Richard Baxter's Catholic theology plain, pure, peaceable, for pacification of the dogmatical word-warriors who,…Richard Baxter's Catholick theologie plain, pure, peaceable, for pacification of the dogmatical word-warriours who,…

149. 2. Or a man may be hindered Physically. And that 1. By to•al restraint and disabling, 2. Or by lesser impediments which make not the act impossible, but difficult. God doth not always thus hinder sin, and therefore thus he permitteth it. He doth not disable the sinner, e. g. to lie: And he doth not always render it difficult to him. But it followeth not necessarily, that this will be done, because it's possible; no nor because it is easy or not difficult to be done.

149. 2. Or a man may be hindered Physically. And that 1. By to•al restraint and disabling, 2. Or by lesser impediments which make not the act impossible, but difficult. God doth not alwayes thus hinder sin, and therefore thus he permitteth it. He doth not disable the sinner, e. g. to lie: And he doth not alwayes render it difficult to him. But it followeth not necessarily, that this will be done, because it's possible; no nor because it is easie or not difficult to be done.

150. ^*But the Case differeth as to permitting of a propense agent, and an indifferent agent, and a contrarily disposed agent. To permit a stone to ascend, will not make it ascend. To permit the Air to move, will not make it move. But to permit a stone in the Air to fall, I think with Durandus, is enough to make it fall, supposing the continuation of the Nature of it and all circumstances. And so is it in permitting some sinners to sin.

1. *Rui•. de praedet. Tr. 2. dip. 12. §. 1, 2. p. 172. so defineth Permission as I confess so it is positively decreed: viz. (Increatam permissionem Deus non praed•finit) Creata permissio simul complec•itur qurundam rerum productionem & aliarum rerum negationem, quibus positis peccatum permittitur. And if by permission they will mean quid positivum, it must have a positive Will and Cause; but what's that to the Negative, or meer non impedire? (Thus still all our wranglings shall be but about ambiguous words.) His reason §. 2. is, Permission of sin is good: 1. Negatio Volitionis essicacis qua Deus impediret peccatum. (And he said that permissio increata is not decreed.) 2. Negatio motivorum, &c. 3. Prod ctio & Constitutio circumstantlarum. 4. Generalis concursus. Ans. 1. Nothing is not Good: mere Negations are Nothing. 2. Moral Negations or Logical (that is, Denial and restraints) are something, and have a Cause. 3. Production and Concursus are something and have a Cause; but so is not a mer non-impedition, which is proper permission.