B. I. Undoubtedly there is no insufficiency in God. All that he willeth to do, he doth: And if he will no more, his Will is not to be called insufficient as to more, but null as to that Object: And we affirm no other proper Will of God, but such as is fulfilled.
II. Gods means which wicked men enjoy are the same that the godly enjoy, and are sufficient ex parte sui, but not ex omni parte, that is, for as much as concerneth their own Office. So Christ's antecedent Preparations, his Satisfaction and Merits are sufficient. The Covenant of Grace is sufficient: The preaching of the Gospel is sufficient in its kind, &c.
III. The objective Grace is sufficient; that is, God as he is to be believed in and loved, revealed in the Word and in his Works: Christ to be believed in; the Precepts to be obeyed, the Promise to be trusted, &c. And though it be doubtful to many whether Amyraldus and his Fellows were in the right, that thought that the [Greek or Hebrew], and other objective Grace be qua objective, sufficient to all Heathens for Salvation; yet none can doubt but it is in suo genere, sufficient to all those good and holy acts which those persons may immediately exercise about them. And indeed he that loveth God but as the light of Nature, hath taught Heathens, or may teach men that he should be loved, if he be damned, must be a damned Saint in the love of God. But who do so love him, is another question.
IV. Subjective Grace is either Power, Act, or Disposition or Habit.
1. This Power is the very thing precisely which they meant by necessary or sufficient Grace. All men have true power to draw nearer Salvation, and do better than they do, though not immediately to do all that is necessary to Salvation. And he that can do it if he will, and also hath power to will it, is said to have sufficient Grace, which if he use not, the fault lieth in his wilfulness.
2. The Act, nor the just Disposition or Habit they have not. But that is their own fault, who had those Means, those Objects, and that Power by which they could and might have attained them.
B. I. Undoubtedly there is no insufficiency in God. All that he willeth to do, he doth: And if he will no more, his Will is not to be called insufficient as to more, but null as to that Object: And we affirm no other proper Will of God, but such as is fulfilled.
II. Gods means which wicked men enjoy are the same that the godly enjoy, and are sufficient ex parte sui, but not ex omni parte, that is, for as much as concerneth their own Office. So Christ's antecedent Preparations, his Satisfaction and Merits are sufficient. The Covenant of Grace is sufficient: The preaching of the Gospel is sufficient in its kind, &c.
III. The objective Grace is sufficient; that is, God as he is to be believed in and loved, revealed in the Word and in his Works: Christ to be believed in; the Precepts to be obeyed, the Promise to be trusted, &c. And though it be doubtful to many whether Amyraldus and his Fellows were in the right, that thought that the 〈non-Latin alphabet〉, and other objective Grace be qua objective, sufficient to all Heathens for Salvation; yet none can doubt but it is in suo genere, sufficient to all those good and holy acts which those persons may immediately exercise about them. And indeed he that loveth God but as the light of Nature, hath taught Heathens, or may teach men that he should be loved, if he be damned, must be a damned Saint in the love of God. But who do so love him, is another question.
IV. Subjective Grace is either Power, Act, or Disposition or Habit.
1. This Power is the very thing precisely which they meant by necessary or sufficient Grace. All men have true power to draw nearer Salvation, and do better than they do, though not immediately to do all that is necessary to Salvation. And he that can do it if he will, and also hath power to will it, is said to have sufficient Grace, which if he use not, the fault lieth in his wilfulness.
2. The Act, nor the just Disposition or Habit they have not. But that is their own fault, who had those Means, those Objects, and that Power by which they could and might have attained them.
