Rich. Baxters apology against the modest exceptions of Mr. T. Blake and the digression…

5. The advantage that you say the new Crew would have upon denial of the use of Maxims of known reason, I know not who gives them (except Veronius and his followers, against whom its long since I read and consented to Vedelius in the main). But once again, and once for all, let me tell you, that if the other of your Premises be less evident or provable then the very Word of God, and be more to be doubted of, then your Conclusion is not de fide. For nothing that is truly de fide, is less evident then the truth of Gods Word, and that part of the word in particular. But yet though in such a case we tell them that the Conclusion is not de fide, yet it follows not that it is untrue, yea or not evident: nor do we therefore deny the use of Reasoning from mediums of lower evidence then Scripture; much less of clearer evidence. But many consequences may be true, and yet not de fide when one of the Premises is de fide.

5. The advantage that you say the new Crew would have upon denyal of the use of Maximes of known reason, I know not who gives them (except Veronius and his followers, against whom its long since I read and consented to Vedelius in the main). But once again, and once for all, let me tell you, that if the other of your Premises be less evident or proveable then the very Word of God, and be more to be doubted of, then your Conclusion is not de fide. For nothing that is truly de fide, is less evident then the truth of Gods Word, and that part of the word in particular. But yet though in such a case we tell them that the Conclusion is not de fide, yet it follows not that it is untrue, yea or not evident: nor do we therefore deny the use of Reasoning from mediums of lower evidence then Scripture; much less of clearer evidence. But many consequences may be true, and yet not de fide when one of the Premises is de fide.

Note also for the understanding of what I have said concerning the evidence of the objects of Faith, that whereas we do usually so compare Science, Opinion and Divine Faith, as to conclude that Science is an assent both firm, certain and evident; Divine Faith is an assent, fi•me and certain, but not evident; Opinion is sometime firm, but never certain or evident; I do not speak in the language of these Divines and Philosophers, when I ascribe an Evidence to Divine Faith: But then you must understand that the difference is not (as I conceive) de re, but de nomine; For I take not the term evident, in so restrained a sense as they do: As to instance in Rob. Baronius (that second Camera ) who saith, Assensus evidens est cum quis per se, hoc est, vi sui sensus aut rationis, absque alterius information & testificatione percipit eam propositionem, cui assentitur, esse veram: and he makes that an inevident Assent, cum quis Assentitur propositioni, non quod sensus, aut solida ratio eam veram esse Demonstret: sed vel quod levis & inefficax ratio illud suadeat, vel quod alius testetur eam esse veram; Philos. Theol. an. p. 148. But I think the term evident, is here too much restrained; and that with great inconvenience, and some wrong to the Christian Faith. I take that to be properly evident, which is to the understanding truly Apparent, or Discernible; which hath divers degrees: And the Negative addition (that it must be absque alterius testificatione) is not only superfluous, but unsound; And may appear even from the Authors words; 1. where he opposeth these two, in describing inevident Assent; non quod sensus aut solida Ratio eam veram esse demonstret, and sed quod alius testetur eam esse veram. Where he grants that whatsoever solid reason demonstrateth to be true, that is evident. Now I say, that he should not have opposed all Testimony to this. For solid reason doth demonstrate Gods Testimony to be true, and this to be his Testimony. 2. He ascribeth Certainty to Divine Faith, which he describeth to be an Assent, qui nititur certo aliquo aut solido fundamento, non vero levi aut fallaci ratione; and he noteth diligently, that ad certitudinem assensus requiri, ut fundamentum quo mens nititur dumb assensum praebet, non solum ut sit in se certum, sed etiam ut assentienti tale videatur;