The arrogancy of reason against divine revelations, repressed

Object. 1. You tell us out of Scripture, that ther• are Devils, most wicked malicious spirits addict[…] to do evil: Who made these Devils, or, how can they to be so bad: Certainly, God is good, and therefore made nothing but what was good; and ever• thing must have a first cause: If they made themselves evil, then they were the first cause of thei• own evil: And then you deify the will of th• Devil in making it to be absolutely a first cause. •• you say as some, That sin is but a privation, and therefore hath no efficient cause, but a deficient […] then either that deficiency must be first from Go• (and then he should be the first cause of all sin) or from the will of the Devil; and then either he wa• before bound non-deficere, or not. If not, it was no sin; if he were, then first, he could primo deficere, though God did all that belonged to him to prevent it; secondly, and he could have stood without any more help then he had when he fell, and so quoad determinationem propriae voluntatis, should have been the first determining cause of his own perseverance, or non-deficiency: For if he could not stand, it was no sin to fall, being before innocent. Moreover, their sin was not a mere privation, but materially an act (whether veil or nolle) and formally a relation of disconformity to the Law.

Object. 1. You tell us out of Scripture, that ther• are Devils, most wicked malicious spirits addict〈…〉 to do evil: Who made these Devils, or, how can they to be so bad: Certainly, God is good, and therefore made nothing but what was good; and ever• thing must have a first cause: If they made themselves evil, then they were the first cause of thei• own evil: And then you deifie the will of th• Devil in making it to be absolutely a first cause. •• you say as some, That sin is but a privation, and therefore hath no efficient cause, but a deficient then either that deficiency must be first from Go (and then he should be the first cause of all sin) or from the will of the Devil; and then either he wa before bound non-deficere, or not. If not, it was no sin; if he were, then first, he could primo deficere, though God did all that belonged to him to prevent it; secondly, and he could have stood without any more help then he had when he fell, and so quoad determinationem propriae voluntatis, should have been the first determining cause of his own perseverance, or non-deficiency: For if he could not stand, it was no sin to fall, being before innocent. Moreover, their sin was not a meer privation, but materially an act (whether velle or nolle) and formally a relation of disconformity to the Law.