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A26869:117

The arrogancy of reason against divine revelations, repressed

Name: The arrogancy of reason against divine revelations, repressed
Author: Richard Baxter

The arrogancy of reason against divine revelations, repressed, or, Proud ignorance the cause of infidelity, and of mens quarrelling with the word of God

Richard Baxter 1615–1691London: printed by T.N. for Tho. Underhil, 1655

77 p. · 21k words · Wing B1192 · ESTC R17483

Title page: Internet Archive scan of the Early English Books microfilm

:116p. 64

Object. 1. You tell us out of Scripture, that ther• are Devils, most wicked malicious spirits addict[…] to do evil: Who made these Devils, or, how can they to be so bad: Certainly, God is good, and therefore made nothing but what was good; and ever• thing must have a first cause: If they made themselves evil, then they were the first cause of thei• own evil: And then you deify the will of th• Devil in making it to be absolutely a first cause. •• you say as some, That sin is but a privation, and therefore hath no efficient cause, but a deficient […] then either that deficiency must be first from Go• (and then he should be the first cause of all sin) or from the will of the Devil; and then either he wa• before bound non-deficere, or not. If not, it was no sin; if he were, then first, he could primo deficere, though God did all that belonged to him to prevent it; secondly, and he could have stood without any more help then he had when he fell, and so quoad determinationem propriae voluntatis, should have been the first determining cause of his own perseverance, or non-deficiency: For if he could not stand, it was no sin to fall, being before innocent. Moreover, their sin was not a mere privation, but materially an act (whether veil or nolle) and formally a relation of disconformity to the Law.

Object. 1. You tell us out of Scripture, that ther• are Devils, most wicked malicious spirits addict〈…〉 to do evil: Who made these Devils, or, how can they to be so bad: Certainly, God is good, and therefore made nothing but what was good; and ever• thing must have a first cause: If they made themselves evil, then they were the first cause of thei• own evil: And then you deifie the will of th• Devil in making it to be absolutely a first cause. •• you say as some, That sin is but a privation, and therefore hath no efficient cause, but a deficient 〈…〉 then either that deficiency must be first from Go• (and then he should be the first cause of all sin) or from the will of the Devil; and then either he wa• before bound non-deficere, or not. If not, it was no sin; if he were, then first, he could primo deficere, though God did all that belonged to him to prevent it; secondly, and he could have stood without any more help then he had when he fell, and so quoad determinationem propriae voluntatis, should have been the first determining cause of his own perseverance, or non-deficiency: For if he could not stand, it was no sin to fall, being before innocent. Moreover, their sin was not a meer privation, but materially an act (whether velle or nolle) and formally a relation of disconformity to the Law.

:117p. 64–65

Answ. 1: The Devil himself was the first ⟨p. 65⟩cause of his own pravity. God made him not evil, but he made himself so. God gave him freewill to be a self-determining principle; by this he was enabled to stand or fall, and left in the hands of his own counsel. By a sinful act he averted himself from the chiefest good, and became disposed to a further aversion, which might quickly habituate him to all evil. Nor is it any deifying of the Creatures will, to say it is such a self-determining principle, and so far a first cause, while it had the power of self-determination from God, and so absolutely is no first cause. It was the excellency of the Creature, as being to be governed, to have freewill, or a self-determining power to good or evil: Though it be a higher perfection to be determined or determinable only to good, which in Patriâ may be enjoyed, yet in viâ for one under Government in the use of means in order to the end, it is most suitable to their condition to have a liberty of self-determination: And therefore this was part of the beauty of the frame of Nature, and therefore not derogatory from the workman. As God intended sapientially, or per potentiam sapientiae, to govern the rational Creature by Laws and Objects: So did he sapientially frame him in a capacity for such a Sapiential Government; and that was by giving •im a free, that is, a self-determining will.

Answ. 1: The Devil himself was the first ⟨p. 65⟩cause of his own pravity. God made him not evil, but he made himself so. God gave him freewil to be a self-determining principle; by this he was enabled to stand or fall, and left in the hands of his own counsel. By a sinful act he averted himself from the chiefest good, and became disposed to a further aversion, which might quickly habituate him to all evil. Nor is it any deifying of the Creatures will, to say it is such a self-determining principle, and so far a first cause, while it had the power of self-determination from God, and so absolutely is no first cause. It was the excellency of the Creature, as being to be governed, to have freewil, or a self-determining power to good or evil: Though it be a higher perfection to be determined or determinable onely to good, which in Patriâ may be enjoyed, yet in viâ for one under Government in the use of means in order to the end, it is most suitable to their condition to have a liberty of self-determination: And therefore this was part of the beauty of the frame of Nature, and therefore not derogatory from the workman. As God intended sapientially, or per potentiam sapientiae, to govern the rational Creature by Laws and Objects: So did he sapientially frame him in a capacity for such a Sapiential Government; and that was by giving im a free, that is, a self-determining will.

