A26974:695
Of justification four disputations clearing and amicably defending the truth against the unnecessary oppositions…
Of justification four disputations clearing and amicably defending the truth against the unnecessary oppositions of divers learned and reverend brethren / by Richard Baxter ...
London: printed by R.W. for Nevil Simmons, 1658
Modern spelling is a reading aid: the words are the author’s, only the spelling is modernized. Original shows the page as printed, with the transcription marks.
And so to Believe, is not agere, but pati or recipere? 3. Whether faith be passive in its Instrumentality? 4. Whether the same may not be said as truly of other Graces? 5. Whether Faith be any proper Instrument of our Justification? 6. If it were, Whether that be the primary, formal Reason of its justifying virtue? 7. Whether your Opinion or mine be the plainer or safer? And for the first, I should not think it worth the looking after, but that I perceive you lay much upon it, and that Philosophers generally suppose that the Sense and Intellect in this are alike; and for ought I discern, it is such a Passiveness of the Intellect that you intend: and therefore we may put all together, and enquire whether videre & intelligere be only Passions? And here you know how ill Philosophers are agreed among themselves, and therefore how slippery a ground this is for a man to build his Faith upon in so high point as this in hand: you know also that Hippocrates, Galen, Plato, Plotinus, with the generality of the Platonists are directly contrary to you: you know also that Albertus Magnus, and his followers judge sensation to be an action, though they take the potentia to be passive. You know also that Aquinas with his followers judge the very potentia to be active as well as passive; passive while it receiveth the species; and active, Dumb per ipsam agit & sensationem producit. And Tolet saith, that this is Scotus his sentence, 2. de Anima. q. 12. & Capreol. & ferè communis. I know Aquinas saith, that intelligere est quoddam pati; but he taketh pati in his third wide improper sense, as omne qu d exit de potentia in actum, potest dici pati: 1. q. 79 a. 2. C. And no doubt every second cause may be said to suffer even in its acting, as it receiveth the Influx from the first, which causeth it to act; but it will not thence follow that the [Greek or Hebrew] videre, intelligere est for maliter pati: ⟨p. 195⟩I cannot think that you deny the intellectum agentem: and you know that generally Philosophers attribute Action to the possible Intellect: and that Jandun. Apollina, &c. do accordingly make an Agent and patient sense: and if the reception of the species were formaliter visio & intellectio (which I believe not) yet how hardly is it proved that the Organ and Intellect are only passive in that reception?
And so to Believe, is not agere, but pati or recipere? 3. Whether faith be passive in its Instrumentality? 4. Whether the same may not be said as truly of other Graces? 5. Whether Faith be any proper Instrument of our Justification? 6. If it were, Whether that be the primary, formal Reason of its justifying vertue? 7. Whether your Opinion or mine be the plainer or safer? And for the first, I should not think it worth the looking after, but that I perceive you lay much upon it, and that Philosophers generally suppose that the Sence and Intellect in this are alike; and for ought I discern, it is such a Passiveness of the Intellect that you intend: and therefore we may put all together, and enquire whether videre & intelligere be only Passions? And here you know how ill Philosophers are agreed among themselves, and therefore how slippery a ground this is for a man to build his Faith upon in so high point as this in hand: you know also that Hippocrates, Galen, Plato, Plotinus, with the generality of the Platonists are directly contrary to you: you know also that Albertus Magnus, and his followers judge sensation to be an action, though they take the potentia to be passive. You know also that Aquinas with his followers judge the very potentia to be active as well as passive; passive while it receiveth the species; and active, Dum per ipsam agit & sensationem producit. And Tolet saith, that this is Scotus his sentence, 2. de Anima. q. 12. & Capreol. & ferè communis. I know Aquinas saith, that intelligere est quoddam pati; but he taketh pati in his third wide improper sense, as omne qu d exit de potentia in actum, potest dici pati: 1. q. 79 a. 2. C. And no doubt every second cause may be said to suffer even in its acting, as it receiveth the Influx from the first, which causeth it to act; but it will not thence follow that the videre, intelligere est for maliter pati: