Of justification four disputations clearing and amicably defending the truth against the unnecessary oppositions…

As all our Divines say, his being in the body of Mary would not have justified her: Nor did the kissing of his lips justify Judas; nor eating and drinking in his presence justify those that must depart from him for working iniquity, Matthew 7. If we had so known Christ, we should know him no more: It was necessary to his Disciples that he should go from them; we must not have the Capernaites conceit of eating his flesh. Yea, to talk of a physical receiving by faith, is far grosser: For the mouth was capable of that physical contact, which faith is not. 3. And then this will not stand with their Judgement, that blame me for making Christ himself the object of justifying faith, and not the promise directly. 2. If you say that the thing received is Christs righteousness, (as most do that I read) I answer, 1. Righteousness is but a relation: And therefore a thing which is naturally uncapable of being of it self physically apprehended. This is past doubt. 2. If it be physically received, then either as a principle and quality, or as an object. Not the former: For so we receive our first, (and after) grace in sanctification; but none ever said so in justification: Nor indeed can that righteousness which is formally but a relation, dwell in us as a principle or quality▪ If we receive it as an object, then by an Act: Or if the soul were granted to be passive in reception of an object, I have showed that, 1. It is but in apprehension ⟨p. 210⟩simplici: None pleadeth for more: But faith is not such. 2. And so it would receive Christ no otherways then it receiveth any object whatsoever it thus apprehendeth. 3. And this is not to receive Christ or his righteousness, but the mere species of it according to your own Philosophers, (and if righteousness be but a relation; and a relation, as Durandus, Dr. Twiss, and many another thin be but Ens Rationis, then the species of an Ens Rationis is a very curious Web) Knowledge (as D'Orbellis saith in 2. sent. Dis. 3. q. 3.) is twofold, i. e. sensitive and intellective; and each of these twofold, Intuitive and Abstractive. Intuitive knowledge is indeed de objecto ut in se praesens; quando scilicet res in propria existentia est per se motiva: Exemplum de sensitiva est, ut visus videt colorem: (yet this is but Recepiendo speciem, non rem) and this is not it in question): Exemplum de intellectiva est, ut visio Divinae essentiae à beatis: