Richard Baxter's Catholic theology plain, pure, peaceable, for pacification of the dogmatical word-warriors who,…Richard Baxter's Catholick theologie plain, pure, peaceable, for pacification of the dogmatical word-warriours who,…

408. The order therefore of Gods Decrees in respect of the Execution is on•y fit for our debate: (Any farther than that we may moreover say that Gods will or Himself is all his ultimate end, and his Glory shining in the perfection of his entire works is the perfect means.) And there is nothing else that we can reasonably controvert. And about this our Controversy is next to none at all. Here we may well enquire what is prius vel posterius, quid superius, quid inferius, &c. and that to our edification.

408. The order therefore of Gods Decrees in respect of the Execution is on•y fit for our debate: (Any farther than that we may moreover say that Gods will or Himself is all his ultimate end, and his Glory shining in the perfection of his intire works is the perfect means.) And there is nothing else that we can reasonably controvert. And about this our Controversie is next to none at all. Here we may well enquire what is prius vel posterius, quid superius, quid inferius, &c. and that to our edification.

409. Seeing then that we are agreed (as is said) with Aquinas that ^*Deus non propter hoc vult hoc, sed vult hoc esse propter hoc, that which ⟨p. 63⟩we have to do is but to enquire, 1. De re, how one thing is a Cause or other means of another; 2. And so how God Decreed it to work and be.

1. *Ruiz de Vo••n. Dei disp. 15. §. 4. p. 163. prettily argueth that Si non potest dari ratio ipsius •olitionis divinae, sed solius denominations extrinse•ae resultants ab elis creat, sequitur anas esse plurima Thoogorum de ordine, dependtia vel ratione divium volitionum, post quam inter illos constat quem ordinem, dependentiam vl rationm habeant externa objecta inter se. The conscquent is true. They are vain indeed, though he deny it. And all his reasons p. 161, 162, &c. to prove that dantur i creata rations finales moventes divinam voluntatem, are but triflings with the ambiguities of the word Ratio and abuses of the word Causa, having before confessed that there is no Real Cause. And are there Causes that are not Real? 1. We grant the Creature is an Object of Gods will: and the object is b some called the material cause of the act in numero. 2. It is the Terminus and Recipient of the divine influx. 3. It may therefore e causa materials of the diversity of the effects of Gods influx as Received in patiente ex diersitate dispositions. 4. Our acts may be the effects of Gods Volitions. 5. And may be second Causes of other effects. 6. Those other effects may be said to be Gods nearer ends, speaking of him after the manner of imperfect man. 7. Where our acts are not causes, they may be conditions sine quibus non, of many of Gods acts quoad effectus, (as sin is of punishment at least.) 8. In all these respects Gods Volition which is One in itself, may and must be denominated divers from the diversity of these effects and objects, which therefore are the Ratio nomin: And he that would prove any other Ratio or Cause of the first Cause, the will of God or any of his acts as in himself, must first renounce all natural and Scholastical Theology at least. He citeth Durand. Major, Richardus, &c. But Durandus 1. d. 41. q. 1. doth but say that Gods Acts are thus to be reckoned secundum rationem, as likening Gods reasoning or thoughts to ours, (ut. n. 7.) and not uxta rei veritatem. Richard. is full for what I say; 1. d. 45. Voluntas sive volens de Deo secundum essentiam dicitur: non est aliud Velle, aliud Esse: But yet his Velle hoc speaketh not his esse quà esse; and therefore he addeth that when God is said scire aut veil, it is his Essence; but to say, Hoc aut illud scit aut vult is but to say, Hoc aut illud est subjectum scientiae vel voluntatis quae ipse Deus est. Et Voluntas Dei est prima & summa Causa omnium; cujus Causa non est quaerenda; & non est diversa Voluntas, sed diversa locutio de ea in Scripturis. And Richardus in loc. p. 141. saith but this, that Ipsius divini Velle nulla est ratio motiva, cum realiter idem sit quod Deus: Tamen Ordinationis quae est inter divinum velle & ipsum volitum bene est ratio aliqua respectu alicujus voliti. Which is no more than I have said. And as to Major, Ruiz did ill to cite him, who there professeth that Predestination and Volition is but Relatio rationis & denominatio extrinseca as to God. And his ordo signorum in meant divina is but the Scotists assimilating Gods acts to mans.