Richard Baxter's Catholic theology plain, pure, peaceable, for pacification of the dogmatical word-warriors who,…Richard Baxter's Catholick theologie plain, pure, peaceable, for pacification of the dogmatical word-warriours who,…

167. They that denying our self-determining power, do make Volition, and free-Volition to signify the same, and Cogency to be nothing but to make men willing and unwilling both at once in the same act, do seem rather to jest, than seriously dispute. And to define Free-will, to be only Lubentia vel Volitio secundum rationem, is no other. For Veil juxta rationem, is no more than Veil; the Will being the Rational Appetite distinct from the sensitive. And if Veil and Libere Veil be all one, why do we blind the World with words, and do not plainly put the case whether man hath any will, and not whether his Will be free? And if to take away its Liberty or constrain it, be nothing else but to make the same numerical act which is a Volition simultaneously to be no Volition, or not the Volition of another thing, the question whether the will may be constrained is ridiculous. If the will be not forced as long as it willeth, or willeth juxta rationem, then to question whether it can will by constraint, is to question whether it can at once will and not will; ^†yet is this description only of Liberty and constraint too common with some.

167. They that denying our self-determining power, do make Volition, and free-Volition to signifie the same, and Cogency to be nothing but to make men willing and unwilling both at once in the same act, do seem rather to jeast, than seriously dispute. And to define Free-will, to be only Lubentia vel Volitio secundum rationem, is no other. For Velle juxta rationem, is no more than Velle; the Will being the Rational Appetite distinct from the sensitive. And if Velle and Libere Velle be all one, why do we blind the World with words, and do not plainly put the case whether man hath any will, and not whether his Will be free? And if to take away its Liberty or constrain it, be nothing else but to make the same numerical act which is a Volition simultaneously to be no Volition, or not the Volition of another thing, the question whether the will may be constrained is ridiculous. If the will be not forced as long as it willeth, or willeth juxta rationem, then to question whether it can will by constraint, is to question whether it can at once will and not will; ^†yet is this description only of Liberty and constraint too common with some.

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