:118p. 65–66

Indeed, the Angelical Nature, and Soul of Man, is so exquisite and subtle, and sublime a thing, that no man can exactly perceive and comprehend the manner of its self-determination: •ut the thing it self is not to be doubted of, ⟨p. 66⟩though the manner of it be yet past our reach. We may certainly conclude, therefore, That God made Angels and Men g•o•; but some of those Angels, and M•n, by •heir inducement, made themselves evil: For God made them free Agents to determin• themselves to good or evil. And the ignorance of the nature of re[…]il, doth cause such Infidels to rise up against God with their impious quarrels.

Indeed, the Angelical Nature, and Soul of Man, is so exquisit and subtile, and sublime a •hing, that no man can exactly perceive and com•rehend the manner of its self-determination: •ut the thing it self is not to be doubted of, ⟨p. 66⟩though the manner of it be yet past our reach. We may certainly conclu•e, therefore, That God made Angels and Men g•o•; but some of those Angels, and M•n, by •heir inducement, made themselves evil: For God made them free Agents to determin• themselves to good or evil. And the ignorance of the nature of re〈…〉il, doth cause such Infidels to rise up against God with their impious quarrels.

:119p. 66–67

2. And see whether these blind wretches do not wilfully put out their own eyes, and reason against most certain sense and experience. For I would ask any of them whether there be indeed any sin, or bad me• in the world, or not? If they say, no; then I would wish them not to blame any man as an evil doer, that shall rob them, o• slander them, or beat them. T•e likeliest cure fo• this error, is to beat them black and blew, til• they believe that he that doth it, doth ill. And why should not any man do it daily if there be no ill in it? Is not he mad with infidelity, tha• thinks there is no bad man in all the world, when there are so many, and so desperately wicked, and when he is so bad himself? Or is •e fit to be tolerated in any Society, that thinks there is no evil? Sure he will think, that he may •o any thing, and not do ev•••• ▪ But if he confess, tha• any man i• evil, or doth evil, let him ask himself who mad• him evil? Did God that is good? or did he himself? And if he can find out how man came to be evil, he may find a satisfactory answer to his question, how Angels came to be evil. Bu• what if we could not tell how this evil did firs• ⟨p. 67⟩come? Shall we therefore say, that there is no such thing? Shall we deny that which we see and hear, and feel, because we know not how or whence it came? What folly is this? Then let every Murderer, Thief, or other offender at the Assizes, come off with this Argument, and say, That he hath done no evil; for all things are of God, and God doth no evil. As mad as this reasoning is, yet have I known them that have openly professed, that they longed to see the Devil▪ and would ride a hundred mile to see him, in mer confidence, that there is no Devil; and that upon such vain imaginations as these.

:120p. 67

Object. 2. •he Scripture saith, That God made all things of nothing; when of nothing, nothing can be made. How then can these things be?

:121p. 67

Answ. Cannot God do it, unless such worms can tell how he should do it? Doth the Infant know how he is formed in the Womb? But why should it seem improbable, that the first Infinite Being should create a Finite Being? He that give all Creatures their Forms, can as well cause the first Matter. What if it were granted. That Earth, or Water, or Air, were from Eternity? Is it not as hard to make the Sun and Heavens of one of these, as to make one of these of nothing?

:122p. 67–68

But me thinks these Infidels should consider, That either God made all things of nothing, or else, that something of which he made them, must be eternal, and without any cause. If so, then it is God; and if God, then either the One ⟨p. 68⟩true God himself, or some other God. If God himself, then all Creatures should be his substance, and s• be God; and so they would make every ••one to be God. If any other God, then they will incur the sa•• •• conveniences; besides, the feigning of many Gods, ••cause they will not confess the omnipotency of One. Is it not more reasonable to •el•ev•, th•• God made a Stone, or Earth o• no••ing, then to believe that it made it self? But thus will Mortals ensnare and bewilder themselves▪ while they will g• about to comprehend and question Omnipotency, and ask their Maker, How he can so make them.

