166. When we say that God causeth the Act of sin as Causa universalis, *the sense of this word must needs be opened by this distinction. A Cause is called Universal, 1. In praedicando, Logically; And so Artifex is causa universalis rei artificialis, & Statuarius est Causa particularis, & Polycletus est causa singularis hujus statuae. 2. In causande, as to the effect. And so that is an Universal Cause, whose causality extendeth to many effects. And this is two-fold: 1. When it is the cause of some-what common to all those effects, but not of all that is proper to each, unless its causality be otherwise (as by the dispositio recipientis) determined. And so the Sun is causa universalis of the sweetness of the Rose, and the stink of the Dunghill, &c. And so God is the Causa universalis ut fons naturae, by his common sustaining and moving Influx, of all sinful actions, 2. When it is the Cause of those actions, not only as to that which is common to them all, but as to that which is proper to each by which they differ from one another, and that of it self, and not as determined by the dispositio recipientis, or by any other cause. And so God is the Universal Cause of all that is merely physical in all beings and actions; As in Generation, &c. which is properly to say that he is at once, both Cause universalis, particularis & singularis. And how far he is thus also the Cause of all the moral Good of all Actions I must open to you more distinctly in the third part. But of the sinful morality of Actions he is not such a Cause; but only a mere Universal as aforesaid.
166. When we say that God causeth the Act of sin as Causa universalis, *the sense of this word must needs be opened by this distinction. A Cause is called Universal, 1. In praedicando, Logically; And so Artifex is causa universalis rei artificialis, & Statuarius est Causa particularis, & Polycletus est causa singularis hujus statuae. 2. In causande, as to the effect. And so that is an Universal Cause, whose causality extendeth to many effects. And this is two-fold: 1. When it is the cause of some-what common to all those effects, but not of all that is proper to each, unless its causality be otherwise (as by the dispositio recipientis) determined. And so the Sun is causa universalis of the sweetness of the Rose, and the stink of the Dunghill, &c. And so God is the Causa universalis ut fons naturae, by his common sustaining and moving Influx, of all sinful actions, 2. When it is the Cause of those actions, not only as to that which is common to them all, but as to that which is proper to each by which they differ from one another, and that of it self, and not as determined by the dispositio recipientis, or by any other cause. And so God is the Universal Cause of all that is meerly physical in all beings and actions; As in Generation, &c. which is properly to say that he is at once, both Cause universalis, particularis & singularis. And how far he is thus also the Cause of all the moral Good of all Actions I must open to you more distinctly in the third part. But of the sinful morality of Actions he is not such a Cause; but only a meer Universal as aforesaid.
- *Bellarmin's Universal Cause, seemeth the same wi•• what Durandus meaneth. And Pennottus denying Durandus's opinion, saith, l. 4. c. 16. p. 212. Non quod evidenter sequatur ex hac opinione dari duo prima rerum principia: Multi enim Philosophi, ut Plato, Aristot. •gnoverunt unum primum principium omnium, & tamen non agnoverunt istud primum principium esa causam immediatam omnium esse•luum Causarum sec•ndarum.Bellarmin's Universal Cause, seemeth the same wi•• what Durandus meaneth. And Pennottus denying Durandus's opinion, saith, l. 4. c. 16. p. 212. Non quod evidenter sequatur ex hac opinione dari duo prima rerum principia: Multi enim Philosophi, ut Plato, Aristot. •gnoverunt unum primum principium omnium, & tamen non agnoverunt istud primum principium ess• causam immediatam omnium esse•luum Causarum sec•ndarum.