A26883:393
Richard Baxter's Catholic theology plain, pure, peaceable, for pacification of the dogmatical word-warriors who,…Richard Baxter's Catholick theologie plain, pure, peaceable, for pacification of the dogmatical word-warriours who,…
Richard Baxter's Catholic theology plain, pure, peaceable, for pacification of the dogmatical word-warriors who, 1. by contending about things unrevealed or not understood, 2. and by taking verbal differences for real,Richard Baxter's Catholick theologie plain, pure, peaceable, for pacification of the dogmatical word-warriours who, 1. by contending about things unrevealed or not understood, 2. and by taking verbal differences for real,
London: printed by Robert White for Nevill Simmons, 1675
Modern spelling is a reading aid: the words are the author’s, only the spelling is modernized. Original shows the page as printed, with the transcription marks.
150. *But the Case differeth as to permitting of a propense agent, and an indifferent agent, and a contrarily disposed agent. To permit a stone to ascend, will not make it ascend. To permit the Air to move, will not make it move. But to permit a stone in the Air to fall, I think with Durandus, is enough to make it fall, supposing the continuation of the Nature of it and all circumstances. And so is it in permitting some sinners to sin.
- *Rui•. de praedet. Tr. 2. dip. 12. §. 1, 2. p. 172. so defineth Permission as I confess so it is positively decreed: viz. (Increatam permissionem Deus non praed•finit) Creata permissio simul complec•itur qu•rundam rerum productionem & aliarum rerum negationem, quibus positis peccatum permittitur. And if by permission they will mean quid positivum, it must have a positive Will and Cause; but what's that to the Negative, or meer non impedire? (Thus still all our wranglings shall be but about ambiguous words.) His reason §. 2. is, Permission of sin is good: 1. Negatio Volitionis essicacis qua Deus impediret peccatum. (And he said that permissio increata is not decreed.) 2. Negatio motivorum, &c. 3. Prod• ctio & Constitutio circumstantlarum. 4. Generalis concursus. Ans. 1. Nothing is not Good: mere Negations are Nothing. 2. Moral Negations or Logical (that is, Denial and restraints) are something, and have a Cause. 3. Production and Concursus are something and have a Cause; but so is not a me•r non-impedition, which is proper permission.Rui•. de praedet. Tr. 2. di•p. 12. §. 1, 2. p. 172. so defineth Permission as I confess so it is positively decreed: viz. (Increatam permissionem Deus non praed•finit) Creata permissio simul complec•itur qu•rundam rerum productionem & aliarum rerum negationem, quibus positis peccatum permittitur. And if by permission they will mean quid positivum, it must have a positive Will and Cause; but what's that to the Negative, or meer non impedire? (Thus still all our wranglings shall be but about ambiguos words.) His reason §. 2. is, Permission of sin is good: 1. Negatio Volitionis essicacis qua Deus impediret peccatum. (And he said that permissio increata is not decreed.) 2. Negatio motivorum, &c. 3. Prod ctio & Constitutio circumstantlarum. 4. Generalis concursus. Ans. 1. Nothing is not Good: meer Negations are Nothing. 2. Moral Negations or Logical (that is, Denyal and restraints) are something, and have a Cause. 3. Production and Concursus are something and have a Cause; but so is not a mer non-impedition, which is proper permission.