More of Gods Fore-knowledge, and of Permission of Sin.: Richard Baxter's Catholic theology plain, pure, peaceable… by Richard Baxter | AskReformation

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:383p. 24¶143

143. Either Futurity as such, is Intelligible in it self to God, or else the things future are Intelligible as in Eternity; or else futurity is intelligible only in its Causes: We can think of no other way (but God hath more than we can think of.) If it be Intelligible in it self, or as things are In Eternity, the Controversy is mostly ended: The perfection of Gods understanding then is proof enough that he knoweth all that is intelligible. But if it be only in the Causes, it is either as those Cases necessarily will Cause, or else as freely and contingently. The first Cause reacheth ¹not our Controversy: For sin hath no necessitating Cause, but free. The second is the same difficulty with that in question, viz. How God knoweth that a free undetermined Cause (mans Will) will this or that way determine it self? Nothing is knowable to us as certain from an uncertain cause; which hath no antecedent reason to prove its future self-determination to this more than to that.

143. Either Futurity as such, is Intelligible in it self to God, or else the things future are Intelligible as in Eternity; or else futurity is intelligible only in its Causes: We can think of no other way (but God hath more than we can think of.) If it be Intelligible in it self, or as things are In Eternity, the Controversie is mostly ended: The perfection of Gods understanding then is proof enough that he knoweth all that is intelligible. But if it be only in the Causes, it is either as those Cases necessarily will Cause, or else as freely and contingently. The first Cause reacheth ¹not our Controversie: For sin hath no necessitating Cause, but free. The second is the same difficulty with that in question, viz. How God knoweth that a free undetermined Cause (mans Will) will this or that way determine it self? Nothing is knowable to us as certain from an uncertain cause; which hath no antecedent reason to prove its future self-determination to this more than to that.

1Pennottus propugn. l. 3. c. 11. n. 1. noteth, that even the reconciling of the certainty of Divine pre-science with contingency, was quite past the power of mans understanding in this life, in the opinion of these subtle Schoolmen, Gabriel 1. d. 38. q. 1. a. 2. Ock•m ibid. q. 1. Marsil. 1. q. 40. How much more difficult will it be to reconcile Gods Decrees, and most of all his premotion if pre-determining with contingency? Plainly and honestly saith Bonaventure, in few words, in 1. d. 37. q. 2. Divina Cognitio quia à re non Causatur, nec dependet, ideo potest esse certa de re contingenti.Pennottus propugn. l. 3. c. 11. n. 1. noteth, that even the reconciling of the certainty of Divine pre-science with contingency, was quite past the power of mans understanding in this life, in the opinion of these subtile Schoolmen, Gabriel 1. d. 38. q. 1. a. 2. Ock•m ibid. q. 1. Marsil. 1. q. 40. How much more difficult will it be to reconcile Gods D•crees, and most of all his premotion if pre-determining with contingency? Plainly and honestly saith Bonaventure, in few words, in 1. d. 37. q. 2. Divina Cognitio quia à re non Causatur, nec dependet, ideo potest esse certa de re contingenti.

:390p. 25¶150

150. ^*But the Case differeth as to permitting of a propense agent, and an indifferent agent, and a contrarily disposed agent. To permit a stone to ascend, will not make it ascend. To permit the Air to move, will not make it move. But to permit a stone in the Air to fall, I think with Durandus, is enough to make it fall, supposing the continuation of the Nature of it and all circumstances. And so is it in permitting some sinners to sin.

*Rui•. de praedet. Tr. 2. dip. 12. §. 1, 2. p. 172. so defineth Permission as I confess so it is positively decreed: viz. (Increatam permissionem Deus non praed•finit) Creata permissio simul complec•itur qu•rundam rerum productionem & aliarum rerum negationem, quibus positis peccatum permittitur. And if by permission they will mean quid positivum, it must have a positive Will and Cause; but what's that to the Negative, or meer non impedire? (Thus still all our wranglings shall be but about ambiguous words.) His reason §. 2. is, Permission of sin is good: 1. Negatio Volitionis essicacis qua Deus impediret peccatum. (And he said that permissio increata is not decreed.) 2. Negatio motivorum, &c. 3. Prod• ctio & Constitutio circumstantlarum. 4. Generalis concursus. Ans. 1. Nothing is not Good: mere Negations are Nothing. 2. Moral Negations or Logical (that is, Denial and restraints) are something, and have a Cause. 3. Production and Concursus are something and have a Cause; but so is not a me•r non-impedition, which is proper permission.Rui•. de praedet. Tr. 2. di•p. 12. §. 1, 2. p. 172. so defineth Permission as I confess so it is positively decreed: viz. (Increatam permissionem Deus non praed•finit) Creata permissio simul complec•itur qu•rundam rerum productionem & aliarum rerum negationem, quibus positis peccatum permittitur. And if by permission they will mean quid positivum, it must have a positive Will and Cause; but what's that to the Negative, or meer non impedire? (Thus still all our wranglings shall be but about ambiguo•s words.) His reason §. 2. is, Permission of sin is good: 1. Negatio Volitionis essicacis qua Deus impediret peccatum. (And he said that permissio increata is not decreed.) 2. Negatio motivorum, &c. 3. Prod• ctio & Constitutio circumstantlarum. 4. Generalis concursus. Ans. 1. Nothing is not Good: meer Negations are Nothing. 2. Moral Negations or Logical (that is, Denyal and restraints) are something, and have a Cause. 3. Production and Concursus are something and have a Cause; but so is not a me•r non-impedition, which is proper permission.