But me thinks these Infidels should consider, That either God made all things of nothing, or else, that something of which he made them, must be eternal, and without any cause. If so, then it is God; and if God, then either the One ⟨p. 68⟩true God himself, or some other God. If God himself, then all Creatures should be his substance, and s• be God; and so they would make every ••one to be God. If any other God, then they will in•ur the sa•• •• conv••iences; besides, the feigning of many Gods, cause they will not coness the omnipoteny of One. Is it not more reasonable to elev, th God made a Stone, or Earth o noing, then to believe that it made it self? But thus will Motals ensare and bewilder themselves while they will g about to comprehend and question Omnipotency, and ask their Maker, How he can so make them.

:123p. 68

Object. 3. Moses saith, That God made the light, and day, and darkness, and night, before the Sun: When the light is the effect, and the Sun the cause; and the darkness is but a privation of the light of the Sun. How then can these things be?

:124p. 68

Answ. 1. Whatsoever God can produce mediately by the Sun, or other Instruments, that he can produce as easily, immediately himself without an Instrument. Is it not as easy to him, to cause light without a Sun, as to make the Sun it self, with its light?

Answ. 1. Whatsoever God can produce mediately by the Sun, or other Instruments, that he can produce as easily, immediately himself without an Instrument. Is it not as easie to him, to cause light without a Sun, as to make the Sun it self, with its light?

:125p. 68

2. Are not Philosophers yet unresolved, whether light be not a substance? And then why might it not be first created alone?

:126p. 68–69

3. However, it might be the effect of the Element of fi•e, disposed of by God for differencing day and night, without a Sun, till the Sun was made. And is it not agreeable to the rest of his works, that he should first make the Elements and general matter before he form particular ⟨p. 69⟩Creatures h••e•f? As he made the water, before he confined it in its banks, and made it a Sea: So might he make the light or fire, be•ore he contracted so much of it into a Sun: And if he can distinguish day and night by the […]un afterward, he might as easily do it by the Element o• Fire or Light before. You ma• see a pretence of fu• there satisfaction to Reason in this point, in Tho. White his Appendix, The•l. ad Institut. Peripat. cap. •. & 4. which […] […] […] recite.

3. However, it might be the effect of the Element of fi•e, disposed of by God for differencing day and night, without a Sun, till the Sun was made. And is it not agreeable to the rest of his works, that he should first make the Elements and general matter before he form particular ⟨p. 69⟩Creatures h••e•f? As he made the water, before he con•in•d it in its banks, and made it a Sea: So might he make the light or fire, be•ore he contracted so much of it into a Sun: And if he can distinguish day and night by the 〈…〉un afterward, he might as easily do it by the Element o• Fire or Light before. You ma• see a prtence of fu ther satisfaction to Reason in this point, in Tho. White his Appendix, Thel. ad Institut. Peripat. cap. . & 4. which recite.

:127p. 69

Object 4. M•s•• saith Gen. 1 16. That God made two great Lights, the Sun and Moon; whereas it is certain▪ th[…] many […] Plan••s are greater then the Mo••, therefore he speaketh ignorantly.

Object 4. M•s•• saith Gen. 1 16. That God made two great Lights, the Sun and Moon; whereas it is certain▪ th〈…〉 many 〈…〉 Plan••s are greater then the Mo••, therefore he speaketh ignoran•ly.

:128p. 69

Answ. But though they a•e greater then •he Moon, they ••e n•• g[…] Li•h•s to the Earth, then t•e Mo•n, w•i•h is the thing that Moses affirmeth.

Answ. But though they a•e greater then •he Moon, they ••e n•• g〈…〉 Li•h•s to the Earth, then t•e Mo•n, w•i•h is the thing that Moses affirmeth.

:129p. 69

Object. 5. M•s•s makes the Garden of Eden to have a Riv•• arising i• it, which divideth it self into four parts. But there is no such place now known in the world, where four such Rivers as he describeth are so near.

Object. 5. M•s•s makes the Garden of Eden to have a Riv•• arising i• it, which •ivideth it self into four parts. But there is no such place now known in the world, where four such Rivers as he describeth are so near.

Reformers309

Puritans1,782

Westminster Assembly24

Evangelicals36