pp. 64–674 passages
Modern spelling is a reading aid: the words are the author’s, only the spelling is modernized. Original shows the page as printed, with the transcription marks.
Answ. 1: The Devil himself was the first ⟨p. 65⟩cause of his own pravity. God made him not evil, but he made himself so. God gave him freewill to be a self-determining principle; by this he was enabled to stand or fall, and left in the hands of his own counsel. By a sinful act he averted himself from the chiefest good, and became disposed to a further aversion, which might quickly habituate him to all evil. Nor is it any deifying of the Creatures will, to say it is such a self-determining principle, and so far a first cause, while it had the power of self-determination from God, and so absolutely is no first cause. It was the excellency of the Creature, as being to be governed, to have freewill, or a self-determining power to good or evil: Though it be a higher perfection to be determined or determinable only to good, which in Patriâ may be enjoyed, yet in viâ for one under Government in the use of means in order to the end, it is most suitable to their condition to have a liberty of self-determination: And therefore this was part of the beauty of the frame of Nature, and therefore not derogatory from the workman. As God intended sapientially, or per potentiam sapientiae, to govern the rational Creature by Laws and Objects: So did he sapientially frame him in a capacity for such a Sapiential Government; and that was by giving •im a free, that is, a self-determining will.
Answ. 1: The Devil himself was the first ⟨p. 65⟩cause of his own pravity. God made him not evil, but he made himself so. God gave him freewil to be a self-determining principle; by this he was enabled to stand or fall, and left in the hands of his own counsel. By a sinful act he averted himself from the chiefest good, and became disposed to a further aversion, which might quickly habituate him to all evil. Nor is it any deifying of the Creatures will, to say it is such a self-determining principle, and so far a first cause, while it had the power of self-determination from God, and so absolutely is no first cause. It was the excellency of the Creature, as being to be governed, to have freewil, or a self-determining power to good or evil: Though it be a higher perfection to be determined or determinable onely to good, which in Patriâ may be enjoyed, yet in viâ for one under Government in the use of means in order to the end, it is most suitable to their condition to have a liberty of self-determination: And therefore this was part of the beauty of the frame of Nature, and therefore not derogatory from the workman. As God intended sapientially, or per potentiam sapientiae, to govern the rational Creature by Laws and Objects: So did he sapientially frame him in a capacity for such a Sapiential Government; and that was by giving im a free, that is, a self-determining will.
Indeed, the Angelical Nature, and Soul of Man, is so exquisite and subtle, and sublime a thing, that no man can exactly perceive and comprehend the manner of its self-determination: •ut the thing it self is not to be doubted of, ⟨p. 66⟩though the manner of it be yet past our reach. We may certainly conclude, therefore, That God made Angels and Men g•o•; but some of those Angels, and M•n, by •heir inducement, made themselves evil: For God made them free Agents to determin• themselves to good or evil. And the ignorance of the nature of re[…]il, doth cause such Infidels to rise up against God with their impious quarrels.
Indeed, the Angelical Nature, and Soul of Man, is so exquisit and subtile, and sublime a •hing, that no man can exactly perceive and com•rehend the manner of its self-determination: •ut the thing it self is not to be doubted of, ⟨p. 66⟩though the manner of it be yet past our reach. We may certainly conclu•e, therefore, That God made Angels and Men g•o•; but some of those Angels, and M•n, by •heir inducement, made themselves evil: For God made them free Agents to determin• themselves to good or evil. And the ignorance of the nature of re〈…〉il, doth cause such Infidels to rise up against God with their impious quarrels.
2. And see whether these blind wretches do not wilfully put out their own eyes, and reason against most certain sense and experience. For I would ask any of them whether there be indeed any sin, or bad me• in the world, or not? If they say, no; then I would wish them not to blame any man as an evil doer, that shall rob them, o• slander them, or beat them. T•e likeliest cure fo• this error, is to beat them black and blew, til• they believe that he that doth it, doth ill. And why should not any man do it daily if there be no ill in it? Is not he mad with infidelity, tha• thinks there is no bad man in all the world, when there are so many, and so desperately wicked, and when he is so bad himself? Or is •e fit to be tolerated in any Society, that thinks there is no evil? Sure he will think, that he may •o any thing, and not do ev•••• ▪ But if he confess, tha• any man i• evil, or doth evil, let him ask himself who mad• him evil? Did God that is good? or did he himself? And if he can find out how man came to be evil, he may find a satisfactory answer to his question, how Angels came to be evil. Bu• what if we could not tell how this evil did firs• ⟨p. 67⟩come? Shall we therefore say, that there is no such thing? Shall we deny that which we see and hear, and feel, because we know not how or whence it came? What folly is this? Then let every Murderer, Thief, or other offender at the Assizes, come off with this Argument, and say, That he hath done no evil; for all things are of God, and God doth no evil. As mad as this reasoning is, yet have I known them that have openly professed, that they longed to see the Devil▪ and would ride a hundred mile to see him, in m•er confidence, that there is no Devil; and that upon such vain imaginations as these.
2. And see whether these blinde wretches do not wilfully put out their own eyes, and reason against most certain sense and experience. For I would ask any of them whether there be indeed any sin, or bad me• in the world, or not? If they say, no; then I would wish them not to blame any man as an evil doer, that shall rob them, o• slander them, or beat them. T•e likeliest cure fo• this error, is to beat them black and blew, til• they believe that he that doth it, doth ill. And why should not any man do it daily if there be no ill in it? Is not he mad with infidel•ty, tha• thinks there is no bad man in all the world, when there are so many, and so desperately wicked, and when he is so bad himself? Or is •e fit to be tolerated in any Society, that thinks there is no evil? Sure he will think, that he may •o any thing, and not do ev•••• ▪ But if he confess, tha• any man i• evil, or do•h evil, let him ask himself who mad• him evil? Did God that is good? or did he himself? And if he can finde out how man came to be evil, he may finde a satisfactory answer to his question, how Angels came to be evil. Bu• what if we could not tell how this evil did firs• ⟨p. 67⟩come? Shall we therefore say, that there is no such thing? Shall we deny that which we see and hear, and feel, because we know not how or whence it came? What folly is this? Then let every Murderer, Thief, or other •ff•ndor at the Assizes, come off with this Argument, and say, That he hath done no evil; for all things are of God, and God doth no evil. As mad as this reasoning is, yet have I known them that have openly prof•ss•d, that they longed to see the Devil▪ and would ride a hundred mile to see him, in m•er confidence, that there is no Devil; and that upon such vain imaginations as these.