, yet I intend thereby to extoll it for evidence above that which is de fide. And when I affirm this Conclusion to be de fide, I R. B. shall rise again, as denominated à parte debiliore, I do speak it in Diminution of its evidence, in comparison of that which is more evident in nature: The Premises are these, All mn shall rise again: I am a man; therefore I shall rise again (supposing we spek of men that dye). If the Major which is de fide, were as evident as the Minor, which is not, the Conclusion would be more evident then it is: and if neither were de fide, but both known naturally as the Minor is, the Conclusion would not be de fide, but would be more evident. This I speak that you may not think that I deny the Certainty, Evidence or Necessity of every Conclusion, which I deny to be de fide, either purly, or by prevalent participation.