Of justification four disputations clearing and amicably defending the truth against the unnecessary oppositions…

And yet more hardly do I believe it when I feel quanto labour & conatu I must see to read a small print, or discern a thing afar off: but above all when I feel the labour of my studies, I hardly believe that my understanding is not active; though I easily believe that I am also too passive. Why do I not understand with every dull thought? To believe also that every stone is still active, and that the eye and Intellect of the living Creature is but passive, is hard to me; because me thinks Action better agreeth to the living, then the inanimate. And yet the less do I assent when I observe what stress they lay upon the similitude of a looking-glass receiving the species, which I am very confident it did never receive, when I see it moving as my eye moveth, and withdrawing when I withdraw, (though the Object be any stone or other immovable thing) I judge that when I am gone, the glass receiveth no more species from the wall, then the wall from the glass; nor that the water receives any more species of the Moon that there appears, then the earth doth; but that all is in mine eyes by the help of that reflection. I doubt not but you have read D'Orbellis arguments, (Dist. 3. in 1. sent. par. 3. q. 2.) against both extremes in point of intellection: Against yours his reasons seem to me strong: Quia effectus aequivocus non potest excellere in perfection causam aequivocam totalem sed deficit necessario ab ea; sed intellectio esset effectus aequivocus speciei intelligibilis, si ab easola causaretur, & ita esset simpliciter imperfectior specie intelligibili, quod non est verum. Tum etiam quia tunc non posset salvari imago in mente, ut mens est: quia nihil ipsius mentis haberet rationem parentis. Item quomodo causarentur relationes rationis, sive intentiones logicae, quae sunt in actu collativo? cum illa intentio dicatur realis quae causatur im̄ediate à re vel specie representante rem in se. Even des Cartes his Doctrine of vibration seemeth to make the sensation and intellection to be formally Action, though the Organ must first be passive to the producing it, before it be ⟨p. 197⟩Active. Zabarel, Combacchius, &c. say that in sensation there is first a receiving the species. 2. A judging, &c. The first by the Organ which is passive, and the later (which is the very sensation by the sensitive soul, which is active.

And yet more hardly do I believe it when I feel quanto labore & conatu I must see to read a small print, or discern a thing afar off: but above all when I feel the labor of my studies, I hardly believe that my understanding is not active; though I easily believe that I am also too passive. Why do I not understand with every dull thought? To believe also that every stone is still active, and that the eye and Intellect of the living Creature is but passive, is hard to me; because me thinks Action better agreeth to the living, then the inanimate. And yet the less do I assent when I observe what stress they lay upon the similitude of a looking-glass receiving the species, which I am very confident it did never receive, when I see it moving as my eye moveth, and withdrawing when I withdraw, (though the Object be any stone or other immovable thing) I judge that when I am gone, the glass receiveth no more species from the wall, then the wall from the glass; nor that the water receives any more species of the Moon that there appears, then the earth doth; but that all is in mine eyes by the help of that reflection. I doubt not but you have read D'Orbellis arguments, (Dist. 3. in 1. sent. par. 3. q. 2.) against both extreams in point of intellection: Against yours his reasons seem to me strong: Quia effectus aequivocus non potest excellere in perfectione causam aequivocam totalem sed deficit necessario ab ea; sed intellectio esset effectus aequivocus speciei intelligibilis, si ab easola causaretur, & ita esset simpliciter imperfectior specie intelligibili, quod non est verum. Tum etiam quia tunc non posset salvari imago in mente, ut mens est: quia nihil ipsius mentis haberet rationem parentis. Item quomodo causarentur relationes rationis, sive intentiones logicae, quae sunt in actu collativo? cum illa intentio dicatur realis quae causatur im̄ediate à re vel specie representante rem in se. Even des Cartes his Doctrine of vibration seemeth to make the sensation and intellection to be formally Action, though the Organ must first be passive to the producing it, before it be